Court of Appeal Sitting – 24th to 28th February 2025

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEAL SITTING ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA VIDEOCONFERENCE Monday, 24th February 2025 – Friday, 28th February 2025 JUDGMENTS Case name: Warren Cassell v The King [MNIHCRAP2022/0003] MONTSERRAT Date: Thursday, 27th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett Respondent: Mr. Richard Jory KC with him Mr. Henry Gordon Issue: Criminal appeal – Appeal against conviction – Concealing the proceeds of criminal conduct – Section 33 (1) (a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1999 – Duplicity – Whether the indictment was duplicitous – No Case Submission – Whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the no case submission - Tendering Documents- Evidence – Whether the judge erred in not requiring the documentary evidence of the crown to be admitted and marked before allowing the jury to consider those documents - Whether the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory Result/order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The conviction of the appellant is hereby quashed and the sentence set aside. 2. There is no retrial in this matter. Reason: 1. If a charge contains more than one offence, it is defective and considered bad for duplicity. The stated purpose for the rule against duplicity is to enable a defendant to know the case he is being called upon to answer so that he will not be prejudiced or embarrassed in preparing his defence. Such prejudice or embarrassment could result if the defendant is uncertain as to the specific offence for which he is charged. This principle has been developed and designed to ensure fairness. However, more than one incident of commission of the offence may be included in a count if those incidents taken together amount to a course of conduct having regard to time, place or purpose of commission. Thus, where a person is charged with a single offence which can be carried out in a multiplicity of ways a charge will not be bad for duplicity even where a number of separate criminal acts are implied. Section 33(1)(a) of the Proceeds of the Crime Act 1999 Laws of Montserrat applied; United Kingdom Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 considered. 2. In the Montserrat Proceeds of Crime Act where an individual attempts to conceal criminal property, this may involve disguising, converting or transferring the said property once it is done for the purpose of avoiding prosecution for an offence. Upon examining the activity that the appellant was charged with, that is concealing, it is clear that this was a single activity covering a course of conduct by the appellant over a period of time. Therefore, the charge was not duplicitous. The particulars of the indictment followed strictly the wording of the legislation in alternatively describing the nature of the offence and did not create separate offences. Therefore, this ground of appeal fails. Proceeds of the Crime Act 1999 Chap 4.04 Laws of Montserrat; Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2024, Sweet & Maxwell considered; The Commonwealth Caribbean Criminal Practice and Procedure, Dana S. Seetahal with updates with Roger Ramgoolam, Routledge, 4th Edition considered; Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2025, Oxford University Press, considered; Ware v Fox [1967] 1 All ER 100 considered; Thomson v Knights [1947] 1 All ER 112 applied. 3. The criteria which a trial judge ought to apply to a submission of no case to answer is whether there is material on which a jury could without irrationality be satisfied of guilt. Where there is such material, the trial judge must allow the trial to proceed. In a criminal trial, the judge has a supervisory role and in effect carries out a filtering process to decide what evidence is placed before the jury. The trial judge is tasked with and may be required to consider whether the prosecution has provided sufficient evidence to leave the case to the jury for decision. R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 applied; Daley v R [1998] 1 WLR 494 applied. 4. It is common ground that the proper approach to a submission of no case to answer can be found in the age-old test propounded by Lane CJ in the case of R v Galbraith. In considering the submission of no case to answer, the Court must have in mind the charge before the Court and its constituent parts in order to assess whether either of the two (2) limbs of R v Galbraith apply. The constituent elements as set out in the indictment in this matter required not only oral testimony but the necessary documentary evidence to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the appellant had committed the offence for which he was charged. Failure by the Crown to properly tender the relevant documents was fatal to their case. R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 applied. 5. With respect to the second limb of Galbraith, the issue to be decided by the Court is, not whether there was some evidence but if what evidence existed was of such a tenuous nature that the case ought not to be left to the jury. This involves an assessment or evaluation of the quality and reliability of the evidence rather than the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Taken as a whole, the jury in this matter was faced with satisfying themselves to the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, that in the absence of the relevant documentation, the appellant had committed the offence of concealing the proceeds of criminal conduct, as alleged by the Crown. In this matter, in the absence of documentary evidence, the case against the appellant was tenuous and the jury was in effect left with little or no evidence upon which to conclude that the necessary framework required for the essential elements of the charge were placed before them, in order to come to a conclusion of guilt to the required standard. The Crown’s evidence taken at its highest, was such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict the appellant, and the learned trial judge ought to have accepted the no case submission and consequently had a duty to withdraw the case from the jury. Having failed to do so the learned trial judge erred. This ground of appeal therefore succeeds. R v Colin Shippey et al [1988] CLR 767 applied; Edwin Gomez v The Queen ANUHCRAP2014/0012 consolidated with Isaiah Benjamin v The Queen ANUHCRAP2014/0013 (delivered 17th August 2022, unreported) followed. 6. It is trite law that all documents, photographs and reports used as evidence must satisfy the requirements of the law to be admitted as evidence. During a trial, each piece of evidence should be marked and formally admitted. Such exhibits must be marked and formally admitted into evidence before they can be considered by the judge and jury. At no point in the transcript of the proceedings of the court below were any documents tendered and marked accordingly by the court as exhibits in the proceedings. In fact, the documents did not form part of the Record of Appeal. This procedure is highly irregular and unusual in either civil or criminal matters. In the absence of agreement of the parties that the documents were not being challenged, the documents ought not to be shown to the jury unless and until they have been properly tendered and marked as exhibits. The learned trial judge therefore erred in allowing the jury to be shown documents relative to the matter during the Crown’s opening address and further allowing the jury to highlight or identify certain portions of those documents before they were properly tendered as exhibits in the matter. Further, the jury was allowed to consider the documents during their deliberations. Failure to produce the necessary documents in support of their case left the Crown’s case bare of the necessary proof required to show to the jury that the appellant did what the Crown sought to represent that he had done. R v Troy Christian ANUHCR2022/0062 (delivered 16th January 2024, unreported), applied; Paragraph 2.12 of Stone’s Justices Manual 2024, Butterworths considered. 7. There was a material irregularity when the learned trial judge not only allowed the jury to be shown documents which were not admitted into evidence at the opening of the case for the Crown but further those documents remained with the jurors throughout the entirety of the trial and also during their deliberations, without ever having been admitted, tendered or marked as exhibits by the court. This Court is therefore left in doubt with regards to the correctness of the conviction of this appellant, and having considered all of the circumstances of the case, this Court cannot be satisfied that this conviction is safe and satisfactory and there is a real risk that this appellant was convicted on evidence which ought not to have been seen or considered by the jury, as it was not properly tendered at his trial. A miscarriage of justice has therefore occurred. This ground of appeal also succeeds. Case name: The Attorney General v James St. Prix [SLUHCVAP2022/0014] SAINT LUCIA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Ms. Rochelle John Charles Respondent: Ms. Maureen John-Xavier Issue: Interlocutory appeal – Appeal against the learned master’s refusal to strike out claim – Whether the learned master erred in the exercise of his discretion – Interpretation and application of Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Saint Lucia (“CCP”) – Failure to serve Article 28 notice (giving one month’s notice) on public officer before claim is issued – Whether the learned master erred in finding that an Article 28 Notice need only be served on the public officer if such public officer is named as a defendant to the claim – Whether the learned master erred in finding that the claim for vicarious liability against the Attorney General would survive where the Article 28 Notice is not served on the public officer who is not named as a defendant to the claim – Sections 4(4) and 13(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act (“CPA”) – Whether the learned master failed to have regard to the legal effect of section 13(2) and section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act of Saint Lucia Result/order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal is dismissed, and the order of the learned master is affirmed. 2. The appellant will pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed by a judge of the High Court if not agreed within 21 days of this judgment. Reason: 1. Article 28 lays down the procedure where suits are brought against a public officer, and it clearly imposes a bar against the institution of any judgment against a public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function. The object of the notice required under Article 28 of the CCP is to inform the public officer, or other person fulfilling any public duty or function (the actual tortfeasor) before-hand of the nature of the action contemplated and to give him an opportunity to consider his legal position. It clearly affords a privilege to a public officer against whom legal proceedings are actually contemplated. Where the officer is not intended to be joined as defendant, Article 28 is not engaged. Where a claimant has taken the strategic decision to not sue the public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function for damages, there is no need to afford him or her notice of legal proceedings in which he or she will not be joined as defendant and where no legal remedies are being pursued against him or her. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024, SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) applied; Bihari Chowdhary & Anr v State of Bihar and Ors 1984 AIR 1043 considered; Bhagchand Dagadusha Gujarati and Ors. v Secretary of State for India (1927) 43 TLR 617 considered. 2. The wording in Article 28 of the CCP is clear and it must therefore be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Given the legislative context and the wording of Article 28, it is clear that the drafters did not intend to impose a similar pre-action protocol in regard to the Crown or the State because at the time the CCP would have been promulgated, the legal landscape in regard to liability of the Crown would have been quite different, that is, the Crown was immune from liability. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Conseil des Ports Nationaux v Langelier [1969] SCR 60 applied. 3. A claimant who sues the Crown for a tort committed by a public officer does not need to bring proceedings against the officer personally because the CPA makes clear that the Crown is subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents. Initially, one needed to identify an individual Crown servant who had committed a tort in the course of their duties or employment. However, this is no longer the case. Recognising that it may be difficult or impossible to positively prove which one of several servants was tortious (what may be described as “collective failures”), the court have nevertheless found employers vicariously liable. While primary liability of the primary tortfeasor/servant must be made out, it is therefore not always possible or necessary to join the primary tortfeasor as a defendant in order to prove his primary liability or in order to establish vicarious liability of the Crown. It therefore follows that it will not always be possible or indeed necessary to serve notice of intended action on the public officer who is the primary tortfeasor. Hogg, Monahan, and Wright- “Liability of the Crown” (Carswell 4th edn, 2011) applied; The Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; The Queen v Levy Brothers Company Limited and the Western Assurance Company [1961] SCR 189 applied. 4. Procedurally, section 13 of the CPA makes clear that in a suit by or against the Crown, the authority to be named as claimant or defendant is the Attorney General. Section 13 does not prohibit or prevent suit being instituted personally against a public officer who is an alleged tortfeasor. Rather it simply codifies the position that the Crown may be vicariously liable for his actions. Section 13 of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Basil Williams v The Attorney General of Guyana et al [2023]] CCJ 3 (AJ) GY applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024, SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) applied; Bertha Compton v Dr. Nathaniel et al SLUHCVAP2004/0012 (delivered 15th February 2005, unreported) applied; General Aviation Services Ltd et al v The Director General of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority et al SLUHCVAP2012/006 (delivered 11th September, unreported) applied. 5. Section 4(4) of the CPA essentially states that any legal provision which limits the liability of a government department or Crown officer in relation to a tort will also apply to the Crown when being sued under this section. This means that the Crown is treated as if it were that specific department or officer, in terms of liability limitations for that particular tort. The scheme of Article 28 is procedural in its wording and intent. The framers of Article 28 intended to encourage parties to consider their legal position and make amends or settle if so advised. The object is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation. This characterization is not consistent with an enactment which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of an officer of the Crown in respect of any delict or quasi-delict which he or she may have committed. Article 28 protections are therefore not captured by section 4(4) of the CPA. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section (4) of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2007] 3 All ER 513 applied; Vallayan Chettier v Government of the Province of Madras AIR 1947 PC 197 considered. Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) considered. Section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied. Case name: [1] Police Constable Bertrand Nestor [2] The Attorney General v Daran Edwards [SLUHCVAP2022/0022] SAINT LUCIA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants: Ms. Rochelle John Charles Respondent: Ms. Maureen John-Xavier holding papers for Ms. Natalie Da Breo Issue: Interlocutory appeal - Appeal against the learned master’s refusal to strike out the claim – Whether the learned master erred in the exercise of his discretion - Interpretation and application of Article 28 of the Code of Civil of Procedure Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of St. Lucia – Failure to serve Article 28 notice (giving one month’s notice) on public officer before claim is issued - Whether failure to serve Article 28 notice on the public officer is fatal to the claim - Whether notice is required to be served on Attorney General - Whether the learned master failed to have regard to the legal effect of section 13 (2) and section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act of Saint Lucia Result/Order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal is allowed with respect to the first appellant only as defendant, and the order of the learned judge is to this extent set aside. 1. The Claim in the court below is struck out as against the first appellant. 2. The costs order made in the court below against the first appellant is accordingly set aside. Given the findings herein and the consequential outcome, this appeal should be costs neutral and will, therefore, make no order as to costs. Reason: 1. The language of Article 28 of the CCP is clear. There is therefore no need to resort to any rules of interpretation outside the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used. Article 28 of the CCP imposes a bar against the institution of a suit in damages, or the entry of any judgment against a public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function in respect of any act purported to be done by him in his official capacity unless written notice of such suit has been served on him or her personally at his domicile at least one month before the suit is issued. Article 28 of the CCP lays down the procedure where suits are brought against public officers or individuals who are fulfilling a public duty or function. The provision is imperative in its language, and it clearly affords protection to public officers. The notice must be served upon the public officer or principal tortfeasor personally. The service of this notice on a public officer or a person fulfilling public duties or function is therefore a prerequisite (where he or she is joined as a defendant), essential to the success of legal proceedings against the public officer. If it is not given, the claim against that public officer must be rejected, struck out and dismissed, and the court cannot issue any award for damages. Article 28 of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2:05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) applied. 2. Prior to the enactment of the CPA, the Crown remained immune from claims in tort as there was no other procedural vehicle to bring a tort claim against the Crown. However, this is no longer the case. The proviso to section 4(1) makes clear that under the CPA, no right of action exists against the Crown in tort unless the act or omission would, apart from the provisions of the Act, give rise to a cause of action in tort against that servant or agent or his estate in respect of whom it is alleged that vicarious liability arises against the Crown. Sections 4(1) and 13 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) applied; Conseil des Ports Nationaux v Langelier [1969] S.C.R 60 considered; Section 80 of the India Code of Civil Procedure 1908 considered; Bhagchand Dagadusha Gujrati and others v Secretary of State for India (1927) 43 TLR 617 considered. 3. Section 13(2) of the CPA makes clear that in a suit by or against the Crown, the authority to be named as claimant or defendant is the Attorney General. The Attorney General may well be the principal legal advisor of the Government but under section 13(2) of the CPA, he has been statutorily designated as the nominal defendant when suing the Crown in right of her Majesty’s Government in Saint Lucia. There is therefore no personal or primary liability which attaches the Attorney General. The operating liability here is vicarious and it is attached to the Crown. Sections 13(2) and 30 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section 8 Interpretation Act Cap 1.06 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Town Investments Ltd. and another v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 considered; M v Home Office [1992] 1 QB 270 considered; Basil Williams v Attorney General of Guyana et al [2013] CCJ (AJ) GY applied. 4. Even where a claim against the officer is struck out not on the merits but for non- service of the Article 28 Notice, it may still be possible to maintain the vicarious liability against the Crown once the pleadings contain reasonable information as to the circumstances in which it is alleged that the liability of the Crown has arisen and as to the government department and officer of the Crown involved. Part 59 Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied; Laurence v Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District 255 Ariz. 95, 528 P.3d 139 considered; Peter Clarke v The Attorney General et al SLUHCV1999/0475 (delivered 19th April 2004, unreported) distinguished; DeGraff v Smith 157 P.2d 342, 62 Ariz. 261 considered. 5. The mere allegation of malice does not deprive a public officer protection under Article 28. A public officer is entitled to notice of suit even if it is alleged that in the discharge of his duty, he has acted with malice and not bona fide. Gordon v The Attorney General for Jamaica [1997] UKPC 21 distinguished; Kirby v Simpson (1854) E.R applied; Samantha Koti Reddi v Pothuri Subbiah and Others 46IND. CAS. 86 considered. 