Digest – 13th to 17th October 2025

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEAL SITTING VIDEOCONFERENCE TERRITORY OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS MONDAY, 13TH OCTOBER – FRIDAY, 17TH OCTOBER 2025 JUDGMENTS Case Name: Shaleel Jagroop by His Next Friend Fabian Jagroop v Lucretia Johnny Administratrix of the Estate of Gregory Johnny and Velina Johnny [SLUHCVAP2023/0023] (Saint Lucia) Date: Wednesday, 15th October 2025 Coram for Delivery: The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Cadie St.Rose Albertini, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Ingrid Mangatal, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: No appearance Respondent: Ms. Cynthia Combie Martyr holding papers for Mr. Dexter Theodore KC Issues: Civil appeal – Administration of estates – Appeal against findings of fact – Concurrent findings of fact – Res judicata – Setting aside of order of judge of concurrent jurisdiction – Discretion to award costs – Costs in estate proceedings – Appeal against costs order Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal against the decision of the learned judge is partially allowed. 2. The order of the learned judge to the effect that the costs payable to the appellant in the Claim No. SLUHCV2010/0066 be prescribed costs in the sum of $7,500.00 and shall be payable out of the estate of Gregory Johnny is set aside. 3. The remaining grounds of appeal are dismissed and all other orders of the learned Judge are affirmed. 4. The respondent shall have 90% of her costs in the appeal to be paid by the appellant to be assessed if not agreed within 21 days of the date of this judgment. Reason: 1. An appellate court will only interfere with a finding of fact made by a trial judge if it is satisfied that the conclusion is plainly wrong. It must either be possible to identify a material error in the judge's process of reasoning such as a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis on the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. If the question is simply one of judgment as to the appropriate weight to be given to the relevant evidence, the appellate court must be satisfied that the judge's conclusion cannot reasonably be explained or justified. Group Seven Limited v Notable Services LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 614 applied; DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7 applied; Yates Associates Construction Company Ltd v Blue Sand Investments Ltd. BVIHCVAP2012/0028 (delivered 20th April 2016, unreported) applied; Flat Point Development Limited v Mary Dooley ANUHCVAP2015/0029 (delivered 13th March 2019, unreported) applied. 2. In this case, the appellant took no issue with the amount which the respondent claimed to have received by way of insurance proceeds but rather contends that he did not receive the full entitlement (1/5) share of those proceeds. The respondent’s statement of account however asserts that these proceeds were distributed to the heirs (i.e., 1/5 shares after the expenses of the estate of Gregory Johnny were deducted). Apart from his bare assertion that the distribution of the assets of the estates is incomplete, the appellant advanced no cogent basis upon which the learned judge could deliberate. The appellant did not identify any material error in the judge's process of reasoning, and it cannot be said that the learned judge made a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or that he demonstrably misunderstood relevant evidence, or failed to consider relevant evidence. 3. The learned judge’s findings in respect of the purported failure to account for funds contained in a BOSL Account No. 421819347; Bank of Nova Scotia Account No.10296, and RBTT Account No. 1107600117 cannot be impugned. The learned judge was seised of the relevant factual background and chronology, and it would not have been lost upon him that at the time of Velina Johnny’s death in January 2007, Greta Johnny-Jagroop, the other account holder of the BOSL account, would have been alive and responsible for the closing of the account; and thus not forming part of the estate of Velina Johnny. The appellant did not argue below that the respondent failed to verify the authenticity of the document from RBTT Bank which indicated a savings Account No. 1107600117 with a balance of $10,712.01, nor did the appellant argue the issue of a delay on the part of the respondent in requesting information from RBTT in respect to this purported account. In any event, the relevant document was relied on by the appellant in his statement of account and the onus was therefore on him to verify its authenticity. It is therefore not open to him to raise these points on appeal. More conclusively, 1st National Bank (formerly RBTT Bank) by letter dated 21st June 2021 informed that there were no accounts in the name of Gregory Johnny and Velina Johnny and no sums due and owing to the bank in respect of mortgages and other facilities. The learned judge categorically determined that the proceeds of Bank of Nova Scotia Account No. 10296 had already been distributed and the claimant\appellant had received his share of the proceeds. The appellant has failed to identify any errors in the learned judge’s reasoning or conclusion. Therefore, there is no basis to interfere with the learned judge’s findings of fact in respect of these accounts. 4. As a matter of settled practice, an appellate court will also decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, save in very limited circumstances. The question of the weight of the evidence is not a sufficient reason to depart from this established practice. No serious violation of legal principle or procedure has been identified as it relates to the liabilities and expenses of the estates in this case. Further, it has not been proved that the learned judge deviated from definitive findings made by Wilkinson J. It is clear that Wilkinson J did not consider her judgment and order to be a final one and made clear that she was unable to close off the accounts by way of the final order and gave a number of further directions for further accounting. To the extent that there were further legal costs associated with this Second Claim which arose, it would therefore fall to the judicial officer considering the final account to make any determination. It therefore follows that it was open to Innocent J to consider and determine the same. Collins Richardson et al v Benjamin W Richardson et al AXAHCVAP2016/0002 (delivered 24th May 2014, unreported) applied. 5. The doctrine of res judicata prescribes that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The court, however, has the discretionary power to revoke or vary any order that it has power to make in appropriate circumstances. Having reviewed the relevant authorities and the circumstances which obtained in this case, Wilkinson J did not have the requisite jurisdiction to vary or amend her costs order made in the First Claim. Moreover, an order made by a high court judge without jurisdiction can only be set aside on appeal to the Court of Appeal. It follows that the learned judge could not purport to set aside the judgment of Wilkinson J who was a judge of coordinate jurisdiction with him, and that the judgment could only be set aside by the Court of Appeal on an appeal. No such appeal having been instituted in this case, the judgment and costs order of Wilkinson J in the Second Claim stands. Strachan v The Gleaner Company and another [2005] 1 WLR 3204 applied; Vodafone Group Plc v IPcom GmbH and Co KG [2023] EWCA Civ 113 applied. 6. The learned judge did not overrule the order of Wilkinson J as her order clearly left the issue of the quantum of costs to be determined. It is trite law that a court has discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another, the amount of those costs and when they are paid. The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion unless the judge's decision exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible and, accordingly, the decision may be said to be clearly or blatantly wrong. In this case, the learned judge was seised with the litigation and would have observed the parties’ conduct and formed an unfavourable view of the appellant’s conduct. The appellant did not identify any mistake in the learned judge’s evaluation as a whole that is sufficiently material to undermine the learned judge’s conclusions. Strachan v The Gleaner Company and another [2005] 1 WLR 3204 applied; Dufour and Others v Helenair Corporation Ltd and Others (1996) 52 WIR 188 applied; Straker v Tudor Rose [2007] EWCA 368 (CA) applied; Rule 65.