Harre CJ
IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN
CAUSE NO. 245 OF 1995
BETWEEN:
- **HAROLD E. BROWN** - PLAINTIFF
- **GREEN THUMB NURSERY**
- **RAPHAELLENA**
- **BARCLAYS BANK PLC**
- **GODFREY DAWKINS**
- **STANLEY SCOTT** - FIFTH DEFENDANT
For the plaintiff:
- Mr. P. Broadhurst of Collins, Broadhurst & Furniss
For the 3rd defendant:
- Mr. A. Turner of W. S. Walker & Co.
For the 2nd and 5th defendants:
- Mr. S. Hellman of Paget-Brown, Quin & Hampson
HARRE C. J. - name
RULING
The summons claims a third defendant, Barclays Bank plc ("the Bank"), seeks, inter alia, that the following question of law may be determined, namely, whether the rectification of the Registers sought in certain made in the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim shall be or shall not be made as against the Third Defendant in the light of the provisions of Section 140 (2) of the Registered Land Law.
Section 140 (2) of the Registered Land Law (1995 Revision)
"(2) The register shall not be rectified so as to affect the title of a proprietor who is in possession or is in receipt of the rents or profits and acquired the land, lease or charge for valuable consideration, unless such proprietor had knowledge of the omission, fraud or mistake or substantially contributed to it by his act, neglect or default."
This is an application under Order 14A rule 1 of the Grand Court rules 1995, under which the Court may upon the application of a party or of its own motion determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings. It appears to the Court that such question is suitable for determination without a full trial of the action, and such determination will finally determine (subject only to any possible appeal) the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.
Matters of home complexity and importance were argued. That in itself does not render the procedure under Order 14A inappropriate. The comment power-identical English provision in the Supreme Court Practice 19 where "is" or "mat" Court is enabled under this Order in an appropriate case to exercise its summary jurisdiction not only within the time honoured practice of a "plain and obvious" case but also for the determination of the question of law which require prolonged and serious argument.
It is manifest that the determination sought will not determine the entire cause. There are allegations of fraud and
3
conspiracy and claims for rectification of the Land Register against
other defendants which will not be disposed of. A claim for damages
against all the defendants, including the Bank, is included in the
statement of claim, but no allegation of fraud or mistake has been
made against the Bank. So I am left to decide whether the present
question is suitable to be determined without a full trial of the
action, and whether its determination will finally determine any claim
or issue therein. An affirmative decision on the second of these
matters would in my judgment lead inevitably to the conclusion that
the present nlication is premature. The test which I should apply
is whether that apperary and material facts have been duly proved or
admitted, and the Court is not called upon to hear the evidence or
make its own findings of fact. The groundwork of the underlying
facts will me Col. have been prepared: See Note 14A/1-2/5 at page 181
of the Sup of Court Practice 1995.
his action is at
akiousl an early stage of pleading. I had before me only
the statement of the claim, although I was told that defences by
defendants to man the Bank had been filed earlier in the day, and
servd. (mcently no discovery has taken place. It is possible
that amendment to the pleadings will take place once that has
happened. I make a determination now on the assumption that none of
the relevant facts of fact knowledge neglect or default on the
part of the
scribe rs of fact knowledge neglect or default on the
part of the
can come to be in issue as the action unfolds would
be in my ju running the risk of taking the kind of treacherous
short cut a scit by Lord Scarman in Tilling v Whiteman (1980) AC.1
which can in re its price delay anxiety and expense. That was in
oben
idt ne. o
The application by the third defendant is premature. It does however raise an important point of law which may well be suitable for determination at a later stage without a full trial of the action. That stage in my view is after the close of pleadings and discovery, when all sc2 and will be identified. Accordingly, I order that paragraph 3 of the third defendant's summons be adjourned sine die with ent to restore, for hearing before me if possible so that the time o be far on the arguments of law need not be wasted, at that stage 1995.
With regard to paragraph 1 of the summons, the time for the Bank to serve its served. in this action is extended to close of business on 18th August.
Costs reserved.
G. E. Ha
Chief Justice
11th August 1995.