6. Section 4(4) of the CPA essentially states that any legal provision which limits the liability of a government department or Crown officer in relation to a tort will also apply to the Crown when being sued under this section. This means that the Crown is treated as if it were that specific department or officer, in terms of liability limitations for that particular tort. The scheme of Article 28 is procedural in its wording and intent. The framers of Article 28 intended to encourage parties to consider their legal position and make amends or settle if so advised. The object is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation. This characterization is not consistent with an enactment which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of an officer of the Crown in respect of any delict or quasi-delict which he or she may have committed. Article 28 protections are therefore not captured by section 4(4) of the CPA. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section (4) of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2007] 3 All ER 513 applied; Vallayan Chettier v Government of the Province of Madras AIR 1947 PC 197 considered. Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10th February 2016, unreported) considered. Section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied. 7. Under section 26 of the CPA, any statutory defence available to a negligent employee of the Crown should equally be available to the Crown when the Crown was sued as vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence. Even if the provisions of section 26 could be said to apply in this case, in this appeal the respondent would in fact have served the Article 28 Notice on the Attorney General and so the Crown would have had the full benefit of the privilege afforded by that Article. Section 26 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Durity v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2002] UKPC 20 applied. Case name: DeAndre Henry v The King [ANUHCRAP2022/0004] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Jason Tiwari Respondent: Ms. Shannon Jones-Gittens Issue: Criminal Appeal – Appeal against sentence – Aggravated Burglary – Section 33(1) of the Larceny Act of Antigua and Barbuda – The maximum sentence for the offence of aggravated burglary – Whether the appellant’s sentence is excessive in the circumstances Result/order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal against sentence on the Second Offence is allowed. 2. The sentence of 18 years imprisonment is set aside, and a sentence of 10 years, 5 months, and 3 days is substituted, commencing from the date of sentencing of the appellant on 9th May 2018. Reason: 1. When the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery on 1st February 2017, section 6 of the Law Revision Act 2000 was still in force. Under this section, section 33 of the Larceny Act was amended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for the offence of aggravated robbery. Section 3 of the Larceny (Amendment) Act 2017 which amended the Larceny Act to impose a maximum sentence of 35 years for the offence of aggravated robbery only came into force on 14th December 2017. Thus, at the material time, the relevant legislation in Antigua and Barbuda provided a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for aggravated robbery. The practice of the judges in Antigua and Barbuda was to treat the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years as a maximum of 25 years for aggravated robbery in accordance with the approach of Zuniga v R where the doctrine of severance was deployed to remove the mandatory aspects of relevant legislation to remove the inconsistency with the constitutional provisions. Applying that approach, the words “not less than” can be excised from section 33A(1) to provide for a maximum period of 25 years for the offence of aggravated burglary. This is broadly similar to the approach taken by the learned trial judge and reflects the previous practice by trial judges in Antigua and Barbuda. Section 33A(1) of the Larceny Act Cap 241 of the Revised Laws of Antigua and Barbuda applied; Section 6 of the Law Revision, Miscellaneous Provisions Act No. 2 of Act No. 9 of 2000 applied; Section 3 of the Larceny (Amendment) Act No. 29 of 2017 considered; Zuniga v R (2014) 84 WIR 101 applied. 2. An appeal against sentence is an appeal against the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion. An appellate court will only interfere with a sentence passed by the trial judge where it is manifestly excessive, or where the wrong principle has been applied in imposing the sentence. In determining whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, the Court must consider the circumstances of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. In this case, the learned judge erred in using a starting point of 20 years. He was bound by the decision of Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen which established that the appropriate starting point used in Antigua and Barbuda at the time for aggravated robberies involving a firearm was 15 years. Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen ANUHCRAP2018/0002 and 2016/0004 (dated 12th June 2018, unreported) applied; Akim Monah v The Queen GDAHCRAP2021/0015 (delivered 23rd February 2022, unreported) considered; Simon Marius v The King SLUHCRAP2008/0007 (delivered 16th January 2025, unreported) applied; R v Sergeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 applied. 3. Given that the maximum sentence in cases of aggravated robbery should be 25 years imprisonment, the appropriate starting point on the notional sentence shall be 15 years in keeping with the principles of Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen. With a starting point of 15 years, decreased by one year for the mitigating factor of no previous convictions, the notional sentence is reduced to 14 years with an increase of 5 years for the combined aggravating factors with a total notional sentence of 19 years. In respect of the credit for plea and cooperation, the learned judge noted that the appellant was to receive a 25% discount for his guilty plea, because the plea was not given at the first opportunity, although it was given before any listing for trial. The appellant takes no issue with this 25% discount, and it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere. This means that the appellant’s sentence should be 14 years, 3 months (171 months). Deducting the total period of 3 years, 9 months, 27 days that the appellant spent on remand, the sentence imposed on the appellant for the conviction on the Second Offence is 10 years, 5 months and 3 days. Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen ANUHCRAP2018/0002 and 2016/0004 (dated 12th June 2018, unreported) applied; Desmond Baptiste v The Queen Criminal Appeal No.8 of 2003 (dated 6th December 2004, unreported) applied; Omari Phillip v The King (ANUHCRAP2016/0008 dated 13th November 2024) applied. APPLICATIONS AND APPEALS Case name: BOI Bank Corporation v Sodecorp SA [ANUHCVAP2023/0038] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Oral Decision Appellant/Respondent: No appearance Respondent/Applicant: Dr. David Dorsett Issue: Application for security for costs – Rule 62.17 Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 - The merits of the appeal - Appeal against an enforcement order - Whether the demand for security of costs is fair, just, and proportionate - The likely ability of the appellant to pay the costs of the appeal if ordered to do so Type of order: Result/order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The respondent/appellant shall provide security for the applicant/respondent’s costs in the sum of $7500.00, such sum to be paid in Court within 14 days of this order. 2. The appeal be dismissed with costs if the security for costs ordered in paragraph 1 is not provided in the amount, manner and by the time ordered. 3. The applicant/respondent shall have its costs in the amount of EC$1500.00. 4. The Registrar of the high court shall serve a copy of this order to be served on the Bank’s registered agent. Reason: Before the Court was an application for security for costs filed on 19th March 2024. That application was supported by an affidavit filed on even date. The Court also had regard to the notice of opposition filed on 28th March 2024 and the affidavit in opposition which supported that notice filed on 17th April 2024. The Court considered the amended notice of appeal in this matter filed on 6th December 2023, the judgment in respect of which the appeal was lodged dated 25th November 2023. The Court also considered the legal submissions advanced by the respondent/applicant as well as the submissions by the appellant/respondent and the applicable legal principles relevant to an application for security for costs. The Court also applied the judgment in Keary Development Ltd. v Tarmac Construction Ltd. [1995] 3 ALL ER 534 and Ultramarine (Antigua) Limited v Sunsail (Antigua) Limited ANUHCVAP2016/0004 (delivered 7th April, 2017, unreported). These legal principles indicate that the Court must carry out a balancing exercise when considering an application for security for costs. On the one hand the Court must weigh the injustice caused from the appellant pursuing a proper claim and on the other, the Court must weigh the injustice to the respondent if no security is ordered, and the appellant’s case fails, and the respondent is unable to recover from the appellant the costs which would have been incurred in defence of the claim. The Court was also aware and has considered that it should be concerned not to allow the power to order security for costs to be used as an instrument of oppression. Having considered the application and the evidence filed in opposition the Court was not satisfied that the respondent to the application has furnished the Court with any cogent evidence of their means so as to satisfy the Court on a balance of probabilities that the claim would be stifled if security for costs would be ordered. Notwithstanding, the Court took the view that the applicant has not provided to its satisfaction, evidence on which the sum of USD$25,000.00 should be ordered as security for costs likely to be incurred for this appeal. The Court was nevertheless of the view that some form of security should be ordered in this case, and that CPR 65.20 (1) provides that costs of an appeal are to be assessed. The Court was therefore minded to exercise its discretion and made an order for security for costs in the sum of EC$7500.00. Case name: BOI Bank Corporation v Jose Rafael Padron Salazar Oral decision [ANUHCVAP2023/0039] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant/Respondent: No appearance Respondent/Applicant: Dr. David Dorsett Issue: Application to vary order - Order that the appellant shall provide security for the respondent’s costs in the sum of two-thirds of the costs incurred at the High Court within 14 days - Whether the order complies with rule 62.21(4) Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 – Noncompliance with order - Whether the appeal should be dismissed Type of order: Result/order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Leave is granted to withdraw the application filed on 8th August 2024. 2. There is no order as to costs. Reason: Before the Court was an application filed on 8th August 2024 seeking to vary the order of a single judge dated 23rd April 2024 granting security for costs to reflect an amendment in Item 1 of the Order which would read as follows: “The respondent/appellant shall provide security for the applicant’s/respondent’s costs in the sum of two- thirds the costs incurred at the High Court to be paid within 14 days of this order. The application further sought an order to dismiss the appeal filed on the 16th November 2023 with costs if the security is not provided in the amount, in the manner and by the time ordered.” The Court reviewed the notice of opposition filed on 15th August 2024 and considered the written legal submissions from both parties. Counsel for the applicant/respondent, made an oral application to withdraw the application before the Court. The Court noted the undertaking provided by the applicant/ respondent’s counsel to pay into court the sum of one thousand dollars received from the appellant/respondent on the 15th of May 2024 in purported compliance of the order for the payment of security for costs, and therefore, withdrew the application filed on 24th April 2024. Case name: Keir Construction Limited v [1] Sundry Workers [2] George Dexter Tavernier (Trading as Tavernier Construction) [ANUHCVAP2022/0009] [formerly ANUHLTAP2019/0007] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Directions Date: Monday, 24th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicant: Mr. Kendrickson Kentish Respondents: Ms. Safiya Roberts for the 1st respondent Mr. Cosbert Cumberbatch for the 2nd respondent Issue: Motion for conditional leave to His Majesty in Council - Section 122(1)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 - Appeal as of right - Whether the order of the Court is a final order or interlocutory - Whether the applicant has met the prescribed threshold for the grant of conditional leave to appeal to appeal to His Majesty in Council - Section 122(2)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The respondents are to file brief submissions addressing the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 on or before 11th March 2025. 2. The applicant is at liberty to file submissions in reply, confined solely to those submissions raised by the respondents which address the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 on or before 19th March 2025. 3. Judgment is reserved pending the receipt of the submissions by the parties. Reason: The Court was of the view that counsel for the respondents ought to be afforded an opportunity to provide brief submissions which are confined to addressing the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 which was raised by counsel for the applicant during the court of his oral submissions in reply. Case name: [1] Akkel Caribbean Properties Limited [2] David Bond [2] Ena Bond v Ms. Joanne Massiah Carlisle Bay Limited [ANUHCVAP2024/0003] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants/Respondent s: Respondent/Applicant: Mr. David Jospeh KC with him Ms. Rose-Mary Reynolds Issue: Application to strike out appeal – Whether appeal should be struck out as a nullity – Failure of appellants/respondents to seek leave to appeal – Whether the order for sale is an interlocutory or final order – Rule 62.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2023 – Application Test – Application for an adjournment – Whether the appellant’s/respondent’s provided cogent evidence in support of the application for the adjournment Oral decision Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appellants’/respondents’ application to adjourn the matter is refused. 2. The application to strike out the notice of appeal is granted. 3. The notice of appeal filed on 24th January 2024 is declared a nullity and is struck out. 4. Costs are awarded to the respondent/applicant in the sum of $2,000.00 to be paid within 21 days from today’s date, that is, or on or before 17th March 2025. Reason: The Court was of the view that the appellants’/respondents’ application for an adjournment, made orally, was not supported by cogent evidence. The Court took into account the reasons advanced in support of the adjournment, the fact that the matter was case managed on 20th January 2025 and the appellants/respondents, and their attorney would have received directions for the filing of legal submissions and setting a window for the hearing of the application. The appellants/respondents were therefore obliged comply with the Court’s order and to file and serve their legal submissions. However, the appellants/respondents elected not to file any written submissions. The Court determined that the reasons for the adjournment were not cogent or reasonable and after noting the appellants’/respondents’ failure to file and serve written legal submissions determined that it would not entertain any oral submissions from the appellants/respondents in response to the application. The substantive application before the Court was an application filed on 23rd August 2024 by the respondent/applicant for an order that the notice of appeal filed on 24th January 2024 be struck out and for costs. The notice of appeal was against a decision of the learned master given on 12th December 2023 where in respect of an application filed by the respondent/applicant, made an order, inter alia, for sale of certain property by private treaty or public auction in satisfaction of a judgment debt on the condition that the respondent/applicant file a supplementary affidavit exhibiting a second valuation report from a qualified land valuer or surveyor within 21 days of the order. The basis for the application to strike out the appeal was that the proposed appeal was against an interlocutory order of the High Court and the appellants/respondents did not seek leave to file the appeal as they were required to do in accordance with Rule 62.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023. Rule 62.1(3) provides that a determination as to whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is made on the application test. The sole issue for the Court’s consideration was whether the learned master’s order was interlocutory or final. The Court considered the notice of application to strike out, the affidavit of Angel Charles filed on 20th August 2024 in support, the written skeleton arguments filed on 10th October 2024 by the respondent/applicant and all oral submissions presented on behalf of the respondent/applicant. The test for whether an order is final or interlocutory is set out in Antigua Commercial Bank v Louise Martin ANUHCVAP2007/0022 (delivered 15th January 2008, unreported) where it was held that in determining whether a party required leave to appeal from a decision of the High Court, Rule 62.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 had to be read with section 31(2)(g) of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Antigua and Barbuda) Act to the effect that any person who wishes to appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order of the High Court must first obtain leave of a judge or of the Court of Appeal. The Application test is used to determine whether an order is interlocutory or final. It is well established than an order made on an application which would not necessarily bring an end to the proceedings whichever way a decision was made is an interlocutory order and not a final order. Consequently, applying that test, and on the authority of Zion v Lacey Sea Shell Reefs Limited ANUHCVAP2007/0029 (delivered 19th February 2008, unreported) cited by the respondent/applicant that the order made by the learned master on 12th December 2023 is an interlocutory order, the Court so found that the order would not have necessarily brought the proceedings to an end irrespective of which way the application for sale was resolved. Therefore, leave was required to file the notice of appeal. Leave was neither sought nor granted. As stated by the Court in Oliver McDonna v Benjamin Wilson Richardson AXAHCVAP2005/0003 (delivered 25th November, 2013, unreported) (“McDonna”) an appeal from an interlocutory order cannot be commenced until leave is granted. Furthermore, the Court took into consideration its pronouncement in McDonna that “any notice which may have been filed without leave being first obtained is of no effect and is completely valueless and void. It cannot be revived by the subsequent granting of leave”. Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed 24th January 2024 was declared a nullity and was struck out. Case name: Aldy Cornelius (As Lawful Attorney for Marilyn Cornelius) v Oral decision Eustace Cornelius [ANUHCVAP2021/0012] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant/Respondent: Mr. Hugh Marshall Respondent/Appellant: Mr. Sherfield Bowen Issue: Application to strike out notice of appeal - Want of prosecution - Whether the Court should strike out the appeal on the ground of the respondent/appellant failing to take the all necessary steps with the Registry of the High Court to arrange for the transcript of the proceedings - Whether it is just and equitable in the circumstances to strike out the appeal Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The notice of appeal filed by the appellant on 12th May 2021 is struck out for want of prosecution. Reason: This is an application by Eustace Cornelius, the respondent in the appeal and the applicant in the application, to strike out the notice of appeal filed in this matter on 12th May 2021. The appeal arises from a judgment of Justice Robertson in the High Court of Antigua and Barbuda dated 31st March 2021. The appeal was filed on 12th May 2021 which is within the period of 42 days required for the filing of the appeal. The application to strike out the notice of appeal was made on 3rd October 2024 on the ground that since the filing of the notice of appeal, over 3 years prior to the filing of the application, the appellant has taken no further steps to prosecute the appeal. Evidently, after the appeal has been filed and no steps were taken to pursue the appeal, the appeal was set down for status hearing on 27th February 2023. At the status hearing, it was ordered that the appellant take the necessary steps with the Registry of the High Court to arrange for the transcript of proceedings and that the Registrar of the High Court shall thereafter take the necessary steps to obtain the transcript. It was also ordered that the matter be removed from the status hearing list to be relisted at the next status hearing upon availability of the transcript or on a date fixed by the Chief Registrar. According to the applicant, to the date of filing of the application to strike out the notice of appeal, the appellant has taken no steps to prosecute the appeal well over 3 years since the filing of the appeal and almost 1 year, 8 months after the status hearing order. In an affidavit in opposition to the strike out filed on 8th November 2024, the appellant claimed that promptly after the status hearing order, she accompanied her attorney to the office of the registry of the High Court to make arrangements for the transcript of proceedings and paid the sum of $500 dollars at the registry on account of the ordering of the transcript. The appellant denies failure to take the necessary steps to arrange for the transcript of the proceedings and states that, in fact, she promptly took all the necessary steps on 7th March 2023, his language, that is, in the affidavit in opposition. This, of course, is just under 2 years ago when the appellant says she took all the necessary steps. The appellant has given no explanation for the 1 year, 9 months which elapsed between the filing of the appeal and his endeavouring to carry out the status hearing order or the 2 years which elapsed since she sought to make arrangements for the transcript. Counsel for the appellant Mr. Bowen sought to argue that the procedure in place at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in this case is that the appellant awaited the notification of availability of the transcript before doing anything else to progress the appeal. The Court was not persuaded by this line of argument by counsel. It has always been the case that upon filing an appeal, an appellant would or should take such steps as are necessary to progress the appeal, and if there are delays occasioned by the High Court office, then the appellant should take all such steps as are reasonable and practical to cause the transcript to be produced and to show evidence of these steps even when required to satisfy the Court that the appellant is interested in and proceeding to get his appeal heard. We have heard no such evidence from the appellant. Indeed, the appellant has not sought to argue that the delays in progressing the appeal were not inordinate. The appellant has not sought to argue that she will suffer any prejudice from the notice of appeal being struck out other than to say that he would be prejudiced if the application is granted. The appellant has not sought to argue that she has an appeal with any prospect of success other than to file the notice of appeal with 3 grounds of appeal. The Court is satisfied that the conditions prerequisite for the striking out of a notice of appeal have been met and the one factor which could have overridden these prerequisites, that is, strong prospects of success on the appeal, are not here apparent. Case name: Delvia Pierre v [1] Tywana Morris [2] Tenijah Morris [ANUMCVAP2025/0001] [Formerly ANUMCVAP2018/0004] No appearance ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant/Respondent: Ms. Mandi A. Thomas Respondents/Appellant s: Oral Decision Issue: Application to strike out appeal - Want of prosecution - Abuse of process - Whether the Court should strike out the appeal where the appellant has failed to serve the notice of appeal and the record of appeal on the respondent – Whether the application should be struck out on the ground that the appellant has seemingly abandoned the appeal by failing to appear at any Status Hearing of the matter or demonstrated any interest in the appeal - Whether the appellant’s appeal lacks merit Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The notice of appeal filed on 18th November 2018 against the decision of the magistrate dated 9th October 2018 is struck out for want of prosecution. 2. The appellant shall pay costs to the respondent in the sum of $1,500. Reason: Before the Court was an application to strike out the notice of appeal filed on 18th November 2018. Upon reading the applicant’s written submissions and hearing the applicant’s oral submissions and upon noting that the respondent was served with a notice of hearing filed on 27th January 2025 but did not appear in Court, the Court was of the view that the application to strike out should be granted. The Court was of the view that the applicant had satisfied the prerequisites in that there was prejudice to the applicant since the appeal was filed 6 years ago but there had been no service on the respondent. The Court noted that, that amounted to an inordinate delay and there were no reasons provided for the delay by the appellant. The Court therefore struck out the appeal for want of prosecution with costs in the amount of $1,500.00 to be paid to the applicant/respondent. Case name: Everton Welsh v The Attorney General [ANUHCVAP2021/0011] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] Directions The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett Respondent: Mrs. Carla Brookes-Harris Issue: Civil appeal - Appeal against order dismissing claim for an administrative order - Section 15(2) of the Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda - Continuation of a portion of criminal trial in appellant’s absence - Sentencing judgment delivered in the absence of the appellant - Abridged notice of hearing - Whether the abridged notice of hearing afforded the appellant a reasonable opportunity of appearing before the court - Counsel for the appellant present in court for the handing down of the sentencing judgment - Whether the learned judge erred in finding that the appellant had consented to his absence from trial, validating the judgment handed down on 27th May 2015 - Whether the appellant’s right to the protection of the law as guaranteed by section 3 of the Constitution was contravened when a portion of the appellant’s criminal trial, namely, the sentencing hearing was conducted in the appellant’s absence and in contravention of section 15(2) of the Constitution Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The Registrar of the High Court do produce and make available to the Court and to counsel for the parties, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings in this matter on 27th May 2015, if available within 28 days of the date of this order. 2. If the transcript is produced to the Court and to the parties, the parties are required to file further submissions in this matter within 21 days of the date of receipt of the transcript. 3. The judgment of the Court will be delivered after receipt of the further submissions by counsel or notification by the Registrar of the High Court that the transcript is not available. Reason: Having heard both counsels in the appeal against the decision of Justice Roberston dated 29th March 2021, the Court noted that the transcript of proceedings is necessary to properly address the issues before the Court. Consequently, counsel for both parties would be required to file further submissions upon receipt of the transcript. Accordingly, the Court gave directions for the Registrar of the High Court to provide the parties with the transcript and gave directions for the filing of further submissions. Case name: [1] JSN Development Group Limited [2] HBC1 Properties Limited v [1] Global Bank of Commerce Limited [2] Brian Stuart-Young [ANUHCVAP2022/0025] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac- Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Mr. Andrew O’Kola Appearances: Appellants/Respondent s: Respondents/Appellant s: Oral decision Dr. David Dorsett for the 1st respondent Mr. Jason Tiwari for the 2nd respondent Issue: Application to strike out the first appellant - Whether the first appellant should be struck out on the ground of the dissolution of the company - Section 511 of the Companies Act 1995 - Whether dissolution is the effect of being struck off the register Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The parties are to file and serve supplemental submissions on the judgment of Blairmont Rice Investments Inc v Kayman Sankar Co Ltd [2021] CCJ 7 (AJ) GY, [2021] 5 LRC 433 on or before 14th March 2025. 2. Judgment is reserved. Reason: The Court was minded to direct the parties to file written submissions on the case of Blairmont Rice Investments Inc v Kayman Sankar Co Ltd [2021] CCJ 7 (AJ) GY, [2021] 5 LRC 433 upon determining its applicability to the issues before the Court. Case name: Caribbean Development (Antigua) Limited v [1] Stuart Lockheart [2] Geert Duizendstraal [3] Gaye Hechme ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant/Respondent: Mr. Hugh Marshall Respondents/Applicant s: Oral decision Dr. David Dorsett with him Mr. Andrew Young for the 1st respondent Issue: Motion for conditional leave to His Majesty in Council – Section 122(2)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 – Whether leave should be granted by reason of the issue being one of great general or public importance or otherwise – Whether leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council should be granted on a decision for an application for extension of time for leave to appeal – Whether there was an existing appeal from which leave could be granted Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The application is dismissed. 2. There is no order as to costs. Reason: By notice of motion filed on 4th November 2024, the applicant seeks conditional leave to appeal to his majesty in council pursuant to section 122(2) a of the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda. The applicant seeks to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 14th October 2024 wherein the Court granted orders: 1)extending the time for the applicant to apply for leave to appeal; 2) granting the applicant leave to appeal the decision of the high court judge; 3) stipulated that the notice of appeal be filed and served within 21 days of the date of its order; 4) stay in the proceedings in the court below pending the hearing and determination of the appeal and 5) no order as to costs. The application for conditional leave is grounded in section 122(2)(a) of the constitution which provides so far as material, both subject to the provisions of section 44(8) of the constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions from the Court of Appeal to his majesty in council with the leave of the Court of Appeal in the following cases: a)decisions in any civil proceedings where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the question involved in the appeal is one that by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to his majesty in council. This section imposes the following essential requirements each of which must be fulfilled: 1) the decision must be in civil proceedings; 2) there must be a question involved in the appeal meaning the appeal in before the Court of Appeal and 3) that question must be one that by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to his majesty in council. The decision sought to be appealed to the Privy Council here is the finding by the Court of Appeal that the compromise agreement was required to be in writing to be legally valid. That finding was made in the context of an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal. That hearing was not an appeal. An appeal would only come to be when leave is granted, and the notice of appeal is filed. The appeal did not commence until 24th October 2024 when the notice of appeal was filed pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeal. It follows therefore that the issue raised in the motion is not a question involved in the appeal in the Court of Appeal since there was no appeal. The appeal is yet to be heard. Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that the applicant has not fulfilled all of the requirements for the grant of conditional leave to appeal to his majesty in council. Therefore, the application is dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court further stated that there is no basis to vary the orders made by the Court of Appeal in relation to the stay given the pendency of the appeal. Case name: Timothy Jackman v The King [ANUHCRAP2025/0002] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant/Applicant: Mr. Wendel Alexander with Mr. Wayne Benjamin Marsh Respondent: Mrs. Shannon Jones-Gittens Issue: Application for leave to appeal against sentence – Sentence of 112 months erroneously recorded as 11 years 9 months - Whether the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances - Application for extension of time to file appeal against sentence - Whether the delay was inordinate Oral decision Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The application for an extension of time is granted. 2. The appeal is allowed. 3. The appellant having been sentenced to 112 months being 9 years and 4 months, having served that time in full, he is to be released immediately. Reason: Upon hearing submissions from counsel for the applicant, and the Crown having no objection to an extension of time for the filing of the appeal, the Court granted an extension of time for the filing of the appeal. The appellant, on the 15th of July 2020, was sentenced by the learned trial judge to 112 months imprisonment which the learned trial judge stated amounted to 11 years and 9 months. That would have led to a release date of the appellant of the 29th June 2026. It is accepted by both parties that the calculation of 112 months is in fact 9 nine years and 4 months. The earliest release date for that sentence would have been the 17th of November 2024. Her majesty’s prison released the appellant on the 3rd July 2024. Realising the error, the appellant was taken back into custody by the prison authority on 16th August 2024. These are the accepted facts in the matter. The Appellant is still in custody at the prison. In the circumstances, the Crown properly did not oppose the application made by the appellant for an extension of time to file an appeal against the sentence of the learned trial judge. This Court having looked at the facts and circumstances therefore grants the application for the extension of time. The Court noted that the notice of appeal filed on 6th January 2025 is deemed properly filed in the circumstances. The Court further deemed today’s hearing to be the hearing of the substantive appeal against sentence. The sentence of the Court below of 112 months being 9 years and 4 months and not 11 years and 9 months as pronounced by the trial judge, this Court hereby allows the appeal against sentence as the Appellant has served a period of incarceration longer than the sentence given in the Court below. The Appellant is to be released immediately. Case name: The Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda v [1] Sherrel Sutherland [2] Dr. Dane Abbott [ANUHCVAP2024/0031] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett with Mrs. Carla Brookes-Harris and Mr. Zachary Phillips Respondents: Mr. Rishi Dass SC with Ms. Sasha Sookram, Ms. Sherrie-Ann Bradshaw and Ms. Anika Gray Oral judgment Issue: Interlocutory Appeal - Dismissal of appellant’s application to strike out the respondents’ statement of case - Whether the judge erred in dismissing the application to strike out the respondents’ statement of case on account of having no or any proper regard to the relevant test for striking out constitutional claims - Whether sections 56 and 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act Cap 300 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda had been repealed by the Sexual Offences Act - Whether the issue of whether a law has been repealed is a pure question of law that a judge should be able to strike out/ determine it on paper- Whether the judge adopted a restrained approach which was not appropriate in the circumstances Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. No order as to costs. Reason: This was an appeal against the decision of the learned judge dated 16th October 2024 dismissing the appellant’s application to strike out the respondents’ constitutional claim which challenged sections 56 and 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act Cap 300 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda. The appellant challenged the decision by contending that the learned judge adopted a restrained approach as opposed to “grasping the nettle” as propounded in Frank and another v Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda [2022] UKPC 25 and on the appellant’s case which was a pure question of law to be decided. It should be uncontroversial that a decision to strike out a claim is part of the court’s case management powers. It is clear from the cases that the power to strike out is to be used sparingly as was discussed in the consolidated appeal of Martin Didier and others al v Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd; Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Medical Associates Ltd and others SLUHCVAP2014/0024 consolidated with SLUHCVAP2015/0004 (delivered 6th June 2016, unreported). That case made it clear that the discretion to strike out should not be exercised where the court finds among other things, that the strength of the case may not be clear because it had not been fully investigated. The learned judge clearly had these principles in mind since she made mention of these in her ruling. Constitutional claims should not be struck out prematurely unless it is clear that they have no prospects of success as such cases often involve complex matters which require a full exploration at trial. It is therefore necessary to explore the reasons why the learned judge dismissed the application to strike out the claim. The learned judge at paragraph 5(iii) of her order found that the specific circumstances of the case made it necessary to consider the ambiguities surrounding parliament’s intent regarding the repeal or the validity of the sections which were the subject of the challenge, and she went on to say that this was a highly relevant factor. The judge held that whether the law had been repealed or remained valid required in-depth legal analysis and further evidence. The learned judge found that issues involving evidential exploration or further legal submissions were not suitable for strike out applications. Having considered the material before her, the learned judge concluded that this was not a straightforward matter with an obvious answer but required further evidence. In the Court’s understanding, the learned judge was simply saying that this was not simply a question of law, and that further evidence was required to resolve the question, unlike the situation in Frank v The Attorney General where the Privy Council found that the issue was a pure question of law. For the reasons articulated by the judge she concluded that the claim ought not to be struck out. Considering the reasons given by the learned judge, the Court found that there was no basis for it to interfere with the manner in which the judge exercised her case management discretion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. Case name: The Barbuda Council v PLH (Barbuda) Limited [ANUHCVAP2024/0030] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicant: Ms. E. Ann Henry KC with her Dr. Lenworth Johnson Respondent: Mr. Anthony Astaphan, SC with him Dr. Errol Cort and Ms. Alketz Joseph Issue: Application to vary the decision of a single judge - Application for stay of execution of the judgment in Oral Decision the court below pending the determination of the appeal - Exercise of discretion by a single judge - Whether the single judge exceeded the general ambit of the exercise of his discretion and was plainly wrong - Whether the single judge considered the relevant facts and circumstances – Prospects of success - Whether the appeal would be stifled if a stay is not granted - Whether there are exceptional circumstances which warrant the grant of a stay - Balance of harm or prejudice to the respondent if a stay if granted Type of order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The application to vary the order of a single judge is dismissed. 2. Costs in the application to be agreed by the parties if not to be assessed by the Chief Registrar within 21 days of the date of this order. Reason: Before the Court was an application filed on 2nd January 2025 by the appellant/applicant to vary the order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal dated 17th December 2024 whereby the judge refused the grant of a stay of execution of the judgment in the court below having found that the threshold for a stay had not been met. It was the exercise of discretion by a single judge in refusing to grant the stay. The learned judge considered the well-known principles considered in C- Mobile Services Limited v Huawei Technologies Limited BVIHCMAP2014/0017 and concluded that the appellant/applicant did not meet the relevant threshold for the grant of a stay. It was not shown to the Court’s satisfaction that the learned judge erred in principle by failing to take into account the relevant factors with respect to the grant of a stay. It could not be said on an examination of the factors that the learned judge’s decision to refuse the stay exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement was possible. The factors which a Court should consider or taken into account when considering a stay are well sought out which include: (i) the circumstances of the case, (ii) that a stay is the exemption rather than the rule; (iii) the parties seeking a stay should provide cogent evidence that the appeal would be stifled or rendered nugatory unless the stay is granted; (iv) in exercising its discretion the court applies the balance of harm test in which the likely prejudice to the successful party must be carefully considered and (v) the court takes into account the prospects of the appeal succeeding but only where strong grounds of appeal or strong likelihood that the appeal would succeed is shown. Having taken into account the learning and reasoning in NB v London Borough of Haringey [2011] EWHC 3544 (Fam), the Court found that to have an arguable case is not enough and that the applicant is obliged to provide cogent evidence to the Court that there are strong grounds of appeal and the mere existence of an arguable appeal is not sufficient reasoning to justify the grant of a stay. In addition, the Court also has to consider the likely prejudice to the successful party and in this case the respondents have had a cost judgment that has not been satisfied. The Court was of the view that the appellant/applicant had not provided compelling reasons to the Court as to why a stay should be granted. Therefore, in the circumstances the Court was not minded to vary the order made by the single judge on the 17th December 2024. Case name:

[1]Ramesh Armanani

[2]Moham Amrmanani v AEA Company Limited [GDAHCVAP2023/0019] N/A GRENADA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicants: Ms. Gennilyn Ettienne Respondent: Mr. Ruggles Ferguson KC with him Ms. Mckaeda Augustine Issue: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal - Whether the delay was inordinate - Whether there is good reason for the delay - Application for leave to appeal - Whether the appeal has a realistic prospect of success Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved. Reason: Upon hearing counsel for the parties, the Court decided to reserve its decision on the applications before the Court. Case name: [1] Clico International Life Insurance Limited [2] Wilbur Harrigan v [1] Eastern Caribbean Baptist Mission [2] Jeriann George

[3]Hensworth Jonas [ANUHCVAP2019/0035] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants/Respondent s: Mr. Ramon Alleyne SC with him Mr. Rene Bitcher and Ms. Talia DaCosta Applicants/Respondent s: Oral decision Ms. Chantal Marshall with her Ms. Andrea Smithen- Henry Issue: Application for an extension of time to file submissions – Whether the delay was inordinate – Whether there is sufficient reason for the delay Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The written submissions of the respondents filed on 22nd January 2025 is deemed to be properly filed. 2. There is no order as to costs. Reason: Upon counsel for the appellant/respondent indicating that there was no concern with regards to prejudice, the Court accordingly granted the extension of time and proceeded to hear the substantive appeal. Case name: Antigua Wireless Ventures Ltd. t/a Digicel v Karl Skepple [ANUHLTAP2023/0008] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Michael Koeiman with him Ms. Jenell Gibson Respondent: Mr. Kendrickson Kentish Issue: Labour tribunal appeal - Appeal against the decision that the respondent was unfairly dismissed by the respondent - Whether the Industrial Court erred in finding that the employer was served with timely notice of the trial date - Whether the Industrial Court’s failure to take into account the appellant’s attorney’s correspondence that he was unable to attend trial amounts to specific illegality in the course of proceedings - Whether the Industrial Court breached the appellant’s right to be heard in the proceedings by failing, refusing or neglecting to adjourn the trial in light of the correspondence from the appellant’s attorney - Whether the Industrial Court breached the principles of natural justice and the appellant’s right to procedural fairness - N/A Whether the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering exemplary damages against the appellant in the absence of evidence reasonably capable of supporting such an award - Whether the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering costs where no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant an award of costs pursuant to section 10(2) of the Industrial Court Act, Cap. 214 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case name: [1] Clico International Life Insurance Limited [2] Wilbur Harrigan v [1] Eastern Caribbean Baptist Mission [2] Jeriann George [3] Hensworth Jonas [ANUHCVAP2019/0035] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: N/A Appellants: Mr. Ramon Alleyne SC with him Mr. Rene Bitcher and Ms. Talia DaCosta Respondents: Ms. Chantal Marshall with her Ms. Andrea Smithen- Henry Issue: Civil appeal - Enforcement - Section 5 of the Judgments Act - Corporate veil - Beneficial interest - Ownership of property -Overriding interests - Whether the learned Judge complied with the requirements of Part 55 of Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 and erred in finding that there was sufficient basis to permit the corporate veil to be lifted and to find that CLICO was the beneficial and true owner of the land - Whether the Judge in the Court below was entitled to make the order for the enforcement of a claim against the first Appellant in circumstances it was under judicial management – Whether Part 55 of the CPR, Section 5 and Section 3 of the Judgments Act permit an Order for Sale with respect to the Land in circumstances where the Appellant, as Judgment Debtor, only holds a beneficial interest therein - Nature of appellate jurisdiction Type of Order: Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved.