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. Case Name: James Simpson v Selecta Insurance and Reinsurance Company (Caribbean) Limited [NEVHCVAP2025/0010] (Saint Kitts and Nevis) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Coram for Delivery: The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Gerard St.C. Farara, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Tana’ania Small, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Terence Byron Respondent: Ms. Edisha Greene Issues: Interlocutory Appeal – Contempt Order – Committal Order – Rule 53.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 – Section 3(1) and 4 (1) (b) of the Debtors Act – Whether the Committal Order was procedurally unfair and ought not to have been made – Whether the Committal Order was manifestly unfair Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The Committal Order is set aside. 3. The respondent shall pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed by a judge of the High Court if not agreed by the parties within 21 days. Reason: 1. The expression “judgment debtor” in Rule 53.4(a) and (c) and elsewhere in Part 53, means the person, in this matter BONI, who is the subject of the 5th March Order for payment of the stipulated sum into court by the date and time specified therein. It is BONI which is the person who is liable to enforcement under the said order. Therefore, BONI falls squarely within the definition of “judgment debtor” under Part 53. Rule 53.4 (a) and (c) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. 2. Rule 53.4 (c) applies not to service of the order on the officer of the body corporate, but on the “judgment debtor”, that is, the body corporate itself, which is required or obligated to pay the money judgment or to make payment in accordance with an order for payment. It is the body corporate that is mandated to comply with the order to do the act. It is also required pursuant to Rule 53.3(a) that the order endorsed with a penal notice be served personally on the body corporate and, pursuant to Rule 53.4(c), “in sufficient time to give the judgment debtor a reasonable opportunity to do the act” before the expiration of the specified date and time. Once there has been compliance with the mandatory requirements as to service on the judgment debtor and on the named officer of the body corporate, subject to Rule 53.5(2), the court may proceed to find the body corporate and its named office in contempt, subject to any reasonable explanations or reasons for their non-compliance, and to make in its discretion a committal order against the named officer. It is also a requirement under Part 53 that the order endorsed with penal notice must be served on the officer named in the order and who is the subject of a penal notice directed to him or her pursuant to Rule 53.4(a). Once service has been effected on the body corporate and on the named officer, it is for that officer to see to it or to take such steps as is within the power of the office which he/she holds in the body corporate, to ensure that the body corporate complies with such an order, failing which he or she becomes liable to be committed for contempt. Rule 53.4 (c) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. 3. Under Part 53, there is no specific requirement similar to that at Rule 53.4 (c), for service on the officer of the body corporate within sufficient time to give him or her a reasonable opportunity to ensure that the body corporate does the act within the time specified in the order. However, it would follow that should Rule 53.4 (c) not be satisfied in relation to the body corporate, the court cannot go on to make a finding of contempt against the body corporate and hence, not against the named officer and to commit that officer to prison pursuant to Rule 53.4. Also, where the terms of the order with penal notices was not made in the presence of the officer named therein and the order itself was not served on the named officer sufficiently timely as to afford him or her sufficient time to take steps to ensure that the body corporate complies with the terms of the said order, this would be an important factor against a court, in the exercise of its discretion, not taking the more drastic step of ordering the imprisonment of the named officer of that body corporate. Rule 53.4. of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. 4. The language in Rule 53.7(3)(a) specifies the requirement for the applicant for a committal order to prove ‘service of the order’ which is endorsed with the appropriate penal notice proscribed under either Rule 53.3(b) or Rule 53.4(b). It is the service of the order with the appropriate penal notice which is required by Rule 53.7(3)(a). More importantly, it is pursuant to Rule 53.4 that the respondent applied for the committal order against the appellant as an officer of BONI. Rule 53.4 specifies that the court should not make such an order unless the conditions at (a), (b) and (c) have been satisfied. Furthermore, pursuant to condition (c) unless the order was served in sufficient time to enable reasonable compliance with the order, it ought not to be made by the court. Rule 53.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. 5. In the circumstances of this case, there was a clear prejudice to the appellant as contemnor which required compliance by payment by BONI into court of a large sum of money. This prejudice stems from and is a result of the very late service of the 5th March Order on the appellant, a mere 1.5 hours before the mandatory stipulated time on the said date for its compliance. This was clearly unfair and an injustice to the appellant charged with ensuring BONI’s compliance with the said order under peril of his imprisonment for contempt. Ronson Products Ltd v Ronson Furniture Ltd. (1966) Ch. 603 followed. 6. In light of the non-compliance with Rule 53.4 (c), the learned judge ought to have given consideration to exercising his powers under Rule 53.2(1) to make an order specifying another date and time for BONI and the appellant’s compliance with the 5th March Order, such new order being endorsed with the prescribed penal notices under Rules 53.3 and 53.4 directed, respectively, to BONI and the appellant, and to adjourning the Committal Application to a date after the new date for compliance. In not doing so, the learned judge erred. Rule 53.2 (1), Rule 53.3 and Rule 53.4 (c) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. 7. While the judge had made two prior orders for payment (December 2024 and February 2025) against BONI, with respect to which BONI has failed to comply either within the prescribed time or at any time thereafter, these orders are an important part of the chronological procedural history of this matter pointing, as they do, to a history of non-compliance by BONI. However, neither of them could properly form the legal basis of a committal application against the appellant for his contempt as an officer of BONI pursuant to Rule 53.4, as neither of these two orders were endorsed with the requisite penal notice directed to the appellant. Indeed, these orders were treated by the learned judge as part of the BONI non-compliance landscape, and not as a legal foundational basis for the making of the Committal Order against the appellant as an officer of BONI. Put differently, as a matter of principle, the failures of BONI to comply with the 18th December 2024 and 3rd February 2025 orders for payment in, while of some significance towards establishing a consistent failure or willful refusal by BONI to comply with the said orders, they cannot be used to demonstrate or to establish a failure by the appellant to comply with the subsequent order, the 5th March Order, which is the only order endorsed with a penal notice directed to the appellant to ensure BONI’s compliance with the terms thereof. Thus, it was only the 5th March Order endorsed with the penal notice which could be used as the legal basis for a committal application pursuant to Rule 53.4. Rule 53.4 (c) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 applied. Case Name: Caldicott Worldwide Limited v

