```html IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS CRIMINAL SIDE INDICTMENT No. 114/12 REGINA v. TAREEK RICARDO RICKETTS Appearances： Ms. Cheryll Richards Q.C. and Ms. Elisabeth Less for the Crown Mr. John Ryder Q.C. and Ms. Prathna Bodden for the Defendant Before： Justice Alexander Henderson Q.C. Hearing： 18th January 2017 Delivery of Decision： 7th February 2017 HEADNOTE Criminal Law Sentence Mandatory life sentence Minimum term Conditional Release Firearm Exceptional in nature Aggravating circumstance Extenuating circumstance Arbitrary and disproportionate legitimate expectation of release. JUDGMENT ```
```html 1. John Tareek Ricketts was convicted of murder (and the related offence of possession of 2 an unlicensed firearm) by a jury on August 17， 2013 and sentenced to imprisonment 3 for life. In light of a change in the law, the sentencing hearing must now be 4 supplemented with this judgment. 5 6 7 LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 8 The only sentence for murder in the Cayman Islands has been, and still is, one of 9 imprisonment for life. Until recently, this was a “whole life” sentence； the offender had 10 no prospect of ever being released. That position has changed as a result of decisions 11 such as Vinter & others v UK1. While an offender convicted of murder has no 12 entitlement to be released at any time, he now has an entitlement to be considered for 13 release after a certain number of years have passed. I will refer to the period of time 14 that must elapse before release as the “minimum term”. The hearing I have conducted 15 was for the purpose of fixing the minimum term for Mr. Ricketts. 16 17 The new minimum term legislation is contained in the Conditional Release Law, 2014 18 (“the Law”)， which received the assent of the Governor on November 20， 2014 and 19 came into force on February 15， 2016； and in the Conditional Release of Prisoners 20 Regulations， 2016 (“the Regulations”). Both apply to all prisoners regardless of when 21 they were convicted or sentenced： Law， s.3(1). 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427</td
The Law provides for the first time that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall be eligible "to be considered for conditional release on licence" after serving a minimum term of incarceration: Law, s. 7(1)(a). Going forward, that minimum term is to be set by the trial judge at the time of sentencing. For each of those who were sentenced before the Law came into effect, minimum terms must now be set. In both circumstances, the applicable principles are the same. The minimum term must be the period of time that the Court considers "appropriate to satisfy requirements of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation": Law, s. 14(1). The Court must assess the circumstances as if it were sentencing an accused who has just been convicted: Law, s. 23(1). Evidence of the offender's behavior in prison after the date of the original sentencing is not admissible: Law, s. 23(4). When setting a minimum term for an offender who was sentenced before the inception of the new legislation, the Court must consider only those matters that were or could have been put before it at the original sentencing; events that occurred afterwards are of no relevance. When a life sentence is imposed for murder, the Law contains a clear expression of the intent and expectation of the Legislative Assembly: the minimum term "shall" be 30 years unless there are "extenuating" or "aggravating" circumstances that are "exceptional in nature": Law, s. 41(1). The former, of course, will tend to justify a lower minimum term than 30 years while the latter will support an increase. Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 3 of 22
The Regulations contain a schedule – Schedule 12 (and see regulation 14) – that elaborates upon what may be taken into consideration. Section 2(1) of Schedule 12 states that “Detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances may result in a minimum term of any length.” There are specific rules for previous convictions and murders committed while on bail and lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that “may be relevant to the offence of murder” in subsections 2(2) and 2(3) of Schedule 12. The following aggravating circumstances may be relevant: (a) a significant degree of planning or premeditation; (b) the fact that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or disability; (c) mental or physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death; (d) the abuse of a position of trust; (e) the use of duress or threats against another person to facilitate the commission of the offence; (f) the fact that the victim was providing a public service or performing a public duty; (g) concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body; (h) previous convictions; (i) abduction and sexual or sadistic conduct; and (j) any other circumstances which may be considered relevant. Extenuating circumstances include: (a) an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill; (b) lack of premeditation; (c) the fact that the offender suffered from any mental disorder or mental disability which (although not falling within section 185(1) of the Penal Code (2013 Revision)), lowered the offender’s degree of culpability; (d) the fact that the offender was provoked (for example, by prolonged stress); (e) the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence or in fear of violence; (f) a belief by the offender that the murder was necessary in the circumstances; (g) the fact that the offender acted in mercy; (h) any other circumstances which may be considered relevant. Judgment: R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 4 of 22
