Pauline Ebanks (as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bruce Lee Ebanks, deceased) v Alexander Callan and The Attorney General - Reasons for Judgment

¶ ```markdown # IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS ## HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN, CAYMAN ISLANDS ### CIVIL DIVISION **Cause No. 63 of 2011** --- ### BETWEEN: **PAULINE EBANKS** (As Personal Representative of the Estate of Bruce Lee G. Ebanks, deceased) **Plaintiff** and **Defendants** (1) ALEXANDER CALLAN (2) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS --- ### Appearances: - Mr. Guy Dilliway-Parry of Priestleys for the Plaintiff - Ms. Suzanne Bothwell of the Attorney General’s Chambers for the Attorney General - Mr. Alexander Callan, a Defendant, did not appear nor did he need to appear --- ### Before: Hon. Justice Henderson ### Heard: March 27, 2013 --- ### Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13 --- **Page 1 of 8** ```
```markdown # REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

¶ [1] Bruce Ebanks died on February 29, 2008, while riding as a passenger in a car driven by the First Defendant, Alexander Callan. This claim is brought by the mother of the deceased, Pauline Ebanks, as personal representative of the Estate. A judgment has already been obtained against Mr. Callan but remains unsatisfied.

¶ [2] The claim against the Second Defendant, the Attorney General, alleges that the actions of the Royal Cayman Islands Police Service just prior to the accident caused or contributed to it and to the death of Mr. Ebanks. The trial has been concerned with liability only.

¶ [3] Around 11:30 p.m. on February 29, 2008, an RCIPS officer, Police Constable Mitchell, encountered Mr. Callan, Mr. Ebanks, and a third person in a vehicle in West Bay. The area was a known hangout of drug users and traffickers. The men were acting suspiciously. Police Constable Mitchell suspected that they were involved in a drug transaction. Because drug traffickers in the Cayman Islands are known to carry illegal firearms from time to time, he also suspected that one or more of the men might be in possession of a gun. Police Constable Mitchell had no evidence which would justify an arrest for either offense or once. --- **Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands** **Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13** **Page 2 of 8**

¶ [4] The car driven by Mr. Callan sped away from the scene and Police Constable Mitchell followed. It is conceded that he embarked upon what is termed a "pursuit". Like most police forces, the RCIPS had in effect a formal policy governing pursuits entitled the "Pursuit Policy and Procedures."

¶ [5] The question of substance during this trial was whether the RCIPS adhered to this policy and, if they did not, whether their failure to do so was an act of negligence which caused or contributed to the accident.

¶ [6] The pursuit lasted for about 6 minutes and 15 seconds, a relatively long pursuit according to the Plaintiff's expert. The two cars drove at high speed from Velma Banks Drive in West Bay along Fountain Road and Town Hall Road to the four-way crossing and then down West Bay Road until Mr. Callan swerved to avoid a collision with a vehicle in the turning lane and struck a light pole. Mr. Ebanks died of injuries suffered in the collision. Police Constable Mitchell acknowledges that he embarked upon a pursuit near Velma Banks Drive. I do not think he can be criticised for this initial decision.

¶ [7] The policy requires that an officer embarking upon a pursuit "immediately" advise the 911 communication centre of certain information, including the reason for the pursuit. It also requires that he request that a supervisor be notified. Police Constable Mitchell did not, at any time, request a notification of a supervisor. He did not immediately provide... the reason for the pursuit either. Instead, he said operating there on Kings Road and saw the police car and they took off from us." This was said as --- **Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands** **Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13** ```
```markdown he was driving past Silver Sands, a location which would be well over two-thirds of the way along the course of the pursuit. A reason was provided after the pursuit had carried on for about four and three-quarter minutes.

¶ [8] The need to notify a supervisor and provide the reason for the pursuit immediately lies at the heart of the policy which is intended to place the crucial decision as to whether to continue or abandon the pursuit in the hands of an experienced senior officer. Because the senior officer is not involved physically in the chase, he is able to exercise the sort of independent and considered judgment which circumstances may have denied to the officers doing the chasing. The superintendent is expected to weigh the reason for the pursuit, and particularly the gravity of the reason for it, against the potential danger to the public in conducting it. The policy says that the immediate apprehension of the suspect is "never more important" than the safety of the public and that no officer will be criticised for terminating a pursuit in the interest of safety although he will be held accountable for continuing one inappropriately. Thus, the superintendent must be placed in a position where he can take command and control of the pursuit. He must be given information about the speed of the vehicles, the driving and traffic conditions and the danger presented by continuing to pursue. All of that must be weighed in order to determine, moment by moment, whether the risk is justified by the gravity of the suspected wrongdoing. Any doubt is resolved in favour of public safety.

¶ [9] Pable Mitchel evidence not because he believed that the 911 operator would do that. The communication transcript shows that an unidentified person was asking the sort of questions that a supervisor would ask. --- **Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands** **Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13**

¶ [10] The Attorney General's position is that Acting Sergeant Forth took on the role of supervisor and was asking these questions. Acting Sergeant Forth, who is no longer with the force, did not give evidence. In his witness statement, he makes no mention of having assumed the role of supervisor although he does say he listened to the radio communications and asked for the reason for the pursuit. No witness has said affirmatively that he or any other officer acted as a supervisor of this pursuit.