[1]Siong Beng Seng

[2]Ching Hui Huat

[3]Springfield Investments & Nominees Pte Ltd [BVIHCMAP2023/0009] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Coram for Delivery: The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Dexter Theodore, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Dean Robson Respondents: Mr. Iain Tucker Issues: Application for conditional leave to His Majesty in Council − Section 3(2)(a) of the Virgin Islands (Appeals to Privy Council) Order 1967 - The interplay between arbitration clauses and statutory unfair prejudice remedies - Threshold for leave to appeal to the Privy Council - Whether the appeal raises matters of great general or public importance or otherwise which justify consideration by the Privy Council Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: (1) Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is granted to the applicant pursuant to section 3(2)(a) of the Virgin Islands (Appeals to Privy Council) Order 1967 against the judgment of the Court of Appeal issued herein on 18th September 2024 upon the following conditions: (a) the applicant within ninety (90) days of the date hereof do enter into good and sufficient security in the sum of Five Hundred Pounds (£500.00) for the due prosecution of the appeal, such security to consist of a deposit of the said amount at the court office; (b) within 90 days of the date hereof, the applicant takes the necessary steps for the purposes of procuring the preparation of the record, the settling of such records with the solicitors of the respondent to this application, and the certification of the record by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal; (c) the record shall be prepared in accordance with rules 18 to 20 of the Judicial Committee (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order 2024 and its Practice Direction 5.3 to 5.8 shall be transmitted to the Registrar of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council without delay where final permission to appeal has been granted; (d) Costs of this application are reserved to the Privy Council. (2) The applicant shall make an application to the Court for final permission to appeal to His Majesty in Council, supported by the certificate of the Registrar that the security for costs ordered herein has been given within the time prescribed by this Order to the satisfaction of the Registrar. Reason: 1. The threshold for leave to appeal to the Privy Council is that the question must be one of great general or public importance. It must be a genuinely disputable issue, not one that is merely academic or of interest to the parties. The issue must be substantial, and its resolution must be necessary for the future guidance of the courts or the public. Section 3(2)(a) Virgin Islands (Appeals to Privy Council) Order 1967 applied; Martinus Francois v The Attorney General SLUHCVAP2000/0037 (delivered 7th June 2004, unreported) followed. 2. The Second Appeal Judgment does not treat with arbitration clauses as universally ousting or staying statutory unfair prejudice claims. Instead, the judgment adopts a two-stage, fact sensitive, issue-specific approach. It requires the court to identify firstly which claims or issues fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and secondly to stay only those issues, not the entire unfair prejudice claim or claims against the parties. While the Second Appeal Judgment stayed specific declaratory relief, it did not expressly stay the underlying factual issue of whether dividends were improperly withheld. 3. The Third Appeal Judgment may overstate the Second Appeal Judgment, which only stays issues that are properly subject to arbitration under the Company's articles, not all unfair prejudice claims. The Third Appeal Judgment, by interpreting the Second Appeal Judgment as staying the factual foundation of the unfair prejudice claim, may have made it difficult for Caldicott to establish the essential element of its claim against the respondents. While there has been no appeal against the Second Appeal Judgment, it can be argued that the “Catch-22” situation now existing was created by the interpretation in the Third Appeal, rather than being an inevitable consequence of the Second Appeal Judgment. The Third Appeal Judgment could therefore be seen as the operative decision that has resulted in a potential quandary for minority shareholders seeking relief under section 184I of the BCA. 4. The question raised, whether an arbitration clause between a company and a shareholder can be used to stay the factual basis of a shareholder-versus-shareholder unfair prejudice claim, has wide-reaching implications for the operation of section 184I of the BCA and for minority shareholder protection in the BVI and similar jurisdictions. It affects the integrity of statutory remedies for thousands of companies. 5. The Third Appeal Judgment is the appropriate subject for appeal because it operationalized the procedural deadlock and its systemic consequences. Its effect is to allow arbitration clauses to oust the court’s jurisdiction over the factual matrix of unfair prejudice claims, potentially rendering statutory remedies illusory, raising a significant policy concern for which guidance from the Privy Council is warranted. Therefore, the application raises a genuinely disputable and substantial issue of great general or public importance regarding the interplay between arbitration clauses and statutory unfair prejudice remedies, and the practical ability of minority shareholders to obtain relief under section 184I of the BCA. Case Name: Antonio Stoutt v The Commissioner of Police [BVIMCRAP2025/0011] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Coram for Delivery: The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Dexter Theodore, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Stephen Daniels Respondent: Ms. Kellee-Gai Smith holding for the Director of Public Prosecutions Issues: Magisterial criminal appeal – Appeal against conviction − Unlawful possession of explosives – Sections 6 and 26 of the Explosives Ordinance – Whether the offence of unlawful possession of explosives was made out – Definition of ‘explosive’ - Whether a judicial decision which sets a precedent in law can be applied retroactively to a conviction – Section 11(2)(a) of the Firearms and Air Guns Act - Carrying a firearm without a licence – Presumption of ownership of firearm - Section 12 of the Firearms and Air Guns Act –Whether legal possession was made out on the evidence before the magistrate – Common law and statutory standards of proof - Whether the magistrate applied the correct standard of proof or properly assessed whether the appellant had discharged the evidential burden on a balance of probabilities imposed by the deeming provision in section 12 of the Firearms and Air Guns Act – Unlawful joint enterprise - Section 20 of the Criminal Code of the British Virgin Islands – Principles of joint enterprise distinct from joint possession Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The appeal against conviction for carrying a firearm without a licence is dismissed. The conviction is affirmed. 2. The appeal against conviction for unlawful possession of explosives is allowed. The conviction is quashed and the sentence consequently set aside. Reason: 1. Applying Selvin Chinnery v The Commissioner of Police, the definition of the term ‘explosive’ as found in section 2 of the Explosives Ordinance of the Laws of the Virgin Islands does not encapsulate ammunition. Selvin Chinnery v The Commissioner of Police BVIMCRAP2018/0002 (delivered 24th February 2020, unreported) followed. 2. In criminal law, the concept of retrospectivity refers to the application of new laws or judicial interpretation to cases that occurred prior to their enactment. There is a presumption against the retrospective application of statutes, which is rooted in the idea of fairness and justice. It is presumed that Parliament does not intend to alter the law applicable to past events so as to alter the rights and obligations of the parties in a manner which is unfair to them unless a contrary intent is clearly demonstrated. The rationale for the presumption is to engender certainty in the law and to prevent the harsh and chaotic operation of law. However, judicial decisions which set a precedent in law do have retrospective effect. Therefore, notwithstanding the delay in disposing the appeal which was filed in July 2015 (some four years prior to the Selvin Chinnery judgment), the appellant’s appeal against his convictions remained pending and would not have been completed at the time that the decision in Selvin Chinnery would have been handed down. It follows that the judgment in Selvin Chinnery v The Commissioner of Police may be relied upon and applied. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed (1969) applied; Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 applied; Cadder v Her Majesty's Advocate

[2011]3 LRC 100 considered; A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison

[2006]4 IR 88 applied. 3. Even if one were to assume that Selvin Chinnery v The Commissioner of Police could not be applied, the Court in considering the appeal is entitled to consider whether in relation to the ammunition, the appellant could have been properly charged and convicted under the Explosives Ordinance for possession of explosives. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the interpretation of the term ‘explosive’ under section 2 of the Explosives Ordinance cannot be construed to include ammunition. Consequently, the appellant could not have been properly charged and convicted of possession of explosives contrary to sections 6 and 26 of the Explosives Ordinance. Accordingly, the conviction in that regard must be set aside. 4. The offence created by section 11(2)(a) of the Firearms Act involves an element of possession. In this case, the offence was particularized as ‘keeping a firearm’ without a licence. The word ‘keep’ is not defined by the Firearms Act and therefore the magistrate considered the ordinary meaning of the word which she concluded to be synonymous with possession. The magistrate there considered the common law definition of possession. However, given the way in which the prosecution had advanced its case, the magistrate was compelled to consider the deeming provision set out in section 12 of the Firearms Act, that is, whether the firearm was in the possession and control of the appellant as he was in possession and control of the motor vehicle in which it was found. No issue can be taken with the learned magistrate’s consideration of both the common law definition of possession as well as the concept of ‘deemed possession’. 5. Deemed possession does not abolish common law possession but rather supplements it and expands upon the traditional understanding of possession by including situations where the traditional elements of possession are not fully present but where the law still deems possession to exist for the purpose of criminal liability. Where the prosecution relies on the deeming provision created by section 12 of the Firearms Act, it must show that the accused was the owner of the house, premises, vehicle, vessel, boat or conveyance in which the firearm is found, bearing in mind that the consequence of this conclusion is that the accused would be deemed to be in possession of the firearm. The section also makes it clear that deemed possession due to ownership of the premises, vehicle, vessel, boat or conveyance can be rebutted. The Firearms Act makes clear that it is the defendant who has the onus of rebutting the presumption of possession. It follows that deemed possession due to ownership can be rebutted by the accused proving, on the balance of probabilities, that they were unaware that the firearm was on the premises or in the vehicle or vessel or that they had no intention to exercise control over the firearm. Section 12 of the Firearms and Air Guns Act, Cap 124 of the Revised Laws of the Virgin Islands applied. 6. A review of the record of evidence, the submissions advanced by the appellant in the court below, and the learned magistrate’s analysis of the same reveals that it was clear that the magistrate was fully seised of all of the elements of the appellant’s defence and that she correctly analysed and treated with each aspect of the same in determining whether he had discharged his burden to rebut the presumption of possession. As it relates to the lack of DNA evidence linking the appellant to the firearm, the presence or absence of DNA or fingerprints is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of any defendant. The absence of DNA is one factor among many that ought to be considered. As such, the absence of DNA does not preclude a finding of possession where the circumstantial evidence is otherwise sufficient. R v Crawford [2015] UKPC 44 followed. 7. Additionally, the appellant’s defence of complete denial and ignorance or knowledge of the firearm ignores the fact that while knowledge of the firearm is a requirement of possession, (as defined by the common law) it is not a requirement when the prosecution relies on deemed possession under section 12 of the Firearms Act. While the magistrate may not have made clear that in advancing his rebuttal of the presumption, the appellant’s standard of proof was on a balance of probabilities, she did not apply any higher standard in her analysis of his case. Ultimately, the magistrate was not persuaded by the appellant’s defence, and was clearly perturbed that the appellant could offer no credible explanation to the police as to how the firearm and ammunition came to be in a vehicle owned by him that was, according to him, always clean.