```html 1 9. In all cases, aggravating or extenuating circumstances cannot have an effect on 2 the decision unless they are, individually or in combination, “exceptional in 3 nature”；regulation 1(3)，reiterating a provision in s. 14(1) of the Law. I will 4 return to this subject below. 5 6 10. When deciding whether one or more aggravating circumstances are present， 7 the standard of proof is the same as that applied by the jury in reaching their 8 verdict. Before a circumstance can be viewed as aggravating，the Court must 9 be sure of its existence；the evidence must establish that beyond a reasonable 10 doubt. That is the effect of the decision of the UK Court of Appeal in R v 11 Davies2 (in relation to the fixing of a minimum term) and of the decision of 12 Quin，J in R v Ramoon & Douglas3. The rule is a salutary one，providing 13 significant protection to a defendant. 14 15 11. The Governor of the Cayman Islands has had the authority to release a prisoner 16 serving a life sentence on licence under s.31A of the Prison Law，1975. Six 17 such prisoners have been released. The periods of imprisonment they served 18 before release range from 22 to 29 years；the average is 26 years 4 months. 19 The Governor's jurisdiction to release has now passed to the Conditional 20 Release Board. 21 2 [2008] EWCA Crim 1055；[2009] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 15 3 Indictment 53/2015，(unreported) December 19，2016 Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram：Henderson J. Date：07.02.2017 Page 5 of 22 ```
```html 12. One class of prisoner serving life for murder is exempted from the new minimum term requirement - those who have “applied for” release under s.31A of the Prison Law, 1975：regulation 15(1). There are two prisoners who have applied for but not yet obtained a release on licence. Because of the express wording of regulation 15(1)，no minimum term can be set for these prisoners at this time. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 13. At a case management conference I expressed some uncertainty about possible constitutional ramifications arising from the change in the law. The subsequent declaration by the Legislative Assembly that a minimum term of 30 years shall be the norm might be seen as a retroactive increase in the penalty. Section 8(1) of the Cayman Islands Constitution Order，2009 (the “Bill of Rights”) prohibits the imposition of a “heavier penalty” than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed. Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights contains a similar provision. 14. Ms. Richards，QC and Mr. Ryder，QC are in agreement that a change in the law regarding release on licence does not amount to a heavier penalty within the meaning of s.8(1)；it is，rather，a change in the manner of execution or enforcement of the sentence. The penalty remains imprisonment for life. Thus， it card that the Laulations infringe the human rights of prisoners sentenced before the law came into effect. Judgment. Rv. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram：Henderson J. Date：07.02.2017 Page 6 of 22
I am indebted to counsel on both sides for their insightful assistance. Having reviewed the authorities, I am in agreement with them. I draw my conclusion from the decisions in Uttley v Secretary of State for the Home Department⁴; Kafkaris v Cyprus⁵; Robinson v Secretary of State for Justice⁶; Del Rio Prada v Spain⁷; and The Queen on the application of Abedin v Secretary of State for Justice⁸.
The Defendant also accepts, on the authority of Vinter v UK⁹; Kafkaris¹⁰; and R (Wellington) v Secretary of State¹¹ that the possibility of release under the Law and the Regulations means that a mandatory life sentence for murder is not, for that reason alone, “grossly disproportionate” in a manner that infringes section 3 of the Bill of Rights. Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 7 of 22 --- ⁴ [20078 (HL)] ⁵ [20025 (ECHR)] ⁶ [20051 (QBD)] ⁷ [20051 (QBD)] ⁸ [2015] EWHC 782 (QBD) ⁹ EWHC 22 ¹⁰ [2004] 58 EHR R ¹¹ [2008] UKHL 72; [2009] 1 AC 335 (HL)