Reason:

N/A

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEAL SITTING ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA VIDEOCONFERENCE Monday, 24 th February 2025 – Friday, 28 th February 2025 JUDGMENTS Case name: Warren Cassell v The King [MNIHCRAP2022/0003] MONTSERRAT Date: Thursday, 27 th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett Respondent: Mr. Richard Jory KC with him Mr. Henry Gordon Issue: Criminal appeal – Appeal against conviction – Concealing the proceeds of criminal conduct – Section 33 (1) (a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1999 – Duplicity – Whether the indictment was duplicitous – No Case Submission – Whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the no case submission – Tendering Documents- Evidence – Whether the judge erred in not requiring the documentary evidence of the crown to be admitted and marked before allowing the jury to consider those documents – Whether the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory Result/order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

[1]Police Constable Bertrand Nestor

[2]The Attorney General v Daran Edwards [SLUHCVAP2022/0022] SAINT LUCIA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants: Ms. Rochelle John Charles Respondent: Ms. Maureen John-Xavier holding papers for Ms. Natalie Da Breo Issue: Interlocutory appeal – Appeal against the learned master’s refusal to strike out the claim – Whether the learned master erred in the exercise of his discretion – Interpretation and Application of Article 28 of the Code of Civil of Procedure Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of St. Lucia – Failure to serve Article 28 notice (giving one month’s notice) on public officer before claim is issued – Whether failure to serve Article 28 notice on the public officer is fatal to the claim – Whether notice is required to be served on Attorney General – Whether the learned master failed to have regard to the legal effect of section 13 (2) and section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act of Saint Lucia Result/Order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The appeal is allowed with respect to the first appellant only as defendant, and the order of the learned judge is to this extent set aside. the Claim in the Court. below is struck out as against the first appellant. The costs order made in the court below against the first appellant is accordingly set aside. Given the findings herein and the consequential outcome, this appeal should be costs neutral and will, therefore, make no order as to costs. Reason:

[3]Gaye Hechme ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant/Respondent: Mr. Hugh Marshall Respondents/Applicants: Dr. David Dorsett with him Mr. Andrew Young for the 1 st respondent Issue: Motion for conditional leave to His Majesty in Council – Section 122(2)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 – Whether leave should be granted by reason of The Issue: being one of great general or public importance or otherwise – Whether leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council should be granted on a decision for an application for extension of time for leave to Appeal – Whether there was an existing appeal from which leave could be granted Type of Order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

2.In the Montserrat Proceeds of Crime Act where an individual attempts to conceal criminal property, this may involve disguising, converting or transferring the said property once it is done for the purpose of avoiding prosecution for an offence. Upon examining the activity that the appellant was charged with, that is concealing, it is clear that this was a single activity covering a course of conduct by the appellant over a period of time. Therefore, the charge was not duplicitous. The particulars of the indictment followed strictly the wording of the legislation in alternatively describing the nature of the offence and did not create separate offences. Therefore, this ground of appeal fails. Proceeds of the Crime Act 1999 Chap 4.04 Laws of Montserrat; Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2024, Sweet & Maxwell considered; The Commonwealth Caribbean Criminal Practice and Procedure, Dana S. Seetahal with updates with Roger Ramgoolam, Routledge, 4 th Edition considered; Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2025, Oxford University Press, considered; Ware v Fox [1967] 1 All ER 100 considered; Thomson v Knights [1947] 1 All ER 112 applied.

3.The criteria which a trial judge ought to apply to a submission of no case to answer is whether there is material on which a jury could without irrationality be satisfied of guilt. Where there is such material, the trial judge must allow the trial to proceed. In a criminal trial, the judge has a supervisory role and in effect carries out a filtering process to decide what evidence is placed before the jury. The trial judge is tasked with and may be required to consider whether the prosecution has provided sufficient evidence to leave the case to the jury for decision. R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 applied; Daley v R [1998] 1 WLR 494 applied.

1.The conviction of the appellant is hereby quashed and the sentence set aside.

2.There is no retrial in this matter. Reason:

1.If a charge contains more than one offence, it is defective and considered bad for duplicity. The stated purpose for the rule against duplicity is to enable a defendant to know the case he is being called upon to answer so that he will not be prejudiced or embarrassed in preparing his defence. Such prejudice or embarrassment could result if the defendant is uncertain as to the specific offence for which he is charged. This principle has been developed and designed to ensure fairness. However, more than one incident of commission of the offence may be included in a count if those incidents taken together amount to a course of conduct having regard to time, place or purpose of commission. Thus, where a person is charged with a single offence which can be carried out in a multiplicity of ways a charge will not be bad for duplicity even where a number of separate criminal acts are implied. Section 33(1)(a) of the Proceeds of the Crime Act 1999 Laws of Montserrat applied; United Kingdom Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 considered.

4.It is common ground that the proper approach to a submission of no case to answer can be found in the age-old test propounded by Lane CJ in the case of R v Galbraith. In considering the submission of no case to answer, the Court must have in mind the charge before the Court and its constituent parts in order to assess whether either of the two (2) limbs of R v Galbraith apply. The constituent elements as set out in the indictment in this matter required not only oral testimony but the necessary documentary evidence to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the appellant had committed the offence for which he was charged. Failure by the Crown to properly tender the relevant documents was fatal to their case. R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 applied.

5.With respect to the second limb of Galbraith, the issue to be decided by the Court is, not whether there was some evidence but if what evidence existed was of such a tenuous nature that the case ought not to be left to the jury. This involves an assessment or evaluation of the quality and reliability of the evidence rather than the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Taken as a whole, the jury in this matter was faced with satisfying themselves to the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, that in the absence of the relevant documentation, the appellant had committed the offence of concealing the proceeds of criminal conduct, as alleged by the Crown. In this matter, in the absence of documentary evidence, the case against the appellant was tenuous and the jury was in effect left with little or no evidence upon which to conclude that the necessary framework required for the essential elements of the charge were placed before them, in order to come to a conclusion of guilt to the required standard. The Crown’s evidence taken at its highest, was such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict the appellant, and the learned trial judge ought to have accepted the no case submission and consequently had a duty to withdraw the case from the jury. Having failed to do so the learned trial judge erred. This ground of appeal therefore succeeds. R v Colin Shippey et al [1988] CLR 767 applied; Edwin Gomez v The Queen ANUHCRAP2014/0012 consolidated with Isaiah Benjamin v The Queen ANUHCRAP2014/0013 (delivered 17 th August 2022, unreported) followed.

6.It is trite law that all documents, photographs and reports used as evidence must satisfy the requirements of the law to be admitted as evidence. During a trial, each piece of evidence should be marked and formally admitted. Such exhibits must be marked and formally admitted into evidence before they can be considered by the judge and jury. At no point in the transcript of the proceedings of the court below were any documents tendered and marked accordingly by the court as exhibits in the proceedings. In fact, the documents did not form part of the Record of Appeal. This procedure is highly irregular and unusual in either civil or criminal matters. In the absence of agreement of the parties that the documents were not being challenged, the documents ought not to be shown to the jury unless and until they have been properly tendered and marked as exhibits. The learned trial judge therefore erred in allowing the jury to be shown documents relative to the matter during the Crown’s opening address and further allowing the jury to highlight or identify certain portions of those documents before they were properly tendered as exhibits in the matter. Further, the jury was allowed to consider the documents during their deliberations. Failure to produce the necessary documents in support of their case left the Crown’s case bare of the necessary proof required to show to the jury that the appellant did what the Crown sought to represent that he had done. R v Troy Christian ANUHCR2022/0062 (delivered 16 th January 2024, unreported), applied; Paragraph 2.12 of Stone’s Justices Manual 2024, Butterworths considered.

7.There was a material irregularity when the learned trial judge not only allowed the jury to be shown documents which were not admitted into evidence at the opening of the case for the Crown but further those documents remained with the jurors throughout the entirety of the trial and also during their deliberations, without ever having been admitted, tendered or marked as exhibits by the court. This Court is therefore left in doubt with regards to the correctness of the conviction of this appellant, and having considered all of the circumstances of the case, this Court cannot be satisfied that this conviction is safe and satisfactory and there is a real risk that this appellant was convicted on evidence which ought not to have been seen or considered by the jury, as it was not properly tendered at his trial. A miscarriage of justice has therefore occurred. This ground of appeal also succeeds. Case name: The Attorney General v James St. Prix [SLUHCVAP2022/0014] SAINT LUCIA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Ms. Rochelle John Charles Respondent: Ms. Maureen John-Xavier Issue: Interlocutory appeal – Appeal against the learned master’s refusal to strike out claim – Whether the learned master erred in the exercise of his discretion – Interpretation and application of Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Saint Lucia (“CCP”) – Failure to serve Article 28 notice (giving one month’s notice) on public officer before claim is issued – Whether the learned master erred in finding that an Article 28 Notice need only be served on the public officer if such public officer is named as a defendant to the claim – Whether the learned master erred in finding that the claim for vicarious liability against the Attorney General would survive where the Article 28 Notice is not served on the public officer who is not named as a defendant to the claim – Sections 4(4) and 13(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act (“CPA”) – Whether the learned master failed to have regard to the legal effect of section 13(2) and section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act of Saint Lucia Result/order: [Oral delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed, and the order of the learned master is affirmed.

2.The appellant will pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed by a judge of the High Court if not agreed within 21 days of this judgment. Reason:

1.Article 28 lays down the procedure where suits are brought against a public officer, and it clearly imposes a bar against the institution of any judgment against a public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function. The object of the notice required under Article 28 of the CCP is to inform the public officer, or other person fulfilling any public duty or function (the actual tortfeasor) before-hand of the nature of the action contemplated and to give him an opportunity to consider his legal position. It clearly affords a privilege to a public officer against whom legal proceedings are actually contemplated. Where the officer is not intended to be joined as defendant, Article 28 is not engaged. Where a claimant has taken the strategic decision to not sue the public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function for damages, there is no need to afford him or her notice of legal proceedings in which he or she will not be joined as defendant and where no legal remedies are being pursued against him or her. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024, SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) applied; Bihari Chowdhary & Anr v State of Bihar and Ors 1984 AIR 1043 considered; Bhagchand Dagadusha Gujarati and Ors. v Secretary of State for India (1927) 43 TLR 617 considered.

2.The wording in Article 28 of the CCP is clear and it must therefore be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Given the legislative context and the wording of Article 28, it is clear that the drafters did not intend to impose a similar pre-action protocol in regard to the Crown or the State because at the time the CCP would have been promulgated, the legal landscape in regard to liability of the Crown would have been quite different, that is, the Crown was immune from liability. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Conseil des Ports Nationaux v Langelier [1969] SCR 60 applied.

3.A claimant who sues the Crown for a tort committed by a public officer does not need to bring proceedings against the officer personally because the CPA makes clear that the Crown is subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents. Initially, one needed to identify an individual Crown servant who had committed a tort in the course of their duties or employment. However, this is no longer the case. Recognising that it may be difficult or impossible to positively prove which one of several servants was tortious (what may be described as “collective failures”), the court have nevertheless found employers vicariously liable. While primary liability of the primary tortfeasor/servant must be made out, it is therefore not always possible or necessary to join the primary tortfeasor as a defendant in order to prove his primary liability or in order to establish vicarious liability of the Crown. It therefore follows that it will not always be possible or indeed necessary to serve notice of intended action on the public officer who is the primary tortfeasor. Hogg, Monahan, and Wright- “Liability of the Crown” (Carswell 4 th edn, 2011) applied; The Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; The Queen v Levy Brothers Company Limited and the Western Assurance Company [1961] SCR 189 applied.

4.Procedurally, section 13 of the CPA makes clear that in a suit by or against the Crown, the authority to be named as claimant or defendant is the Attorney General. Section 13 does not prohibit or prevent suit being instituted personally against a public officer who is an alleged tortfeasor. Rather it simply codifies the position that the Crown may be vicariously liable for his actions. Section 13 of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Basil Williams v The Attorney General of Guyana et al [2023]] CCJ 3 (AJ) GY applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024, SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) applied; Bertha Compton v Dr. Nathaniel et al SLUHCVAP2004/0012 (delivered 15 th February 2005, unreported) applied; General Aviation Services Ltd et al v The Director General of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority et al SLUHCVAP2012/006 (delivered 11 th September, unreported) applied.

5.Section 4(4) of the CPA essentially states that any legal provision which limits the liability of a government department or Crown officer in relation to a tort will also apply to the Crown when being sued under this section. This means that the Crown is treated as if it were that specific department or officer, in terms of liability limitations for that particular tort. The scheme of Article 28 is procedural in its wording and intent. The framers of Article 28 intended to encourage parties to consider their legal position and make amends or settle if so advised. The object is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation. This characterization is not consistent with an enactment which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of an officer of the Crown in respect of any delict or quasi-delict which he or she may have committed. Article 28 protections are therefore not captured by section 4(4) of the CPA. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section 4 (4) of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2007] 3 All ER 513 applied; Vallayan Chettier v Government of the Province of Madras AIR 1947 PC 197 considered. Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) considered. Section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied. Case name:

1.The language of Article 28 of the CCP is clear. There is therefore no need to resort to any rules of interpretation outside the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used. Article 28 of the CCP imposes a bar against the institution of a suit in damages, or the entry of any judgment against a public officer or other person fulfilling any public duty or function in respect of any act purported to be done by him in his official capacity unless written notice of such suit has been served on him or her personally at his domicile at least one month before the suit is issued. Article 28 of the CCP lays down the procedure where suits are brought against public officers or individuals who are fulfilling a public duty or function. The provision is imperative in its language, and it clearly affords protection to public officers. The notice must be served upon the public officer or principal tortfeasor personally. The service of this notice on a public officer or a person fulfilling public duties or function is therefore a prerequisite (where he or she is joined as a defendant), essential to the success of legal proceedings against the public officer. If it is not given, the claim against that public officer must be rejected, struck out and dismissed, and the court cannot issue any award for damages. Article 28 of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2:05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) applied.