R v Fuller & Zazzaro

[2012]SASCFC 101 considered. 8. The appellant’s contention that the magistrate convicted him simply because he was the driver of the vehicle, without additional supporting evidence or that her decision was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence presented is not made out. There was ample basis upon which the learned magistrate was justified in her findings of guilt including the appellant’s admission that he always had custody of his vehicle and always kept it clean which the magistrate concluded showed that the appellant had reasonable opportunity to ascertain its contents whether availed, or not. Additionally, there was the evidence of the co-defendant who gave critical evidence as to the appellant’s interaction with the firearm. The magistrate also came to the view that the appellant was not a believable witness. It is only in rare cases that an appellate court could be satisfied that the trial judge has reached a wrong decision about the credibility of a witness. Against the background of the appellant’s ownership, possession and driving of the motor vehicle in which the unlicensed firearm was found, there was sufficient basis for the learned magistrate to infer ownership and keeping (possession) of the firearm in the absence of any credible explanation from the appellant. Even in the face of his previous good character, the magistrate was nevertheless obliged to assess his demeanour, consistency and plausibility and come to a conclusion as to his credibility. Therefore, in all the circumstances, it cannot be said that the magistrate failed to properly direct herself on the issues raised by the appellant in his defence and on the prosecution’s case, in support of him discharging his evidential burden, on a balance of probabilities that he was not in possession of the firearm.

R v Crawford

[2015]UKPC 44 followed. 9. The legal concept of joint enterprise in criminal law involves two or more people acting together to commit a criminal offence, where each person may have a different role. This is not to be conflated with the concept of joint possession which refers to situations where two or more people share control or dominion over an object such as a firearm or controlled drug. Where joint possession is involved, the co-defendants are joint principals where each does an act amounting to the actus reus of the offence. Each is liable for his own act, rather than for participating in the act of another, to the extent of his own mens rea. It is not in every case where there are two or more defendants who are jointly charged for a joint offence that the court will be obliged to consider whether joint enterprise is made out. Where two or more defendants are jointly charged, it only means that more than one person is being charged in one count. The charges against the defendants are individual and it is sufficient to support a conviction against any and each of them to prove either that he himself did a physical act which is an essential ingredient of the offence charged or that he helped another defendant to do such an act, and, that in doing the act or in helping the other defendant to do it, he himself had the necessary criminal intent. Accordingly, the appellant’s contention that the magistrate should have gone on to consider the elements of joint enterprise under section 20 of the Criminal Code, that is, whether the appellant shared a common intention with the co-defendant to possess the firearm and further what was the requisite conduct of the appellant to assist the co-defendant, in the possession of the firearm, so that he shared with him such an intention, is not supported by law on the facts of this case. The appellant’s appeal against conviction for carrying a firearm without a licence contrary to section 11(2)(a) of the Firearms Act is therefore dismissed. Section 20 of the Criminal Code, Act No 1 of 1997 considered; Julio Romero and Oscar Macrado v R Grenada Criminal Appeals No. 7 & 8 of 1993 (delivered 4th July 1994, unreported) followed; R v Searle & Others (1971) Crim. L.R. 592 distinguished. APPLICATIONS AND APPEALS Case Name: Telecommunication Regulatory Authority v 1. Caribbean Cellular Telephone Authority 2. BVI Cable TV Limited [BVIHCVAP2022/0003] Telecommunication Regulatory Authority v Cable and Wireless (BVI) Limited [BVIHCVAP2022/0004] Telecommunication Regulatory Authority v Digicel (BVI) Limited [BVIHCVAP2022/0005] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Monday 13th- Tuesday 14th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Gerard St.C Farara, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Ingrid Mangatal, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Dexter Theodore, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Javan Herberg KC with him Mr. Terrance Neale and Ms. Nelcia St Jean Respondents: Mr. Sydney Bennett KC with him Ms. Anthea Smith for Caribbean Cellular Telephone Authority Mr. Brian Child with him Mr. Litrow Hickson for Cable and Wireless (BVI) Limited Mr. Nigel Pleming KC with him Mr. Paul Dennis KC, Ms. Asha Johnson Willins and Ms. Catherine Dobson for Digicel (BVI) Limited Issues: Civil appeal - Judicial review - Statutory interpretation - Sections 58(1) and (2), 59(1), (2) and (6). 60, 63 and 65 of the BVI Telecommunications Act, 2006 (“the Act”) - Whether the learned judge erred in holding that Royalty payments under section 60 of the Act were not monies to be paid over or transferred by the Commission to the Government of the BVI , but was part of the funds of the Commission under section 50(1) and required under section 58(2) of the Act to be applied towards the operating and other legitimate expenses of the Commission stipulated at N/A sec-paragraphs (a) to (f) thereof- Whether the trial judge wrongly failed to consider and hold that Royalty payments to Government would be a lawful exercise by the Commission of its power to pay any expenditure authorized by the Commission and properly chargeable to revenue as it saw fit, within section 58(2)(f) of the Act - Whether the trial judge erred in law in holding that there was no ambiguity in sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Act so as to make it necessary to apply a purposeful construction of those sections - Whether the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the correct principle of statutory interpretation - Whether the trial judge erred in law in equating the payment of the Royalty under section 60 of the Act with the payment of tax and thereby erred in the application of the case of Dewar v IRC