```html 1 EXCEPTIONAL IN NATURE 2 3 17. Any deviation from the 30-year norm must be exceptional in nature. For this 4 reason, I consider the word “norm” to be a more accurate characterization than 5 the more common “starting point”, a phrase used routinely in sentencing 6 decisions. 7 8 18. The phrase “exceptional in nature” has not been the subject of judicial 9 commentary but is equivalent to one -“exceptional circumstances”- that has 10 been the subject of judicial construction and comment on several occasions in 11 a variety of contexts. Some assistance can be derived from these decisions 12 provided always that the context and underlying policy rationale of the 13 legislation in question (which may differ markedly from our minimum term 14 provisions) is kept firmly in mind. 15 16 19. In sentencing an offender for a theft from an employer that amounts to a 17 breach of trust, a term of imprisonment is to be imposed unless the court finds 18 that there are exceptional circumstances. In Rv Scott & Fyne12, the Cayman 19 Islands Court of Appeal addressed (at para.13) the meaning of the phrase in 20 that context by quoting with approval what Lord Bingham said in Rv Kelly13: 21 22 23 122007CILR 175 13[2000] QB 198 Judgment. Rv. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 8 of 22 ```
```html 1 ‘We must construe ‘exceptional’ as an ordinary, familiar English 2 adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is 3 such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or 4 unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need 5 not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is 6 regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. To relieve the court of its 7 duty to impose a life sentence under section 2(2), however, circumstances 8 must not only be exceptional but such as, in the opinion of the court, 9 justify it in not imposing a life sentence, and in forming that opinion the court 10 must have regard to the purpose of Parliament in enacting the section ...’ 11 12 Lord Bingham’s definition was proposed in a case concerned with the 13 imposition of a life sentence upon repeat offenders under section 2 of the UK 14 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. The definition was quoted and applied in a 15 decision involving a mandatory life sentence in R v Offen & others14 and has 16 been followed in other UK cases (ibid.) In Ramoon15, Quin, J relied on Lord 17 Bingham’s definition and I adopt it here. 18 20. Section 39(2) of the Firearms Law (2006 Revision) provides that the court 20 must impose a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence for possession of an 21 unlicensed firearm unless there are exceptional circumstances. In Bowen v R16 22 our Court of Appeal observed (at para. 13) that the effect of the phrase in that 23 context is “not to give a court an unfettered discretion to impose a sentence of 24 less than 10 years whenever it thinks fit”. The Court adopted the decision in R 25 v Rehman (Zakir)17 that the circumstances are exceptional if the mandatory 26 minimum “would result in an arbitrary and disproportionate sentence”. ```
```html 1 In Attorney General's Reference (No. 51 of 2013)18 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) reviewed Rehman and other "exceptional circumstance" cases and said that such cases will be "rare". The Court quoted the "arbitrary and disproportionate" yardstick with approval. Assessment of that question, the Court said, requires a "holistic approach". This was also a firearms case. 21. I consider the "arbitrary and disproportionate" formulation to apply equally to the setting of a minimum term. Assessment of whether the circumstances, taken as a whole, are exceptional is the first part of the analysis. If they are not, the 30-year minimum term must be imposed. If they are exceptional, the second stage requires an assessment of whether, in light of the exceptional circumstances that have been found to exist, imposition of the 30-year minimum term would be arbitrary and disproportionate. 22. A theme that runs through several of the authorities is the need to bear firmly in mind the intention of Parliament manifested in the legislation. It is at the second stage that the intention of Parliament must be taken into account; the underlying policy rationale for the legislation will necessarily influence the result. This two-stage approach emerges most clearly from the decisions in Offen19, and R v Buckland20 (a mandatory life sentence case). 18 [2013] EWCA Crim 1927; [2014] 1 Cr. App. Rep. (S.) 83 19 supra 20 [2000] 2 Cr. App. Rep. (S.) 217 (CA) Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 10 of 22 ```
```html 1 23. From time to time the UK courts have warned that the phrase “exceptional 2 circumstances” should not be given so broad a construction as to dilute or 3 remove the deterrent effect assumed to arise from mandatory minimum 4 sentences and terms. Such provisions are measures for the reduction of crime 5 and represent a reasoned policy choice of Parliament. The intent of Parliament 6 will be frustrated if sentencing judges are moved by sympathy to avoid their 7 statutory duty. In this respect see Attorney General’s Reference (No. 115 of 8 2015)21; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 23 of 2009)22; and Offen23. 9 10 24. There are two recent decisions of this Court that are instructive on the meaning 11 of circumstances that are exceptional in nature. 