2.Prior to the enactment of the CPA, the Crown remained immune from claims in tort as there was no other procedural vehicle to bring a tort claim against the Crown. However, this is no longer the case. The proviso to section 4(1) makes clear that under the CPA, no right of action exists against the Crown in tort unless the act or omission would, apart from the provisions of the Act, give rise to a cause of action in tort against that servant or agent or his estate in respect of whom it is alleged that vicarious liability arises against the Crown. Sections 4(1) and 13 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) applied; Conseil des Ports Nationaux v Langelier [1969] S.C.R 60 considered; Section 80 of the India Code of Civil Procedure 1908 considered; Bhagchand Dagadusha Gujrati and others v Secretary of State for India (1927) 43 TLR 617 considered.

3.Section 13(2) of the CPA makes clear that in a suit by or against the Crown, the authority to be named as claimant or defendant is the Attorney General. The Attorney General may well be the principal legal advisor of the Government but under section 13(2) of the CPA, he has been statutorily designated as the nominal defendant when suing the Crown in right of her Majesty’s Government in Saint Lucia. There is therefore no personal or primary liability which attaches the Attorney General. The operating liability here is vicarious and it is attached to the Crown. Sections 13(2) and 30 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section 8 Interpretation Act Cap 1.06 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Town Investments Ltd. and another v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 considered; M v Home Office [1992] 1 QB 270 considered; Basil Williams v Attorney General of Guyana et al [2013] CCJ (AJ) GY applied.

4.Even where a claim against the officer is struck out not on the merits but for non- service of the Article 28 Notice, it may still be possible to maintain the vicarious liability against the Crown once the pleadings contain reasonable information as to the circumstances in which it is alleged that the liability of the Crown has arisen and as to the government department and officer of the Crown involved. Part 59 Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied; Laurence v Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District 255 Ariz. 95, 528 P.3d 139 considered; Peter Clarke v The Attorney General et al SLUHCV1999/0475 (delivered 19 th April 2004, unreported) distinguished; DeGraff v Smith 157 P.2d 342, 62 Ariz. 261 considered.

5.The mere allegation of malice does not deprive a public officer protection under Article 28. A public officer is entitled to notice of suit even if it is alleged that in the discharge of his duty, he has acted with malice and not bona fide. Gordon v The Attorney General for Jamaica [1997] UKPC 21 distinguished; Kirby v Simpson (1854) 156 E.R 482 applied; Samantha Koti Reddi v Pothuri Subbiah and Others 46IND. CAS. 86 considered.

6.Section 4(4) of the CPA essentially states that any legal provision which limits the liability of a government department or Crown officer in relation to a tort will also apply to the Crown when being sued under this section. This means that the Crown is treated as if it were that specific department or officer, in terms of liability limitations for that particular tort. The scheme of Article 28 is procedural in its wording and intent. The framers of Article 28 intended to encourage parties to consider their legal position and make amends or settle if so advised. The object is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation. This characterization is not consistent with an enactment which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of an officer of the Crown in respect of any delict or quasi-delict which he or she may have committed. Article 28 protections are therefore not captured by section 4(4) of the CPA. Article 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Cap 22.08 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Section 4 (4) of the Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2007] 3 All ER 513 applied; Vallayan Chettier v Government of the Province of Madras AIR 1947 PC 197 considered. Bryan James et al v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2013/0023, SLUHCVAP2013/0024,SLUHCVAP2014/0021 (delivered 10 th February 2016, unreported) considered. Section 4(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied.

7.Under section 26 of the CPA, any statutory defence available to a negligent employee of the Crown should equally be available to the Crown when the Crown was sued as vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence. Even if the provisions of section 26 could be said to apply in this case, in this appeal the respondent would in fact have served the Article 28 Notice on the Attorney General and so the Crown would have had the full benefit of the privilege afforded by that Article. Section 26 Crown Proceedings Act Cap 2.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia applied; Durity v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2002] UKPC 20 applied. Case name: DeAndre Henry v The King [ANUHCRAP2022/0004] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram for delivery: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Jason Tiwari Respondent: Ms. Shannon Jones-Gittens Issue: Criminal Appeal – Appeal against sentence – Aggravated Burglary – Section 33(1) of the Larceny Act of Antigua and Barbuda – The maximum sentence for the offence of aggravated burglary – Whether the appellant’s sentence is excessive in the circumstances Result/order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The appeal against sentence on the Second Offence is allowed. The sentence of 18 years imprisonment is set aside, and a sentence of 10 years, 5 months, and 3 days is substituted, commencing from the date of sentencing of the appellant on 9 th May 2018. Reason: When the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery on 1 st February 2017, section 6 of the Law Revision Act 2000 was still in force. Under this section, section 33 of the Larceny Act was amended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for the offence of aggravated robbery. Section 3 of the Larceny (Amendment) Act 2017 which amended the Larceny Act to impose a maximum sentence of 35 years for the offence of aggravated robbery only came into force on 14 th December 2017. Thus, at the material time, the relevant legislation in Antigua and Barbuda provided a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for aggravated robbery. The practice of the judges in Antigua and Barbuda was to treat the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years as a maximum of 25 years for aggravated robbery in accordance with the approach of Zuniga v R where the doctrine of severance was deployed to remove the mandatory aspects of relevant legislation to remove the inconsistency with the constitutional provisions. Applying that approach, the words “not less than” can be excised from section 33A(1) to provide for a maximum period of 25 years for the offence of aggravated burglary. This is broadly similar to the approach taken by the learned trial judge and reflects the previous practice by trial judges in Antigua and Barbuda. Section 33A(1) of the Larceny Act Cap 241 of the Revised Laws of Antigua and Barbuda applied; Section 6 of the Law Revision, Miscellaneous Provisions Act No. 2 of Act No. 9 of 2000 applied; Section 3 of the Larceny (Amendment) Act No. 29 of 2017 considered; Zuniga v R (2014) 84 WIR 101 applied. An appeal against sentence is an appeal against the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion. An appellate court will only interfere with a sentence passed by the trial judge where it is manifestly excessive, or where the wrong principle has been applied in imposing the sentence. In determining whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, the Court must consider the circumstances of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. In this case, the learned judge erred in using a starting point of 20 years. He was bound by the decision of Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen which established that the appropriate starting point used in Antigua and Barbuda at the time for aggravated robberies involving a firearm was 15 years. Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen ANUHCRAP2018/0002 and 2016/0004 (dated 12 th June 2018, unreported) applied; Akim Monah v The Queen GDAHCRAP2021/0015 (delivered 23 rd February 2022, unreported) considered; Simon Marius v The King SLUHCRAP2008/0007 (delivered 16 th January 2025, unreported) applied; R v Sergeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 applied. Given that the maximum sentence in cases of aggravated robbery should be 25 years imprisonment, the appropriate starting point on the notional sentence shall be 15 years in keeping with the principles of Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen. With a starting point of 15 years, decreased by one year for the mitigating factor of no previous convictions, the notional sentence is reduced to 14 years with an increase of 5 years for the combined aggravating factors with a total notional sentence of 19 years. In respect of the credit for plea and cooperation, the learned judge noted that the appellant was to receive a 25% discount for his guilty plea, because the plea was not given at the first opportunity, although it was given before any listing for trial. The appellant takes no issue with this 25% discount, and it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere. This means that the appellant’s sentence should be 14 years, 3 months (171 months). Deducting the total period of 3 years, 9 months, 27 days that the appellant spent on remand, the sentence imposed on the appellant for the conviction on the Second Offence is 10 years, 5 months and 3 days. Glenis Messiah v The Queen and Corian Thomas v The Queen ANUHCRAP2018/0002 and 2016/0004 (dated 12 th June 2018, unreported) applied; Desmond Baptiste v The Queen Criminal Appeal No.8 of 2003 (dated 6 th December 2004, unreported) applied; Omari Phillip v The King (ANUHCRAP2016/0008 dated 13 th November 2024) applied. APPLICATIONS AND APPEALS Case name: BOI Bank Corporation v Sodecorp SA [ANUHCVAP2023/0038] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant/Respondent: No appearance Respondent/Applicant: Dr. David Dorsett Issue: Application for security for costs – Rule 62.17 Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 – The merits of the appeal – Appeal against an enforcement order – Whether the demand for security of costs is fair, just, and proportionate – The likely ability of the appellant to pay the costs of the appeal if ordered to do so Type of order: Oral Decision Result/order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The respondent/appellant shall provide security for the applicant/respondent’s costs in the sum of $7500.00, such sum to be paid in Court within 14 days of this order.

2.The appeal be dismissed with costs if the security for costs ordered in paragraph 1 is not provided in the amount, manner and by the time ordered.

3.The applicant/respondent shall have its costs in the amount of EC$1500.00.

4.The Registrar of the high court shall serve a copy of this order to be served on the Bank’s registered agent. Reason: Before the Court was an application for security for costs filed on 19 th March 2024. That application was supported by an affidavit filed on even date. The Court also had regard to the notice of opposition filed on 28 th March 2024 and the affidavit in opposition which supported that notice filed on 17 th April 2024. The Court considered the amended notice of appeal in this matter filed on 6 th December 2023, the judgment in respect of which the appeal was lodged dated 25 th November 2023. The Court also considered the legal submissions advanced by the respondent/applicant as well as the submissions by the appellant/respondent and the applicable legal principles relevant to an application for security for costs. The Court also applied the judgment in Keary Development Ltd. v Tarmac Construction Ltd. [1995] 3 ALL ER 534 and Ultramarine (Antigua) Limited v Sunsail (Antigua) Limited ANUHCVAP2016/0004 (delivered 7 th April, 2017, unreported). These legal principles indicate that the Court must carry out a balancing exercise when considering an application for security for costs. On the one hand the Court must weigh the injustice caused from the appellant pursuing a proper claim and on the other, the Court must weigh the injustice to the respondent if no security is ordered, and the appellant’s case fails, and the respondent is unable to recover from the appellant the costs which would have been incurred in defence of the claim. The Court was also aware and has considered that it should be concerned not to allow the power to order security for costs to be used as an instrument of oppression. Having considered the application and the evidence filed in opposition the Court was not satisfied that the respondent to the application has furnished the Court with any cogent evidence of their means so as to satisfy the Court on a balance of probabilities that the claim would be stifled if security for costs would be ordered. Notwithstanding, the Court took the view that the applicant has not provided to its satisfaction, evidence on which the sum of USD$25,000.00 should be ordered as security for costs likely to be incurred for this appeal. The Court was nevertheless of the view that some form of security should be ordered in this case, and that CPR 65.20 (1) provides that costs of an appeal are to be assessed. The Court was therefore minded to exercise its discretion and made an order for security for costs in the sum of EC$7500.00. Case name: BOI Bank Corporation v Jose Rafael Padron Salazar [ANUHCVAP2023/0039] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant/Respondent: No appearance Respondent/Applicant: Dr. David Dorsett Issue: Application to vary order – Order that the appellant shall provide security for the respondent’s costs in the sum of two-thirds of the costs incurred at the High Court within 14 days – Whether the order complies with rule 62.21(4) Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 – Noncompliance with order – Whether the appeal should be dismissed Type of order: Oral decision Result/order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.Leave is granted to withdraw the application filed on 8 th August 2024.

2.There is no order as to costs. Reason: Before the Court was an application filed on 8 th August 2024 seeking to vary the order of a single judge dated 23 rd April 2024 granting security for costs to reflect an amendment in Item 1 of the Order which would read as follows: “The respondent/appellant shall provide security for the applicant’s/respondent’s costs in the sum of two-thirds the costs incurred at the High Court to be paid within 14 days of this order. The application further sought an order to dismiss the appeal filed on the 16 th November 2023 with costs if the security is not provided in the amount, in the manner and by the time ordered.” The Court reviewed the notice of opposition filed on 15 th August 2024 and considered the written legal submissions from both parties. Counsel for the applicant/respondent, made an oral application to withdraw the application before the Court. The Court noted the undertaking provided by the applicant/ respondent’s counsel to pay into court the sum of one thousand dollars received from the appellant/respondent on the 15 th of May 2024 in purported compliance of the order for the payment of security for costs, and therefore, withdrew the application filed on 24th April 2024. Case name: Keir Construction Limited v

[1]Sundry Workers

[2]George Dexter Tavernier (Trading as Tavernier Construction) [ANUHCVAP2022/0009] [formerly ANUHLTAP2019/0007] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicant: Mr. Kendrickson Kentish Respondents: Ms. Safiya Roberts for the 1 st respondent Mr. Cosbert Cumberbatch for the 2 nd respondent Issue: Motion for conditional leave to His Majesty in Council – Section 122(1)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 – Appeal as of right – Whether the order of the Court is a final order or interlocutory – Whether the applicant has met the prescribed threshold for the grant of conditional leave to appeal to appeal to His Majesty in Council – Section 122(2)(a) of the Constitution Order 1981 Type of order: Directions Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The respondents are to file brief submissions addressing the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 on or before 11 th March 2025.