[1935]2 KB 351 - Industry levy - Whether the trial judge erred in holding that audited accounts were necessary for the calculation of the industry levy for the 2019-2020 period under section 59 of the Act- Evaluation of evidence - Whether the judge’s finding that the Commission failed to adequately consult with respondents was against the weight of the evidence - Whether the trial judge erred in law when he held that the Commission acted irrationally and unreasonably - Whether the trial judge’s finding that the Commission’s conduct and statements in the matter gave rise to a legitimate expectation that the respondents would be consulted prior to the final demand for payment of the industry levy was contrary to the weight of the evidence - Whether the trial judge erred in law in making a declaration in respect of the collection of the 2020-2021 industry levy - Rule 56.13(3) of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (“CPR”) - Whether the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under CPR 56.13(3) with respect to the appropriate reliefs to be granted on the respondents’ applications for judicial review Type of Order: Result / Order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Ni Weiqin v [1] Green Elite Limited (in Liquidation) [2] Mr. Fang Ankong [3] HWH Holdings Limited [BVIHCMAP2024/0037] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Monday, 13th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Cadie St. Rose Albertini, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Ms. Tana’ania Small, KC, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Alex Potts KC with him Mr. Jerry Samuel Respondents: Mr. John Machell KC with him Mr. Christopher Pease and Mr. Robert Maxwell Marsh Issues: Commercial appeal - Appeal against findings of law - Charging Order - The Court’s power to order a sale - Whether the judge erred in law in concluding that it was possible, fair, just, or appropriate, for an order for sale of the Stock to be made on the application of the first respondent - Whether the judge erred in law in failing to conclude that the appellant’s interest in, and rights over, the Stock had already been established in a valid and binding HKIAC Arbitration N/A Award as between the appellant and the second respondent (which was capable of recognition and enforcement in the British Virgin Islands) and/or took priority over the Final Charging Order made in favour of the first respondent- Whether the judge erred in law in concluding that the court had jurisdiction (or should exercise any jurisdiction) to determine any issues “as to the loan alleged to have been made by the Third Defendant to the First Defendant” and/or “the charge alleged to have been granted by the First Defendant over the Stock in favour of the Third Defendant” Type of Order: Result / Order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment Reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Bridge Holdings International Corp v Kiran Taneja [BVIHCMAP2024/0025] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Tuesday, 14th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Reginald T.A. Armour, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Petra Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Tana’ania Small, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] N/A Appearances: Applicant: Mr. Tom Roscoe Respondent: Mr. Khamaal Collymore Issues: Application to adduce fresh evidence – Rules 62.24(1), 26.1(2)(f), 26.1(2)(y) and 29.1 Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 ‒ Whether the First Affidavit of Jan Alessandrini attaching clause 25 of the 12th March 2020 Settlement Agreement, constitutes admissible fresh evidence, given its relevance to the choice of law clause in the underlying dispute - Whether the fresh evidence sought to be admitted satisfies the conditions set out in Ladd v Marshall