12 13 25. In R. v Butler24, Malcolm, J (Actg.) set the minimum term for a mother 14 convicted of the murder of her 6-year-old daughter and, in doing so, took 15 several aggravating and extenuating circumstances into account. He began by 16 observing that some of the factors listed in the Schedule cannot be viewed in 17 isolation as exceptional in nature, a view with which I agree. He then observed 18 that both lists of factors conclude by saying that the Court may take into 19 account “any other circumstances which may be considered relevant”. The 20 inclusion of this broad invitation to treat any relevant circumstance as 21 aggravating or extenuating suggests that the other listed factors are no more than suggestions of nt elements 22 legislative su possibly rel 23 [2016] EWCA Crim 765; [2016] 2 Cr. App. Rep. (S.) 23 at para. 18 (CA, Crim Div) [2009] EWCA Crim 1683; [2010] 2 Cr. App. Rep. (S.) 70 at para. 12 (CA, Crim Div) supra 24 Indictment 102/2014 (unreported) May 6, 2016 Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 11 of 22 ```
```html 1 26. Malcolm， J (Actg.) found the Defendant to have been suffering from a 2 paranoid personality disorder with traits of narcissistic personality disorder. He 3 accepted that as a substantial extenuating circumstance and reduced the term of 4 30 years by six years as a consequence. Balanced against that were several 5 aggravating circumstances that, collectively, resulted in an increase of four 6 years: abuse of a position of trust (the daughter was in her 7 mother's sole care at the time of the killing)， the infliction of mental or 8 physical suffering upon the victim (the attack was prolonged， the child 9 suffering 35 stab wounds)， the particular vulnerability of the victim (she was 10 only six)， and the resulting harm to the husband who lost his daughter. The 11 ultimate result was a minimum term of imprisonment for 28 years. 12 13 27. In R v Ramoon & Douglas25， Quin， J held that several factors， considered 14 collectively， amounted to aggravating circumstances that were exceptional in 15 nature. These included the use of an unlicensed firearm， a "significant" degree 16 of planning and premeditation resulting in a killing "with clinical precision" 17 and in public， and an unsuccessful attempt to kill a witness to the shooting. 18 Together， these factors resulted in an uplift of four years. A fifth year was 19 added to Mr. Ramoon's minimum term because he had a previous conviction 20 for possession of an imitation firearm. 21 22 23 24 25 supra Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram： Henderson J. Date： 07.02.2017 Page 12 of 22 ```
```html 1 28. In summary, I draw the following points from the authorities cited to me: 2 a. the first step in a two-stage analysis is to decide whether there are 3 circumstances that are exceptional in nature; 4 b. to be “exceptional”, the circumstances must be unusual or uncommon 5 although they need not be unprecedented or very rare; 6 c. the assessment should be holistic, taking all of the circumstances into 7 account; 8 d. the second step is to decide whether, in light of any exceptional 9 circumstances that are found to exist, a minimum term of 30 years 10 would be arbitrary and disproportionate; 11 e. the intent behind the legislation, which here must be the protection of 12 the public, should be kept firmly in mind; and 13 f. in the absence of circumstances that are truly exceptional in nature, the 14 Court has no discretion to depart from the 30-year norm. Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 13 of 22 ```
```html 1 FACTS 2 29. Jackson Rainford died from two gunshot wounds suffered around 10：30 p.m. 3 on December 16， 2012 while sitting in the front passenger seat of a car outside 4 455 Shedden Road in George Town， Grand Cayman. It was conceded that he 5 was murdered. The only issue at trial was the identity of his killer. The 6 Defendant's case was that he was elsewhere at the time. 7 8 30. Terina Tomlinson testified that she had a romantic relationship with Mr. 9 Ricketts for several years； they lived together for two years. Mr. Ricketts is the 10 father of two of her children. They separated about nine or ten months before 11 the shooting but continued to see each other. The Crown's case was that Mr. 12 Ricketts continued to feel a romantic attraction to Ms. Tomlinson， despite the 13 fact that he had entered into a new relationship with another woman， and was 14 motivated by jealousy to shoot Mr. Rainford. 15 16 31. Shortly before the shooting Ms. Tomlinson met Mr. Rainford. On December 17 14， two days before the murder， Mr. Ricketts became aware that his former 18 partner was associating with Mr. Rainford. In fact， Ms. Tomlinson spent that 19 night with him. 20 21 32. On the day of the shooting Ms. Tomlinson told Mr. Ricketts that she was going 22 to the beach with Mr. Rainford and taking the children with her. That angered 23 Ricketts. Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram： Henderson J. Date ： 07.02.2017 Page 14 of 22 ```