2.The applicant is at liberty to file submissions in reply, confined solely to those submissions raised by the respondents which address the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 on or before 19 th March 2025.

3.Judgment is reserved pending the receipt of the submissions by the parties. Reason: The Court was of the view that counsel for the respondents ought to be afforded an opportunity to provide brief submissions which are confined to addressing the authority of Chhina v Ismail [2024] 1 WLR 2459 which was raised by counsel for the applicant during the court of his oral submissions in reply. Case name:

[1]Akkel Caribbean Properties Limited

[2]David Bond

[2]Ena Bond v Carlisle Bay Limited [ANUHCVAP2024/0003] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Monday, 24 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Esco L. Henry, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants/Respondents: Ms. Joanne Massiah Respondent/Applicant: Mr. David Jospeh KC with him Ms. Rose-Mary Reynolds Issue: Application to strike out appeal – Whether appeal should be struck out as a nullity – Failure of appellants/respondents to seek leave to appeal – Whether the order for sale is an interlocutory or final order – Rule 62.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2023 – Application Test – Application for an adjournment – Whether the appellant’s/respondent’s provided cogent evidence in support of the application for the adjournment Type of order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The appellants’/respondents’ application to adjourn the matter is refused.

2.The application to strike out the notice of appeal is granted.

3.The notice of appeal filed on 24 th January 2024 is declared a nullity and is struck out.

4.Costs are awarded to the respondent/applicant in the sum of $2,000.00 to be paid within 21 days from today’s date, that is, or on or before 17 th March 2025. Reason: The Court was of the view that the appellants’/respondents’ application for an adjournment, made orally, was not supported by cogent evidence. The Court took into account the reasons advanced in support of the adjournment, the fact that the matter was case managed on 20 th January 2025 and the appellants/respondents, and their attorney would have received directions for the filing of legal submissions and setting a window for the hearing of the application. The appellants/respondents were therefore obliged comply with the Court’s order and to file and serve their legal submissions. However, the appellants/respondents elected not to file any written submissions. The Court determined that the reasons for the adjournment were not cogent or reasonable and after noting the appellants’/respondents’ failure to file and serve written legal submissions determined that it would not entertain any oral submissions from the appellants/respondents in response to the application. The substantive application before the Court was an application filed on 23 rd August 2024 by the respondent/applicant for an order that the notice of appeal filed on 24 th January 2024 be struck out and for costs. The notice of appeal was against a decision of the learned master given on 12 th December 2023 where in respect of an application filed by the respondent/applicant, made an order, inter alia, for sale of certain property by private treaty or public auction in satisfaction of a judgment debt on the condition that the respondent/applicant file a supplementary affidavit exhibiting a second valuation report from a qualified land valuer or surveyor within 21 days of the order. The basis for the application to strike out the appeal was that the proposed appeal was against an interlocutory order of the High Court and the appellants/respondents did not seek leave to file the appeal as they were required to do in accordance with Rule 62.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023. Rule 62.1(3) provides that a determination as to whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is made on the application test. The sole issue for the Court’s consideration was whether the learned master’s order was interlocutory or final. The Court considered the notice of application to strike out, the affidavit of Angel Charles filed on 20 th August 2024 in support, the written skeleton arguments filed on 10 th October 2024 by the respondent/applicant and all oral submissions presented on behalf of the respondent/applicant. The test for whether an order is final or interlocutory is set out in Antigua Commercial Bank v Louise Martin ANUHCVAP2007/0022 (delivered 15 th January 2008, unreported) where it was held that in determining whether a party required leave to appeal from a decision of the High Court, Rule 62.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 had to be read with section 31(2)(g) of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Antigua and Barbuda) Act to the effect that any person who wishes to appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order of the High Court must first obtain leave of a judge or of the Court of Appeal. The Application test is used to determine whether an order is interlocutory or final. It is well established than an order made on an application which would not necessarily bring an end to the proceedings whichever way a decision was made is an interlocutory order and not a final order. Consequently, applying that test, and on the authority of Zion v Lacey Sea Shell Reefs Limited ANUHCVAP2007/0029 (delivered 19 th February 2008, unreported) cited by the respondent/applicant that the order made by the learned master on 12 th December 2023 is an interlocutory order, the Court so found that the order would not have necessarily brought the proceedings to an end irrespective of which way the application for sale was resolved. Therefore, leave was required to file the notice of appeal. Leave was neither sought nor granted. As stated by the Court in Oliver McDonna v Benjamin Wilson Richardson AXAHCVAP2005/0003 (delivered 25 th November, 2013, unreported) (“McDonna”) an appeal from an interlocutory order cannot be commenced until leave is granted. Furthermore, the Court took into consideration its pronouncement in McDonna that “any notice which may have been filed without leave being first obtained is of no effect and is completely valueless and void. It cannot be revived by the subsequent granting of leave”. Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed 24 th January 2024 was declared a nullity and was struck out. Case name: Aldy Cornelius (As Lawful Attorney for Marilyn Cornelius) v Eustace Cornelius [ANUHCVAP2021/0012] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant/Respondent: Mr. Hugh Marshall Respondent/Appellant: Mr. Sherfield Bowen Issue: Application to strike out notice of appeal – Want of prosecution – Whether the Court should strike out the appeal on the ground of the respondent/appellant failing to take the all necessary steps with the Registry of the High Court to arrange for the transcript of the proceedings – Whether it is just and equitable in the circumstances to strike out the appeal Type of order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The notice of appeal filed by the appellant on 12 th May 2021 is struck out for want of prosecution. Reason: This is an application by Eustace Cornelius, the respondent in the appeal and the applicant in the application, to strike out the notice of appeal filed in this matter on 12 th May 2021. The appeal arises from a judgment of Justice Robertson in the High Court of Antigua and Barbuda dated 31 st March 2021. The appeal was filed on 12 th May 2021 which is within the period of 42 days required for the filing of the appeal. The application to strike out the notice of appeal was made on 3 rd October 2024 on the ground that since the filing of the notice of appeal, over 3 years prior to the filing of the application, the appellant has taken no further steps to prosecute the appeal. Evidently, after the appeal has been filed and no steps were taken to pursue the appeal, the appeal was set down for status hearing on 27 th February 2023. At the status hearing, it was ordered that the appellant take the necessary steps with the Registry of the High Court to arrange for the transcript of proceedings and that the Registrar of the High Court shall thereafter take the necessary steps to obtain the transcript. It was also ordered that the matter be removed from the status hearing list to be relisted at the next status hearing upon availability of the transcript or on a date fixed by the Chief Registrar. According to the applicant, to the date of filing of the application to strike out the notice of appeal, the appellant has taken no steps to prosecute the appeal well over 3 years since the filing of the appeal and almost 1 year, 8 months after the status hearing order. In an affidavit in opposition to the strike out filed on 8 th November 2024, the appellant claimed that promptly after the status hearing order, she accompanied her attorney to the office of the registry of the High Court to make arrangements for the transcript of proceedings and paid the sum of $500 dollars at the registry on account of the ordering of the transcript. The appellant denies failure to take the necessary steps to arrange for the transcript of the proceedings and states that, in fact, she promptly took all the necessary steps on 7 th March 2023, his language, that is, in the affidavit in opposition. This, of course, is just under 2 years ago when the appellant says she took all the necessary steps. The appellant has given no explanation for the 1 year, 9 months which elapsed between the filing of the appeal and his endeavouring to carry out the status hearing order or the 2 years which elapsed since she sought to make arrangements for the transcript. Counsel for the appellant Mr. Bowen sought to argue that the procedure in place at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in this case is that the appellant awaited the notification of availability of the transcript before doing anything else to progress the appeal. The Court was not persuaded by this line of argument by counsel. It has always been the case that upon filing an appeal, an appellant would or should take such steps as are necessary to progress the appeal, and if there are delays occasioned by the High Court office, then the appellant should take all such steps as are reasonable and practical to cause the transcript to be produced and to show evidence of these steps even when required to satisfy the Court that the appellant is interested in and proceeding to get his appeal heard. We have heard no such evidence from the appellant. Indeed, the appellant has not sought to argue that the delays in progressing the appeal were not inordinate. The appellant has not sought to argue that she will suffer any prejudice from the notice of appeal being struck out other than to say that he would be prejudiced if the application is granted. The appellant has not sought to argue that she has an appeal with any prospect of success other than to file the notice of appeal with 3 grounds of appeal. The Court is satisfied that the conditions prerequisite for the striking out of a notice of appeal have been met and the one factor which could have overridden these prerequisites, that is, strong prospects of success on the appeal, are not here apparent. Case name: Delvia Pierre v

[1]Tywana Morris

[2]Tenijah Morris [ANUMCVAP2025/0001] [Formerly ANUMCVAP2018/0004] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant/Respondent: Ms. Mandi A. Thomas Respondents/Appellants: No appearance Issue: Application to strike out appeal – Want of prosecution – Abuse of process – Whether the Court should strike out the appeal where the appellant has failed to serve the notice of appeal and the record of appeal on the respondent – Whether the application should be struck out on the ground that the appellant has seemingly abandoned the appeal by failing to appear at any Status Hearing of the matter or demonstrated any interest in the appeal – Whether the appellant’s appeal lacks merit Type of order: Oral Decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The notice of appeal filed on 18 th November 2018 against the decision of the magistrate dated 9 th October 2018 is struck out for want of prosecution.

2.The appellant shall pay costs to the respondent in the sum of $1,500. Reason: Before the Court was an application to strike out the notice of appeal filed on 18 th November 2018. Upon reading the applicant’s written submissions and hearing the applicant’s oral submissions and upon noting that the respondent was served with a notice of hearing filed on 27 th January 2025 but did not appear in Court, the Court was of the view that the application to strike out should be granted. The Court was of the view that the applicant had satisfied the prerequisites in that there was prejudice to the applicant since the appeal was filed 6 years ago but there had been no service on the respondent. The Court noted that, that amounted to an inordinate delay and there were no reasons provided for the delay by the appellant. The Court therefore struck out the appeal for want of prosecution with costs in the amount of $1,500.00 to be paid to the applicant/respondent. Case name: Everton Welsh v The Attorney General [ANUHCVAP2021/0011] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Tuesday, 25 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mr. Mario Michel, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett Respondent: Mrs. Carla Brookes-Harris Issue: Civil appeal – Appeal against order dismissing claim for an administrative order – Section 15(2) of the Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda – Continuation of a portion of criminal trial in appellant’s absence – Sentencing judgment delivered in the absence of the appellant – Abridged notice of hearing – Whether the abridged notice of hearing afforded the appellant a reasonable opportunity of appearing before the court – Counsel for the appellant present in court for the handing down of the sentencing judgment – Whether the learned judge erred in finding that the appellant had consented to his absence from trial, validating the judgment handed down on 27 th May 2015 – Whether the appellant’s right to the protection of the law as guaranteed by section 3 of the Constitution was contravened when a portion of the appellant’s criminal trial, namely, the sentencing hearing was conducted in the appellant’s absence and in contravention of section 15(2) of the Constitution Type of Order: Directions Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Registrar of the High Court do produce and make available to the Court and to counsel for the parties, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings in this matter on 27 th May 2015, if available within 28 days of the date of this order.

2.If the transcript is produced to the Court and to the parties, the parties are required to file further submissions in this matter within 21 days of the date of receipt of the transcript.

3.The judgment of the Court will be delivered after receipt of the further submissions by counsel or notification by the Registrar of the High Court that the transcript is not available. Reason: Having heard both counsels in the appeal against the decision of Justice Roberston dated 29 th March 2021, the Court noted that the transcript of proceedings is necessary to properly address the issues before the Court. Consequently, counsel for both parties would be required to file further submissions upon receipt of the transcript. Accordingly, the Court gave directions for the Registrar of the High Court to provide the parties with the transcript and gave directions for the filing of further submissions. Case name:

[1]JSN Development Group Limited

[2]HBC1 Properties Limited v

[1]Global Bank of Commerce Limited

[2]Brian Stuart-Young [ANUHCVAP2022/0025] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac- Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellants/Respondents: Mr. Andrew O’Kola Respondents/Appellants: Dr. David Dorsett for the 1st respondent Mr. Jason Tiwari for the 2nd respondent Issue: Application to strike out the first appellant – Whether the first appellant should be struck out on the ground of the dissolution of the company – Section 511 of the Companies Act 1995 – Whether dissolution is the effect of being struck off the register Type of order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The parties are to file and serve supplemental submissions on the judgment of Blairmont Rice Investments Inc v Kayman Sankar Co Ltd [2021] CCJ 7 (AJ) GY, [2021] 5 LRC 433 on or before 14 th March 2025.

2.Judgment is reserved. Reason: The Court was minded to direct the parties to file written submissions on the case of Blairmont Rice Investments Inc v Kayman Sankar Co Ltd [2021] CCJ 7 (AJ) GY, [2021] 5 LRC 433 upon determining its applicability to the issues before the Court. Case name: Caribbean Development (Antigua) Limited v

[1]Stuart Lockheart

[2]Geert Duizendstraal

1.The application is dismissed.