[1954]3 All ER 745 – Whether the fresh evidence is limited in scope, comprising only a single clause of an agreement that supports an assertion already in evidence - Whether the fresh evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence prior to the first instance hearing - Whether the admission of the fresh evidence would have a significant influence on the outcome of the case - Whether the fresh evidence is prima facie incontrovertible - Whether admitting the fresh evidence is in the interests of justice Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Bridge Holdings International Corp v Kiran Taneja N/A [BVIHCMAP2024/0025] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Tuesday, 14th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Reginald T.A. Armour, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Petra Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Tana’ania Small, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Khamaal Collymore Respondent: Mr. Tom Roscoe Issues: Interlocutory Appeal - Appeal against order setting aside permission for service of claim out of the jurisdiction and dismissing claim - Rule 7.3(7) Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (“CPR”) - Whether the learned judge erred in law in holding that the claim did not fall within the Company Gateway - Rule 7.3(7)(a) CPR - Whether the learned judge erred in law in holding that the claim did not fall within the Contract Gateway Rule 7.3(3)(b) - Forum non conveniens - Whether the learned judge erred in law in finding that the courts of Florida are distinctly the more appropriate forum for the trial of the claim Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: [1] Terrae Nominees Ltd. [2] I.F.B.C Directors Services Ltd. [3] Bartonway Directors Ltd. v Paul Pretlove [BVIHCMAP2024/0018] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Wednesday, 15th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Cadie St.Rose Albertini, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Ingrid Mangatal, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellants: Mr. Rabin Kok with Mr. Mark Forte and Mr. Charles Goldblatt Respondent: Mr. Mark Goodman with Mr. Jomokie Phillips Issues: Commercial Appeal - Insolvency - Section 273 of the BVI Insolvency Act 2003 - Sections 209 and 211 of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004 - Whether the learned judge erred in holding that the respondent properly placed the companies into insolvent liquidation on the basis that they were insolvent by reason of their actual liabilities- Whether the learned judge erred in concluding that the respondent properly placed the companies into insolvent liquidation on the basis that they were insolvent by reason of their contingent liabilities- Whether the learned judge erred in failing to consider, address, or follow the reasoning in Re Gallea Capital Group (BVIHCOM2010/231; BVIHCV2010/231)- Whether the learned judge erred in law by failing to properly consider the appellants’ submission that the respondent’s decision to place the companies into insolvent liquidation was objectively unfair and/or based on irrelevant considerations- Standing - Whether the learned judge erred in finding that the N/A appellants had standing to challenge the respondent’s decision, given that they acted solely as former directors with no personal or real interest in the companies, and were not persons aggrieved - Perversity test - Whether the learned judge erred in finding that the perversity test did not apply to the respondent’s decision to declare the companies insolvent, by failing to consider the authority of Stanford v Akers & McDonald BVIHCMAP2017/0019 Type of Order: Result / Order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Culgoa Limited v Basement Investments Limited [BVIHCMAP2024/0011] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Wednesday, 15th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Esco Henry, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Gertel Thom, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Ms. Elizabeth Jones KC with her Ms. Arabella di Iorio and Mr. Paul Adams Respondent: Mr. David Brownbill KC with him Mr. Nicholas Burkill, Ms. Catherine Harston and Ms. Holly Challenger N/A Issues: Application for leave to amend claim form and statement of claim - Application to adduce fresh evidence - Application to amend notice of appeal – Application to raise new point on appeal (set out in paragraph 47 of the applicant’s written submissions) conditioned on permission being granted to amend the Notice of appeal - Whether permitting the applicant to adduce new evidence and to amend its claim form and statement of claim would be in accordance with the overriding objective of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules Revised 2023 - Whether the new evidence was not available at the time the proceedings were issued - Whether the new evidence is credible and likely to have an important influence on the outcome of the Appeal and the case as a whole - Whether the proposed amendments to the statement of case support a claim with real prospects of success - Whether the application to amend on appeal may be an abuse of the Court’s process - Under what circumstances can the Court of Appeal grant permission to amend a statement of case and claim form – Whether it is just to permit the applicant to raise the new point on appeal Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved until 16th October 2025. Reason: N/A APPLICATION Case Name: Culgoa Limited v Basement Investments Limited [BVIHCMAP2024/0011] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Thursday, 16th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Esco Henry, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Gertel Thom, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Ms. Elizabeth Jones KC with her Ms. Arabella di Iorio and Mr. Paul Adams Respondent: Mr. David Brownbill KC with him Mr. Nicholas Burkill, Ms. Catherine Harston and Ms. Holly Challenger Issues: Application for leave to amend claim form and statement of claim - Application to adduce fresh evidence - Application to amend notice of appeal – Application to raise new point on appeal (set out in paragraph 47 of the applicant’s written submissions) conditioned on permission being granted to amend the Notice of appeal - Whether permitting the applicant to adduce new evidence and to amend its claim form and statement of claim would be in accordance with the overriding objective of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules Revised 2023 - Whether the new evidence was not available at the time the proceedings were issued - Whether the new evidence is credible and likely to have an important influence on the outcome of the Appeal and the case as a whole - Whether the proposed amendments to the statement of case support a claim with real prospects of success - Whether the application to amend on appeal may be an abuse of the Court’s process - Under what circumstances can the Court of Appeal grant permission to amend a statement of case and claim form – Whether it is just to permit the applicant to raise the new point on appeal Oral Decision Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Culgoa’s application to amend its Claim Form and Statement of Claim filed on June 12th 2023 is refused. 2. Culgoa’s application to amend its Notice of Appeal filed on July 9th 2024 is refused. 3. Culgoa’s application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal and in support of its application to amend the Claim Form and Statement of Claim is refused. 4. Culgoa’s application to rely on paragraph 47 of its skeleton arguments filed in support of this application, by way of additional written submissions on the substantive appeal falls away. 5. Costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal. Reason: UPON HEARING Ms. Elizabeth Jones KC with her Ms. Arabella di Iorio and Mr. Paul Adams for the applicant Culgoa Limited (‘Culgoa’) and Mr. David Brownbill KC with him Mr. Nicholas Burkhill, Ms. Holly Challenger and Ms. Catherine Harston for the respondent Basement Investments Limited (‘Basement’); UPON READING the application filed on April 8th 2025 by the Applicant/Appellant/Claimant Culgoa seeking orders permitting it to: a. amend its Claim Form and Statement of Claim (‘SOC’) filed on June 12th 2023; b. adduce fresh evidence on appeal; c. amend its Notice of Appeal filed on July 9th 2024; and d. rely on paragraph 47 of its skeleton arguments filed in support of this application, by way of additional written submissions on the substantive appeal as necessary. AND UPON READING the supporting documents filed by the parties respectively including: 1. The order of Price Findlay JA (as she then was) dated April 29th 2025 ordering the respondent to file and serve its evidence in answer to the application and its written submissions within 14 days of the date of the order and adjourning the application for further consideration to the next chamber sitting of the court scheduled for May 27th 2025; 2. The order of Ellis JA dated May 27th 2025 adjourning the application for an oral hearing to be conducted before the Full Court at the same time as the substantive appeal; 3. The consent order of the Hon. Chief Justice [Ag.] Margaret Price Findlay dated October 3rd 2025: a. granting permission to Basement to rely on the further written submissions in response to Culgoa’s Application and to the extent necessary in respect of the substantive appeal; b. granting permission to Basement to adduce the affidavit of Mark Renouf dated 18th September 2025 (Renouf 1) and its exhibit in response to Culgoa’s application; c. granting permission to Basement to adduce Renouf 1 and the trustee resolutions and subscription form exhibited to Renouf 1 in respect of the substantive appeal to the extent necessary; and d. granting permission to Culgoa to rely on the second affidavit of Michael Polonsky dated 25th September 2025 and its exhibit ‘MSP-2’ in respect of Culgoa’s application and to the extent necessary in respect of the substantive appeal; and ordering that costs be costs in the appeal; 4. The affidavit of Michael Samuel Polonsky filed on April 8th 2025 in support of the application; 5. The Certificate of Exhibit ‘MSP-1’ filed on April 8th 2025; 6. The affidavit of Wayne Phillip Elliott (‘Elliot 1’) filed on April 8th 2025 in support of the application; 7. The Certificate of exhibit ‘WPE-1’ filed on April 8th 2025; 8. The first affidavit of Karin Lorain Ginsberg filed on April 8th 2025; 9. The Certificate of exhibit ‘KG-1’ filed on April 8th 2025; 10.The first affidavit of Gail Shawzin De Avillez filed on April 8th 2025; 11.The affidavit of Raanji Fara Baharuddin Lugrin filed on April 8th 2025; 12.The Certificate of Exhibit ‘RFBL-1’ filed on April 8th 2025; 13.The affidavit of Michael Samuel Polonsky filed on September 26th 2025 in support of the application; 14.the Certificate of Exhibit ‘MSP-2’ filed on September 26th 2025; 15.The applicant’s chronology of Principal Events filed on October 10th 2025; 16.The respondent’s chronology of Principal Events filed on October 13th 2025; 17.The respondent’s Notice of Opposition filed on April 15th 2025; 18.The applicant’s skeleton arguments in support of the application filed on April 8th 2025; 19.The respondent’s written submissions filed on May 14th 2025 in respect of the application; 20.The applicant’s Note in Reply to Basement’s written submissions dated May 14th 2025, filed on May 22nd 2025; 21.The joint Authorities Bundle filed on October 3rd 2025; 22.The respondent’s supplemental authorities bundle filed on October 13th 2025; and 23.The applicant’s supplemental authorities bundle filed on October 14th 2025; AND UPON NOTING the factual matrix as between the applicant and respondent companies giving rise to these applications as chronicled in the supporting affidavits and exhibits filed by the applicant and the respondent; AND UPON CONSIDERING the comprehensive written and oral submissions of the applicant and the respondent; AND UPON THE COURT CONSIDERING in relation to the application for amendment of the claim form and statement of claim, that: 1. Rule 20.1 of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 (‘CPR’) empowers the Court to give permission to amend a statement of case at any time on application to the court; 2. Rule 20.1(3) of the CPR provides: “When considering an application to amend a statement of case pursuant to rule 20.1(2), the factors to which the court must have regard shall include a. how promptly the applicant has applied to the court after becoming aware that the change was one which he or she wished to make; b. the prejudice to the applicant if the application were refused; c. the prejudice to the other parties if the change were permitted; d. whether any prejudice to any other party can be compensated by the payment of costs and or interest; e. whether the trial date or any likely trial date can still be met if the application is granted;and f. the administration of justice.” 3. Where however, limitation issues are engaged on such an application, i.e. if a question arises about whether the amendment is being proposed after the end of a relevant limitation period the applicable rule is CPR 20.2. In such cases, the Court ‘may allow an amendment the effect of which will be to add or substitute a new claim but only if the new claim arises out of the same or substantially the same facts as a claim in respect of which the party wishing to change the statement of case has already claimed a remedy in the proceedings’: CPR rule 20.2(2). (Emphasis supplied) 4. Without deciding the issue of whether the proposed constructive trust or resulting trust claims are statute-barred but acknowledging that limitation issues emerge on the face of the proposed amendments as acknowledged by the parties; and that in those circumstances the applicant must satisfy the three-stage test outlined in Ballinger v Mercer

[2014]1 WLR 3597 and adopted by this Court in Zhao Long et al v Endushantum Investments Co LTD et al BVIHC 151 of 2017 (delivered 19th April 2019, unreported), at paragraph 24 if it is to succeed; by way of a three-stage inquiry as follows: a. Is it reasonably arguable that the proposed amendments are outside the applicable limitation period; b. if so, do they seek to add or substitute a new cause of action; c. if so, does the new cause of action arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as are already in issue in the existing claim.” 5. Leaving aside the first question for the time being but noting the applicant’s submission that while a 6-year limitation period applies to constructive trust cases, the alleged fraud could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before 2024. If it is correct, section 25 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Therefore, time would not begin to run until the date of discovery. Question 2 must be answered in the affirmative in that two alternative fundamentally new claims are set out in the proposed statement of case. As it relates to the last question, it is also clear to the court that the proposed new causes of action do not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as are in issue in the existing claim in the existing claim. In those circumstances, the Court’s jurisdiction is engaged under rule 20.1(2) of the CPR and will be considered in that light. The Court does not need to consider the first question and refrains from doing so. 6. Therefore, in order to succeed with its application to amend its statement of case, the applicant must satisfy the Court that it has a real prospect of success: Elite Property Holdings Ltd. v Barclays Bank Plc