```html 1 33. After the visit to the beach, Ms. Tomlinson went with Mr. Rainford to his 2 house. Mr. Ricketts called her there and said he wanted to see the children. She 3 said he could do so the following morning. 4 5 34. Shortly afterwards, Ms. Tomlinson, the children, Mr. Rainford and his brother 6 drove to her home at 455 Shedden Road. Ms. Tomlinson said she saw Mr. 7 Ricketts waiting there, and he seemed upset. She went into her house quickly 8 with the children. Mr. Rainford and his brother drove off but returned just five 9 minutes later. 10 11 35. At this point Mr. Ricketts, wearing a hoody to partially conceal his face, 12 approached the car and fired several shots from an unlicensed handgun at Mr. 13 Rainford, who expired soon after. 14 15 36. In addition to killing Mr. Rainford, there was some evidence to suggest that 16 Mr. Ricketts fired one shot at Mr. Rainford’s brother but missed. 17 18 37. The main identification of Mr. Ricketts was by the evidence of the deceased’s 19 brother; Ms. Tomlinson’s identification evidence was flawed and unreliable. 20 Cell phone records and CCTV video placed Mr. Ricketts near the scene of the 21 shooting at the material time. The Defendant testified to an alibi but this was 22 rejected by the jury. 23 Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 15 of 22 ```
```html 1 ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTIONAL? 38. The Crown says that the use of an unlicensed firearm is an aggravating 39. It could hardly be said that the use of an unlicensed firearm, in and of itself, is 40. However, as I have sought to explain above, it is the circumstances as a whole 41. In Ramoon & Douglas26，Quin，J was satisfied that the use of an unlicensed 23 ay that any urm is an excound that 24 ombination of nces，inclati 25 the firearm was used，were exceptional. 26 supra Judgment. Rv. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram：Henderson J. Date：07.02.2017 Page 16 of 22 ```
The circumstances in the case at bar are not comparable. We do not know the degree to which Mr. Ricketts planned the killing of Mr. Rainford, only that it was intentional. The crime was not committed in a sophisticated manner: although Mr. Ricketts made a feeble effort to disguise his face, he was recognized readily. The police experienced little difficulty in following the route of his escape on CCTV footage. There was a bit of evidence suggesting that Mr. Ricketts also fired a shot at the victim’s brother. I have reviewed that evidence and find it inconclusive and unreliable. The witness was running away from the scene when the shot was fired. He had his back to Mr. Ricketts and was in no position to say with certainty that the Defendant was firing at him. In short, the proven circumstances concerning the use of a firearm are not out of the ordinary in the Cayman Islands and cannot therefore be treated as aggravating. The Defendant says that a combination of his age, apparent lack of maturity, and jealousy of the victim amount to an exceptional circumstance that should be viewed as extenuating. A separate submission, that he has a legitimate expectation that amounts to an extenuating circumstance, will be considered below. On the subject of age as a mitigating factor, see R v Peters & Others\footnote{[2005] EWCA Crim 605; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 101 (CA)}. Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 17 of 22
```html 1 46. Mr. Ricketts was 21 years of age when he killed Mr. Rainford. He gave 2 evidence at trial to assert an alibi. There was nothing about his evidence or 3 demeanour that suggested a level of maturity different from that of a typical 4 man of his age. He is the father of two of Ms. Tomlinson’s children and seems 5 to have been active in caring for them, including taking them to school. He 6 obviously cared for them, and it hurt him to see another man apparently 7 usurping his role as their father. 8 9 47. The Crown’s case was that Mr. Ricketts was motivated by jealousy, which I 10 accept. Mr. Ricketts learned two days before the shooting that Ms. Tomlinson 11 was associating with Mr. Rainford. Whatever emotions that stirred in him, 12 they had 48 hours in which to dissipate. There was a fresh provocation, if I can 13 call it that, in the afternoon of the day of the shooting when Ms. Tomlinson 14 revealed to Mr. Ricketts that she was going to the beach with Mr. Rainford. 15 Again, there was more than enough time (a period of several hours) for Mr. 16 Ricketts to bring his emotions under control. He was also involved in a new 17 romantic relationship of his own (with, as it happened, the wife of the 18 deceased), a circumstance that would tend to blunt his feelings of jealousy. 19 20 48. After anxious consideration, I am not able to characterize these factors as 21 exceptional in nature. A consideration of his age, his maturity level, and his 22 justified feelings of jealousy do not suggest to me that the circumstances are 23 unusual or uncond, in cases ler, these 24 rs are comm 25 26 Judgment. Rv. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram: Henderson J. Date: 07.02.2017 Page 18 of 22 ```