2.There is no order as to costs. Reason: By notice of motion filed on 4 th November 2024, the applicant seeks conditional leave to appeal to his majesty in council pursuant to section 122(2) a of the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda. The applicant seeks to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 14 th October 2024 wherein the Court granted orders: 1)extending the time for the applicant to apply for leave to appeal; 2) granting the applicant leave to appeal the decision of the high court judge; 3) stipulated that the notice of appeal be filed and served within 21 days of the date of its order; 4) stay in the proceedings in the court below pending the hearing and determination of the appeal and 5) no order as to costs. The application for conditional leave is grounded in section 122(2)(a) of the constitution which provides so far as material, both subject to the provisions of section 44(8) of the constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions from the Court of Appeal to his majesty in council with the leave of the Court of Appeal in the following cases: a)decisions in any civil proceedings where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the question involved in the appeal is one that by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to his majesty in council. This section imposes the following essential requirements each of which must be fulfilled: 1) the decision must be in civil proceedings; 2) there must be a question involved in the appeal meaning the appeal in before the Court of Appeal and 3) that question must be one that by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to his majesty in council. The decision sought to be appealed to the Privy Council here is the finding by the Court of Appeal that the compromise agreement was required to be in writing to be legally valid. That finding was made in the context of an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal. That hearing was not an appeal. An appeal would only come to be when leave is granted, and the notice of appeal is filed. The appeal did not commence until 24 th October 2024 when the notice of appeal was filed pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeal. It follows therefore that the issue raised in the motion is not a question involved in the appeal in the Court of Appeal since there was no appeal. The appeal is yet to be heard. Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that the applicant has not fulfilled all of the requirements for the grant of conditional leave to appeal to his majesty in council. Therefore, the application is dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court further stated that there is no basis to vary the orders made by the Court of Appeal in relation to the stay given the pendency of the appeal. Case name: Timothy Jackman v The King [ANUHCRAP2025/0002] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant/Applicant: Mr. Wendel Alexander with Mr. Wayne Benjamin Marsh Respondent: Mrs. Shannon Jones-Gittens Issue: Application for leave to appeal against sentence – Sentence of 112 months erroneously recorded as 11 years 9 months – Whether the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances – Application for extension of time to file appeal against sentence – Whether the delay was inordinate Type of order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time is granted.

2.The appeal is allowed.

3.The appellant having been sentenced to 112 months being 9 years and 4 months, having served that time in full, he is to be released immediately. Reason: Upon hearing submissions from counsel for the applicant, and the Crown having no objection to an extension of time for the filing of the appeal, the Court granted an extension of time for the filing of the appeal. The appellant, on the 15 th of July 2020, was sentenced by the learned trial judge to 112 months imprisonment which the learned trial judge stated amounted to 11 years and 9 months. That would have led to a release date of the appellant of the 29 th June 2026. It is accepted by both parties that the calculation of 112 months is in fact 9 nine years and 4 months. The earliest release date for that sentence would have been the 17 th of November 2024. Her majesty’s prison released the appellant on the 3 rd July 2024. Realising the error, the appellant was taken back into custody by the prison authority on 16 th August 2024. These are the accepted facts in the matter. The Appellant is still in custody at the prison. In the circumstances, the Crown properly did not oppose the application made by the appellant for an extension of time to file an appeal against the sentence of the learned trial judge. This Court having looked at the facts and circumstances therefore grants the application for the extension of time. The Court noted that the notice of appeal filed on 6 th January 2025 is deemed properly filed in the circumstances. The Court further deemed today’s hearing to be the hearing of the substantive appeal against sentence. The sentence of the Court below of 112 months being 9 years and 4 months and not 11 years and 9 months as pronounced by the trial judge, this Court hereby allows the appeal against sentence as the Appellant has served a period of incarceration longer than the sentence given in the Court below. The Appellant is to be released immediately. Case name: The Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda v

[1]Sherrel Sutherland

[2]Dr. Dane Abbott [ANUHCVAP2024/0031] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Thursday, 27 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Dr. David Dorsett with Mrs. Carla Brookes-Harris and Mr. Zachary Phillips Respondents: Mr. Rishi Dass SC with Ms. Sasha Sookram, Ms. Sherrie-Ann Bradshaw and Ms. Anika Gray Issue: Interlocutory Appeal – Dismissal of appellant’s application to strike out the respondents’ statement of case – Whether the judge erred in dismissing the application to strike out the respondents’ statement of case on account of having no or any proper regard to the relevant test for striking out constitutional claims – Whether sections 56 and 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act Cap 300 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda had been repealed by the Sexual Offences Act – Whether the issue of whether a law has been repealed is a pure question of law that a judge should be able to strike out/ determine it on paper- Whether the judge adopted a restrained approach which was not appropriate in the circumstances Type of Order: Oral judgment Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.No order as to costs. Reason: This was an appeal against the decision of the learned judge dated 16 th October 2024 dismissing the appellant’s application to strike out the respondents’ constitutional claim which challenged sections 56 and 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act Cap 300 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda. The appellant challenged the decision by contending that the learned judge adopted a restrained approach as opposed to “grasping the nettle” as propounded in Frank and another v Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda [2022] UKPC 25 and on the appellant’s case which was a pure question of law to be decided. It should be uncontroversial that a decision to strike out a claim is part of the court’s case management powers. It is clear from the cases that the power to strike out is to be used sparingly as was discussed in the consolidated appeal of Martin Didier and others al v Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd; Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Medical Associates Ltd and others SLUHCVAP2014/0024 consolidated with SLUHCVAP2015/0004 (delivered 6 th June 2016, unreported). That case made it clear that the discretion to strike out should not be exercised where the court finds among other things, that the strength of the case may not be clear because it had not been fully investigated. The learned judge clearly had these principles in mind since she made mention of these in her ruling. Constitutional claims should not be struck out prematurely unless it is clear that they have no prospects of success as such cases often involve complex matters which require a full exploration at trial. It is therefore necessary to explore the reasons why the learned judge dismissed the application to strike out the claim. The learned judge at paragraph 5(iii) of her order found that the specific circumstances of the case made it necessary to consider the ambiguities surrounding parliament’s intent regarding the repeal or the validity of the sections which were the subject of the challenge, and she went on to say that this was a highly relevant factor. The judge held that whether the law had been repealed or remained valid required in-depth legal analysis and further evidence. The learned judge found that issues involving evidential exploration or further legal submissions were not suitable for strike out applications. Having considered the material before her, the learned judge concluded that this was not a straightforward matter with an obvious answer but required further evidence. In the Court’s understanding, the learned judge was simply saying that this was not simply a question of law, and that further evidence was required to resolve the question, unlike the situation in Frank v The Attorney General where the Privy Council found that the issue was a pure question of law. For the reasons articulated by the judge she concluded that the claim ought not to be struck out. Considering the reasons given by the learned judge, the Court found that there was no basis for it to interfere with the manner in which the judge exercised her case management discretion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. Case name: The Barbuda Council v PLH (Barbuda) Limited [ANUHCVAP2024/0030] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicant: Ms. E. Ann Henry KC with her Dr. Lenworth Johnson Respondent: Mr. Anthony Astaphan, SC with him Dr. Errol Cort and Ms. Alketz Joseph Issue: Application to vary the decision of a single judge – Application for stay of execution of the judgment in the court below pending the determination of the appeal – Exercise of discretion by a single judge – Whether the single judge exceeded the general ambit of the exercise of his discretion and was plainly wrong – Whether the single judge considered the relevant facts and circumstances – Prospects of success – Whether the appeal would be stifled if a stay is not granted – Whether there are exceptional circumstances which warrant the grant of a stay – Balance of harm or prejudice to the respondent if a stay if granted Type of order: Oral Decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The application to vary the order of a single judge is dismissed.

2.Costs in the application to be agreed by the parties if not to be assessed by the Chief Registrar within 21 days of the date of this order. Reason: Before the Court was an application filed on 2 nd January 2025 by the appellant/applicant to vary the order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal dated 17 th December 2024 whereby the judge refused the grant of a stay of execution of the judgment in the court below having found that the threshold for a stay had not been met. It was the exercise of discretion by a single judge in refusing to grant the stay. The learned judge considered the well-known principles considered in C- Mobile Services Limited v Huawei Technologies Limited BVIHCMAP2014/0017 and concluded that the appellant/applicant did not meet the relevant threshold for the grant of a stay. It was not shown to the Court’s satisfaction that the learned judge erred in principle by failing to take into account the relevant factors with respect to the grant of a stay. It could not be said on an examination of the factors that the learned judge’s decision to refuse the stay exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement was possible. The factors which a Court should consider or taken into account when considering a stay are well sought out which include: (i) the circumstances of the case, (ii) that a stay is the exemption rather than the rule; (iii) the parties seeking a stay should provide cogent evidence that the appeal would be stifled or rendered nugatory unless the stay is granted; (iv) in exercising its discretion the court applies the balance of harm test in which the likely prejudice to the successful party must be carefully considered and (v) the court takes into account the prospects of the appeal succeeding but only where strong grounds of appeal or strong likelihood that the appeal would succeed is shown. Having taken into account the learning and reasoning in NB v London Borough of Haringey [2011] EWHC 3544 (Fam ), the Court found that to have an arguable case is not enough and that the applicant is obliged to provide cogent evidence to the Court that there are strong grounds of appeal and the mere existence of an arguable appeal is not sufficient reasoning to justify the grant of a stay. In addition, the Court also has to consider the likely prejudice to the successful party and in this case the respondents have had a cost judgment that has not been satisfied. The Court was of the view that the appellant/applicant had not provided compelling reasons to the Court as to why a stay should be granted. Therefore, in the circumstances the Court was not minded to vary the order made by the single judge on the 17 th December 2024. Case name:

[1]Ramesh Armanani

[2]Moham Amrmanani v AEA Company Limited [GDAHCVAP2023/0019] GRENADA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Applicants: Ms. Gennilyn Ettienne Respondent: Mr. Ruggles Ferguson KC with him Ms. Mckaeda Augustine Issue: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal – Whether the delay was inordinate – Whether there is good reason for the delay – Application for leave to appeal – Whether the appeal has a realistic prospect of success Type of Order: N/A Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.Judgment is reserved. Reason: Upon hearing counsel for the parties, the Court decided to reserve its decision on the applications before the Court. Case name:

[1]Clico International Life Insurance Limited

[2]Wilbur Harrigan v

[1]Eastern Caribbean Baptist Mission

[2]Jeriann George

[3]Hensworth Jonas [ANUHCVAP2019/0035] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants/Respondents: Mr. Ramon Alleyne SC with him Mr. Rene Bitcher and Ms. Talia DaCosta Applicants/Respondents: Ms. Chantal Marshall with her Ms. Andrea Smithen-Henry Issue: Application for an extension of time to file submissions – Whether the delay was inordinate – Whether there is sufficient reason for the delay Type of Order: Oral decision Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The written submissions of the respondents filed on 22 nd January 2025 is deemed to be properly filed.

2.There is no order as to costs. Reason: Upon counsel for the appellant/respondent indicating that there was no concern with regards to prejudice, the Court accordingly granted the extension of time and proceeded to hear the substantive appeal. Case name: Antigua Wireless Ventures Ltd. t/a Digicel v Karl Skepple [ANUHLTAP2023/0008] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Michael Koeiman with him Ms. Jenell Gibson Respondent: Mr. Kendrickson Kentish Issue: Labour tribunal appeal – Appeal against the decision that the respondent was unfairly dismissed by the respondent – Whether the Industrial Court erred in finding that the employer was served with timely notice of the trial date – Whether the Industrial Court’s failure to take into account the appellant’s attorney’s correspondence that he was unable to attend trial amounts to specific illegality in the course of proceedings – Whether the Industrial Court breached the appellant’s right to be heard in the proceedings by failing, refusing or neglecting to adjourn the trial in light of the correspondence from the appellant’s attorney – Whether the Industrial Court breached the principles of natural justice and the appellant’s right to procedural fairness – Whether the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering exemplary damages against the appellant in the absence of evidence reasonably capable of supporting such an award – Whether the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering costs where no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant an award of costs pursuant to section 10(2) of the Industrial Court Act, Cap. 214 of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda Type of Order: N/A Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case name:

[1]Clico International Life Insurance Limited

[2]Wilbur Harrigan v

[1]Eastern Caribbean Baptist Mission

[2]Jeriann George

[3]Hensworth Jonas [ANUHCVAP2019/0035] ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Date: Friday, 28 th February 2025 Coram: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Eddy D. Ventose, Justice of Appeal Appearances: Appellants: Mr. Ramon Alleyne SC with him Mr. Rene Bitcher and Ms. Talia DaCosta Respondents: Ms. Chantal Marshall with her Ms. Andrea Smithen-Henry Issue: Civil appeal – Enforcement – Section 5 of the Judgments Act – Corporate veil – Beneficial interest – Ownership of property -Overriding interests – Whether the learned Judge complied with the requirements of Part 55 of Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 and erred in finding that there was sufficient basis to permit the corporate veil to be lifted and to find that CLICO was the beneficial and true owner of the land – Whether the Judge in the Court below was entitled to make the order for the enforcement of a claim against the first Appellant in circumstances it was under judicial management – Whether Part 55 of the CPR, Section 5 and Section 3 of the Judgments Act permit an Order for Sale with respect to the Land in circumstances where the Appellant, as Judgment Debtor, only holds a beneficial interest therein – Nature of appellate jurisdiction Type of Order: N/A Result/Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A