[2019]EWCA Civ 204. The Court must also be satisfied that it is just and convenient to grant permission to amend the statement of case. 7. The Court entertains no doubt about its jurisdiction to grant the amendment on appeal and if considered appropriate including where limitation concerns are present and where a respondent does not consent to such a course, to direct that the amendments take effect from the date of filing of the instant application or the date of the order granting permission to do so: Advanced Control Systems Inc v Efacec Engenharia e Sistemas SA

[2021]EWHC 914;

Duke of Sussex v News Group Newspapers Ltd

[2024]EWHC 1208 (Ch) and Frontiers Capital I Limited Partnership v Flohr

[2025]EWHC 678 (Ch). 8. In considering the proposed amendments, it has not gone unremarked that the draft amended statement of case introduces no less than 55 new paragraphs of pleadings some of which contain several sub-paragraphs. Further, the applicant has revealed that it has already filed a new claim on June 10th 2025 outlining the new causes of action sought to be introduced by the proposed amendments. It would therefore have ample opportunity to pursue the new causes of action through that avenue. 9. This Court is also satisfied that contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the proposed amendments do not contain any assertions that can support the existing cause of action based on a claim of an express bare trust. In all circumstances, the Court forms the view that the prejudice to the respondent in granting permission to amend the claim form and statement of claim on appeal far outweighs any prejudice that would be occasioned to the applicant by denying the application. The Court is of the considered view that for those and other reasons to be provided subsequently, it is just and convenient to refuse the application to amend the statement of case filed on June 12th 2023. AND UPON THE COURT CONSIDERING the application to amend the Notice of Appeal; The Court is mindful that by CPR 62.24(1) and sections 30(1)(a) and (b) and 31(2) of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) Act it is empowered to permit an amendment to a Notice of Appeal. It is also cognizant that as a matter of principle it must be cautious when deciding whether to permit a party to raise a new point on appeal and would only do so if the justice of the case so requires. On considering further the legal authorities cited by the parties including Comodo Holdings Ltd. v Renaissance Venture Ltd. BVIHCMAP2014/0032 (delivered 15th April 2019, unreported); Christofi v Barclays Bank

[2000]1 WLR 937, Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding and Anor