¶ [11] The policy requires that a supervisor notify the communication centre of his name and number and that he is monitoring the pursuit. There is no evidence this was done by anyone.

¶ [12] The policy requires that the supervisor debrief the officers involved afterwards and then file a pursuit incident report. Such a report was not filed.

¶ [13] Given this state of the evidence, I consider that no one was supervising the pursuit in the manner contemplated by the policy.

¶ [14] Near the beginning of the pursuit, Police Constable Mitchell said he was travelling at 60 to 65 miles per hour. A bit later on Town Hall Road he said he was going about 90 miles per hour. Since Police Constable Mitchell was trying to keep up with Mr. Callan's vehicle and was succeeding, I infer that both were travelling at these speeds. The evidence is equivocal about the two cars during the pursuit. One eyewitness, Mr. Eric Bush, estimated the speed of both cars as in excess of 80 miles per hour just before the accident. ``` ### Notes: - The text appears to be a legal judgment or report, detailing the actions and policies related to a police pursuit. - The document references specific individuals (e.g., Acting Sergeant Forth, Police Constable Mitchell, Mr. Callan, and Mr. Eric Bush) and their roles or statements. - The policy mentioned in the text outlines requirements for a supervisor during a pursuit, including notifying the communication centre and filing a report, which were not followed according to the evidence. - The speeds of the vehicles involved are a key point of discussion, with estimates provided by witnesses. ### Page Information: - **Page Number:** Page 5 of 8 - **Case Information:** Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands, Cause No. 63 of 2011, 27.03.13 This transcription faithfully reproduces the content and structure of the provided page.

¶ [15] Police Constable Mitchell reported to the 911 communications centre that the traffic was light. He said that light traffic means a few cars but not many. As the pursuit continued down West Bay Road, the cars passed a popular roadside bar and restaurant, Calico Jack's, and the Public Beach area. The pursuit occurred on a Friday night around 11:30 p.m.

¶ [16] In summary, had there been a supervisor in effective control of the pursuit, he would have had to weigh the following question: is the apprehension of three men who might have been carrying out a drug transaction and who could possibly be in possession of a firearm enough to justify the risk inherent in driving at speeds up to 90 miles per hour on roads in West Bay and at very high speeds on West Bay Road itself?

¶ [17] Given the paramountcy in the policy accorded to the safety of the public, it is more probable than not that a supervisor who was given the pertinent information in a timely manner would have answered this question in the negative. He would have terminated the pursuit because he would have considered that the risk to the public could not be justified by the reason for it. I agree with the Plaintiff's expert that the pursuit would have been terminated on Town Hall Road after Police Constable Mitchell reported that the cars were travelling at 90 miles per hour.

¶ [18] I find that Police Constable Mitchell's failure to request a supervisor immediately, and the failure of the RCIPS to ensure that a senior officer supervised the pursuit in accordance with the policy, were omissions which constituted breaches of duty. --- **Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands** **Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13** Page 6 of 8 ```
```markdown violated the letter and the spirit of the policy in a fundamental way. In essence, this was an unsupervised pursuit. The policy represents a self-imposed standard of care which the RCIP is expected to follow. The failures I have mentioned taken together amount to an act of negligence.

¶ [19] Police constables on patrol are likely to encounter difficult and dangerous situations which require them to make hard decisions very quickly. It is to be expected that errors in judgment will occur. A simple error in judgment is not, by itself, an act of negligence. Something more is needed. However, when an error in judgment is so erroneous as to represent a departure from the usual standard of care expected of trained police officers in the Cayman Islands, then it does amount to negligence as well.

¶ [20] Police Constable Mitchell's decision to follow a vehicle travelling at speeds up to 90 miles per hour for the reason given above was a clear error in judgment. The desire to investigate a drug offence, or even a firearms offence, cannot justify the pursuit which occurred. On the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that this error also represents a departure from the usual standard of care expected of trained police officers in the Cayman Islands and was an act of negligence.

¶ [21] Police Constable Mitchell was an agent of the RCIPS at the time and was acting in the course of his duty, so his act of negligence is attributed to his employer.

¶ [22] The Attorney General has placed on record that Ms. Ebanks has accepted that the continuation of the pursuit did not cause the accident. It was caused by the "unforeseeable" fact of the car in the turning lane. **Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands** Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13

¶ [23] This submission has no merit. The accident was contributed to, if not caused by, the speed at which Mr. Callan was driving. He was doing so because a police car was chasing him. Had the pursuit been terminated, it is more probable than not that Mr. Callan would have slowed down to a normal speed so as to avoid attracting further police attention. Consequently, the negligent failure to end the pursuit was one factor which contributed to the accident.

¶ [24] For these reasons, I grant judgment and costs on the standard basis to the Plaintiff. Dated this 27 th day of March, 2013 Henderson, J. Judge of the Grand Court ``` ### Footer ```markdown Judgment (Reasons For) – Pauline Ebanks etc. v. Alexander Callan & The Attorney General of The Cayman Islands Cause No. 63 of 2011 27.03.13 Page 8 of 8 ``` ### Seal The document includes a seal with the text: ```markdown GRAND COURT CAYMAN ISLANDS ``` The seal also features a crown design.