Levers J
```markdown # AMENDED COPY IN CHAMBERS ## IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS CAUSE NO: C16 of 2008 ### BETWEEN: - **STUART CAMERON CONOLLY** - **ANJANNTTE YSAGURRIE** - **SLOANE STUART CONOLLY** ### AND: - **CAYMAN ISLANDS HEALTH SERVICES AUTHORITY** - **CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY** ### Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Levers ### Appearances: - Ms Keva Reid and Mr. Norman Hill QC - Mr. Conolly present ### Heard: 1st July 2008 This is an application by Stuart Cameron Conolly and Anjanntte Ysagurrie as administrators in the Estate of Sloane Stuart Conolly (deceased), to extend the validity of the writ. The plaintiffs in this case are suing the Cayman Islands Health Services Authority and the Civil Aviation of the Cayman Islands. The application is supported by an affidavit of their administrator, Stuart Cameron Conolly. ```
The plaintiffs allege that the Health Services Authority were negligent in providing immediate attention to their son, the deceased, despite the obvious necessity to do so, in view of his worsening condition at the hospital. And it is further alleged it was at the hospital that he was injured, and the unavailability of expertise, and the refusal of the request for assistance of expertise, was negligent. The writ in this case was issued on the 11th January 2008, and was not served due to having to gather details of the various aspects of the claim. For example
The completion of an expert report from the University Hospital of the West Indies in the event that the report was not favourable and action should not be commenced.
To enable details to be gathered to draft a detailed and proper statement of claim.
That the principal parties in the action might renge on their promise to finalise their reports by a certain date.
To ensure that before serious allegations are made against the government institution, which is the main healthcare institution in a small jurisdiction like the Cayman Islands, the matter was investigated thoroughly.
The Law: The jurisdiction given to the Court to exercise its discretion to extend the validity of the writ, even though it has expired, is governed by Order 6 Rule 8. The validity of a writ usually lasts for four months. However, under Order 6 Rule 8 subsection 2 subject to paragraph 3: Where a writ has not been served on the defendant, the Court may, by Order extend the validity of the writ, from time to time, for such period not exceeding four months at any one time, beginning with the day following that on which it would otherwise expire as may be specified in the Order if an application for extension is made to the Court before that day or such later day if any, as the Court may allow. Subsection 3 has no bearing whatsoever on the question of an expired writ being extended and the discretion of the Court to do so. The plaintiffs rely on two cases, one of which is Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrak Ltd. and other Appeals The Myrto (No 3) [1987] 2 All ER page 289. In that case it was held that on the true construction of the Rules of the Supreme Court Order 6 Rule 8 (in the United Kingdom which were identical to those in this jurisdiction) the power to extend the validity of writ was not limited to exceptional circumstances but could be exercised if in the circumstances, and balancing the hardship to the plaintiff were an extension to be goodo so. on to be ere sed againstp to the def e an exteall refuthe hardshiedant, v d reason to nsi owed, th Where an application for an extension was made, and the writ had ceased to be valid, and the relevant limitation period had expired, the applicant was also required to give a
```html 1 satisfactory explanation of his failure to apply for an extension before the expiration of the 2 validity of the writ. It was also held that since there was good reason for allowing the 3 extension of the bank's writ to stand, namely the saving of unnecessary proceedings and 4 costs without prejudice to the respondents, the appeal would be allowed. 5 6 Jones v Jones and another 3 All ER [1970] page 47 is another case on which Mr Norman 7 Hill Q.C. for the plaintiffs relies. 8 The plaintiff solicitor in that case issued a writ against two defendants, which was validly 9 served on the first defendant. The solicitor reasonably, and without negligence but 10 mistakenly as the Court held, took the view that service of the writ on the first defendant 11 within twelve months of its issue enabled him to serve it on the second defendant after the 12 expiry of the twelve months. It was held in that case, there was good and sufficient reason 13 for extending the time for service of the writ on the second defendant because: 14 (a) The solicitor's error was not unreasonable in the circumstances, 15 consequently 16 (i) The plaintiff would have had no redress in negligence against his 17 solicitor, if the second defendant had in fact been held solely to blame for 18 the plaintiff's injury but could not be served and 19 (ii) The Court was entitled in exercising its discretion whether to 20 extend the validity of the writ, to balance the hardships to the plaintiff, 21 d have follovalidity of the 22 he writ not h 23 which would wed, had the been extend 24 against the 25 extension 26 which the sida ```
It is clear from all the authorities, in addition to those that I have researched, that this particular case comes not only as one in which there is good and sufficient reason, but that the case falls within the category of exceptional circumstances. This is a matter of public policy. The hospital is one which services ninety percent of the population of the Cayman Islands. The government makes that service a condition of contracts given to civil servants in these islands, all of whom are cared for by that institution (the George Town hospital). If in fact this is a case of negligence, and if in fact the plaintiffs’ claim is accurately alleged, then not only would the plaintiffs have been denied their right to litigation and suffered enormous hardship, if the claim is stuck out on a technicality, but the population of the islands, especially the civil service population, stands to suffer the same risk. In those circumstances I have no doubt in my mind that I must exercise my discretion in favour of the plaintiffs and grant the validity of the writ for a further four months. Costs in the cause. Levers J. Judge of the Grand Court DateJuly 2008