[2017]1 WLR 39; Playboy Club London Ltd. v Banca Nazionale Del Lavaro Spa

[2018]EWCA Civ 2025; and Notting Hill Finance Ltd. v Sheikh [2019] 4 WLR 146; and on examining the applicable law in relation to creation and character of express trusts, constructive trusts and resulting trusts the Court is satisfied that the proposed amendments have no relevance to the issues raised on the summary judgment application or the appeal against that decision. Further, the Court is satisfied that permitting the amendment to the Notice of Appeal would amount to an abuse of process. In the premises, the Court has therefore concluded that it would not be just to grant permission to the applicant to amend the Notice of Appeal. AND UPON THE COURT CONSIDERING in relation to the application to adduce fresh evidence that the proposed fresh evidence is set out in Elliott 1 and related exhibits and in the affidavits of Michael Samuel Polonsky, Karin Lorain Ginsberg, Gail Shawzin De Avillez and Raanji Fara Baharuddin Lugrin with their exhibits filed on April 8th 2025 in support of the application; AND THE COURT BEING MINDFUL that the principles that guide the Court when considering an application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal are well-established as enunciated by Lord Denning in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 ALL ER 745 at 748; and are expressed as three distinct but cumulative criteria or limbs namely that: a. it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; b. the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although it need not be decisive; and c. the evidence must be apparently credible, although it need not be incontrovertible; AND ON THE COURT NOTING that it is settled law as stated by this Court in Geminis Investors Limited v Goods Technology Starting International Limited BVIHCMAP20220020/BVIHCMAP20220043 (delivered 23rd August 2023, unreported) that a failure to satisfy one of the limbs will lead to a refusal to admit the fresh evidence. THE COURT IS COGNIZANT that the Ladd v Marshall principles are not special rules to be applied rigidly but instead in seeking to give effect to the overriding objective they are to be relaxed in appropriate cases including in interlocutory appeals. See Bilzerian v Weiner SKBHCVAP2019/0033 (delivered 21st July 2020, unreported). Further, a determination of such an application engages the Court’s discretion pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction, and must be exercised judicially. In considering this application the Court reminded itself that to be successful on its application, an applicant must advance strong grounds to satisfy the court that it ought to grant the application to adduce fresh evidence. The Court is of the considered opinion that while the applicant satisfactorily demonstrated that it could not have obtained the proposed fresh evidence with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing of the summary judgment application and that the proposed evidence is generally credible; it was not likely to have an important influence on the outcome of the appeal. The application to adduce fresh evidence for purposes of the appeal is for those reasons refused. IN CONSIDERING the application to permit the applicant to rely on paragraph 47 of its written submissions on appeal, the Court noted that such a course would be warranted only if the applicant succeeded on its application to amend its statement of case. In view of the denial of that aspect of this application, the application to rely on paragraph 47 of the submissions is rendered academic and falls away. AND THE COURT CONSIDERING that its full reasons should be provided to the parties for its decision, such reasons will be to be provided at a later date to be communicated to the parties by the Chief Registrar; The Court ordered that: 1. Culgoa’s application to amend its Claim Form and Statement of Claim filed on June 12th 2023 is refused. 2. Culgoa’s application to amend its Notice of Appeal filed on July 9th 2024 is refused. 3. Culgoa’s application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal and in support of its application to amend the Claim Form and Statement of Claim is refused. 4. Culgoa’s application to rely on paragraph 47 of its skeleton arguments filed in support of this application, by way of additional written submissions on the substantive appeal falls away. 5. Costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal. Case Name: Culgoa Limited v Basement Investments Limited N/A [BVIHCMAP2024/0011] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Thursday, 16th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Esco Henry, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Gertel Thom, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Ms. Elizabeth Jones KC with her Ms. Arabella di Iorio and Mr. Paul Adams Respondent: Mr. David Brownbill KC with him Mr. Nicholas Burkill, Ms. Catherine Harston and Ms. Holly Challenger Issues: Interlocutory appeal - Summary Judgment - Whether the judge applied the incorrect test for summary judgment - Whether the judge erred in concluding that the Claim was “fanciful” and stood no reasonable prospect of success - Whether the appellant was the “beneficial owner” of the Egerton Shares prior to the transfer to respondent - Construction of the Egerton Trust Transfer Form - Whether the expression “beneficial ownership” on the transfer form, its express terms and read properly in context, had the effect that Culgoa remained “beneficial owner” of the Egerton Shares after the transfer - Whether there was any intention to create an express bare trust on the Transfer - Whether the judge erred in concluding that the professionals treated Stella (Shawzin) as the beneficial owner of Culgoa and Basement - Whether the judge erred in concluding that the evidence showed an intention that Basement was to receive the shares beneficially Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Carlos Ghosn v 1. Nissan Motors Co. Ltd. 2. Nissan Middle East FZE [BVIHCMAP2024/0023] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Thursday, 16th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price Findlay, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Reginald T.A. Armour, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: No appearance Respondents/Appli cants: Oral Decision Mr. George Spalton KC with him Mr. Joshua Folkard, Mr. Malcolm Arthurs and Mr. Andrew Gilliland Issues: Application to strike out notice of appeal - Service of notice of appeal out of time - Rule 62.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The application to strike out the notice of appeal is granted. 2. The notice of appeal filed on 20th September 2024 is hereby struck out and dismissed. 3. The Court, having determined the matter on the issue of service, will make no determination on the other issues raised on the face of the application. 4. Costs in the matter are awarded to the applicants to be assessed by a judge of the High Court if not agreed within 21 days of the date of this order. Reason: Before the Court was an application to strike out the notice of appeal filed by the appellant on 20th September 2024 against the order of Justice Wallbank dated 22nd July 2024. The notice of appeal was to be served in accordance with CPR 62.9, that is, within 14 days of the filing of the said notice. The applicants were served via email on 16th October 2024, however the authorisation codes were only provided to the applicants on 23rd October 2024. This would have taken the service outside of the time mandated for service under CPR 62.9. The strike out application was dated 7th March 2025 and was supported by two affidavits of Mr. Andrew Gilliland, dated 7th March 2025 and 3rd April 2025 respectively. The Court considered the notice of application, the evidence filed in support, along with the written and oral submissions of the applicants and was also referred by the applicants to the appellant’s acknowledgement that service of the notice of appeal was late and explained that this was the result of inadvertence. The appellants however submitted that no prejudice was to the applicant was occasioned by the delay. However, despite this concession, the appellant did not file an application seeking an extension of time and did not appear at the hearing of the strike out application despite the fact that the strike out application was served on the appellant on the 3rd April 2025 and that the notice of the hearing of the strike out application, was served on the applicant by the Court on 5th August 2025. The Court, determined that the application should be granted and the notice of appeal filed on 20th September 2024 was accordingly struck out and dismissed with costs to the applicants. The Court having determined the matter on the issue of service made no determination on the other issues raised on the face of the application. Case Name: Geminis Investors Limited v Goods Technology Starting International Limited [BVIHCMAP2022/0020] Consolidated with: Geminis Investors Limited v 1. Goods Technology Starting International Limited 2. G-Force INT’L Co. Ltd. [BVIHCMAP2022/0043] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Thursday, 16th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price Findlay, Chief Justice [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Reginald T.A. Armour, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant: Mr. David Lord KC with him Mr. Jomokie Phillips Respondents: Ms. Angeline Welsh KC with her Ms. Sara-Jane Knock N/A Issues: Application for conditional leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council - Section 3(1)(a) of the Virgin Islands (Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 1967 (the “1967 Order”) - Appeal as of right - Whether the decision to set aside a statutory demand is a final decision - Whether the matter of the statutory demand directly or indirectly meets the statutory value requirement for appeals to His Majesty in Council as of right - Whether appeal raised genuinely disputable issues - Consolidated appeals - Whether the appeal concerning the default judgment should be allowed to advance as of right consequent upon the statutory demand appeal to His Majesty in Council being allowed as of right - Section 3(2)(a) of the 1967 Order - Whether appeal is one of great general or public importance or otherwise - Whether the default judgment appeal falls within the ‘or otherwise’ limb - Application for a stay of execution - Section 7 of the 1967 Order - Whether granting a stay would be just in the circumstances Type of Order: Result / Order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: Lim Yew Cheng v Guanghua SS Holdings Limited [BVIHCMAP2024/0034] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Gerard St. C. Farara, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Tana’ania Small, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Applicant/Appellan t: Oral decision Mr. Alexander Cook KC with him Mr. Guy Olliff-Cooper, Ms. Grainne Hussey and Mr. Aaron Mayers Respondent: Mr. Alex Barden KC with him Mr. Mark Wells Issues: Application to amend notice of appeal - Whether the further ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success - The relevant test for an application to amend - Permission to rely and adduce fresh evidence - Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to allow the Appellant to (1) amend his Notice of Appeal to argue that a stay should be granted pending the determination of (a) the Fraud Proceedings and (b) the New Proceedings, and (2) adduce and rely upon fresh evidence in support of this appeal - Whether there has been a material change of circumstances - Application of Ladd v Marshall principles - Risk of injustice - Degree of prejudice to the respondent Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The application to amend the notice of appeal and permission to adduce and rely on fresh evidence in support of the appeal against the Order of Mithani J (Ag) dated 14th November 2024, is dismissed. 2. Written reasons to follow. Reason: Before the Court was an application by the appellant seeking to amend his Notice of Appeal and to adduce fresh evidence in support of his appeal against the Order of Mithani J (Ag). The Court also heard oral submissions from Counsel for both parties and determined that the application should be dismissed with written reasons to follow. Case Name: Lim Yew Cheng v Guanghua SS Holdings Limited [BVIHCMAP2024/0034] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mr. Gerard St. C. Farara, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mde. Tana’ania Small, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. Alexander Cook KC with him Mr. Guy Olliff-Cooper, Ms. Grainne Hussey and Mr. Aaron Mayers Respondent: Mr. Alex Barden KC with him Mr. Mark Wells Issues: Interlocutory Civil appeal - Exercise of discretion by trial judge - Case management decision - Whether the learned judge erred as a matter of principle and took into account irrelevant matters - Whether the learned judge erred in refusing the Stay Application – The applicable test in granting stay of proceedings- Whether the learned judge erred in not granting the Adjournment Application – Whether the learned judge erred in awarding the respondent’s costs as it was wrong to dismiss the Stay and Adjournment Applications. N/A Type of Order: Result / Order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved. Reason: N/A Case Name: ICM SPC on behalf of Ancile Special Opportunity and Recovery Fund Segregated Portfolio v [1] Ryan Jarvis [2] Rachelle Frisby (as joint liquidators of Phoenix Commodities Pvt Ltd (in liquidation) [BVIHCMAP2024/0019] (Territory of the Virgin Islands) Date: Friday, 17th October 2025 Before: The Hon. Mde. Vicki-Ann Ellis, Justice of Appeal The Hon. Mde. Nicola Byer, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] The Hon. Mr. Dexter Theodore, Justice of Appeal [Ag.] Appearances: Appellant: Mr. David Alexander, KC with him Mr. Brian Lacy, Mr. Alexander Bryant and Ms. Emily Rivett Respondents: Mr. Tony Beswetherick, KC with him Mr. Jeremy Child and Ms. Jhneil Stewart Issues: Commercial appeal - Statutory interpretation - Whether the learned judge was wrong in the construction and application of section 49 of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004 (the “Companies Act”) - Whether it is necessary for a person to enter into a N/A written agreement with the company in advance of the issue of shares specifying (i) the number of shares; (ii) the consideration to be paid; and (iii) the date of the proposed acquisition prior to the issuance of the shares in order to satisfy section 49 of the Companies Act - Whether the judge made material procedural errors in accepting the challenge to the authenticity of documents disclosed by the appellant in the absence of a notice to prove under Part 28.18 CPR 2023 - Appeal against findings of fact - Whether the learned judge erred in concluding that there was “ample evidence” to demonstrate that the appellant agreed in writing within the meaning of section 49 of the Business Companies Act - Whether the learned judge erred in concluding that documents after the issuance of shares can lend support to or corroboration of the conclusions drawn as to an earlier agreement in order to satisfy the parameters of Section 49 – Whether the power of the court to remove the appellant’s name from the register of members is discretionary Type of Order: Result / Order: [Oral Delivery] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Judgment is reserved.

COURT OF APPEAL SITTING SAINT LUCIA VIDEO CONFERENCE TERRITORY OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS MONDAY, 13TH OCTOBER – FRIDAY, 17TH OCTOBER 2025