```html 1 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 2 3 49. The Defendant says that he has a legitimate expectation of being allowed to 4 apply for conditional release and of being released on licence after having 5 served significantly less than 30 years and that this is an extenuating 6 circumstance that is exceptional. The expectation arises from the Governor's 7 recent practice of releasing prisoners serving life sentences after an average 8 incarceration of about 26 years. 9 10 50. In O'Reilly & others v Mackman & others28, the House of Lords recognized 11 the possibility (at AC，p. 275) that a prisoner might， based on his knowledge of 12 what is the general practice， acquire a legitimate expectation of release. In 13 Campbell & Fell v UK29， the European Court of Human Rights also 14 recognized the possibility in these remarks： 15 ... the practice of granting remission - whereby a prisoner will be set free 16 on the estimated date for release given to him at the outset of his sentence， 17 unless remission has been forfeited in disciplinary proceedings - creates 18 in him a legitimate expectation that he will recover his liberty before the 19 end of his term of imprisonment. Forfeiture of remission thus has the effect 20 of causing the detention to continue beyond the period corresponding to 21 that expectation. 22 23 51. The scope of a prisoner's legitimate expectation concerning the date of his release was 24 described by Lord Scarman in these words in Re Findlay30： ```
```html 1 But what was their legitimate expectation? Given the substance and 2 purpose of the legislative provisions governing parole, the most that a 3 convicted prisoner can legitimately expect is that his case will be 4 examined individually in the light of whatever policy the Secretary of State 5 sees fit to adopt provided always that the adopted policy is a lawful 6 exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by the statute. 7 8 9 Findlay was quoted and applied in Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department31. 10 11 12 Under the Law and Regulations, there is no closed list of circumstances that might be 13 considered relevant to a proposed reduction in the minimum term. I am satisfied that a 14 legitimate expectation of release before having served a term of 30 years could, where 15 the facts justify it, amount to an extenuating circumstance. But do the facts justify that 16 conclusion here? 17 18 According to the affidavit evidence of Debra Prendergast, the Secretary of the 19 Conditional Release Board (and former Secretary of the Parole Commissioner's 20 Board), the first prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence to be released on licence 21 was released on June 21， 2013. The offence by Mr. Ricketts was committed on 22 December 16， 2012. Thus， Mr. Ricketts could have had no expectation， legitimate or 23 otherwise， concerning possible release on the date he committed the offence. 24 25 Mr. Ricketts was convicted and sentenced on August 17， 2013. By that date， just one 26 prisoner had been released on licence and that occurred just two months earlier. I 27 cannot infer the presence of a legitimate expectation of release at the time of sentencing from t stance. 28 29 31[1997] 1WLR 906(CA) Judgment. Rv. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram： Henderson J. Date：07.02.2017 Page 20 of 22 ```
```html 1 55. Two further prisoners serving life imprisonment were released on licence in the first 2 half of 2014. The Law received second reading in the Legislative Assembly on 3 October 24， 2014 and would have received substantial media attention at that time， so 4 no legitimate expectation of release before 30 years had passed could arise after that 5 date. 6 56. Am I able to infer that Mr. Ricketts acquired a legitimate expectation of early release 7 from the fact that three prisoners serving life imprisonment were released in a period of 8 a little over one year? These facts do no more than suggest to me that Mr. Ricketts 9 may have entertained a hope of early release. The number of released prisoners is too 10 small and the time is too short to permit a reasonable conclusion that a new policy had 11 become entrenched and would necessarily be followed by successive governors， who 12 are replaced every three or four years. A pattern had not yet emerged. There is no 13 evidence that anyone in authority suggested to Mr. Ricketts that he would be released 14 at any particular point in time. The evidence is too insubstantial to justify a legitimate 15 expectation. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 GRAND COURT CAYMAN ISLANDS 23 24 Judgment. R v. Tareek Ricardo Ricketts. Coram： Henderson J. Date： 07.02.2017 Page 21 of 22 ```
```html CONCLUSION 57. For these reasons, I find that there are no extenuating or aggravating circumstances that are exceptional in nature. The result is that Mr. Ricketts must serve a term of imprisonment of 30 years before he shall be eligible for conditional release, and I so order. The 243 days served by Mr. Ricketts on remand are to be deducted from this term. Dated this the 7th day of February 2017 Henderson J. Justice Alexander Henderson Q.C. Judge of the Grand Court