RODNEY JACOB v STANISLAUS MO~ES~E

~. \ 'I', ........ l'ti ., .... \ "'>-4J ... ~, ' , ~ -'" ............. _ " f· , - ... ./<- .... SAINT LUCIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVIL) A.D. 1996 Suit No. 7&? of 1995 BETWEEN: RODNEY JACOB Plaintiff and STANISLAUS MO~ES~E Defendant Miss F. Byron-Cox for Plaintiff Mr. M. Gordon for Defendant 1996: October 4 and 9 J U D G MEN T MATTHEW J. (In Chambers) . On January 11, 1996 the Plaintiff filed an amended writ o f summons c l aiming against the Defendant the following reliefs :

1.A declaration that a constructive trust exists between the Defendant and the Plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the heirs of Felicien Alexander with respect to property Block 145 6B Parcel No. 162;

2.In the alternative on behalf of himself and the heirs of Felicien Alexander an overriding interest over Block 1456B Parcel No. 162 under Section 28 o f t h e Land Registration Act, 1984;

3.Rectification of the L~~d Register Block 1456B Parcel No. 162 aforesaid;

4.General Damages; and 5 . The costs hereof. The Defendant entered a conditional appearance on January 15, 1996 upon an order made to this effect on January 12 , 1996 but by virtue of the order of the Court it became uncondit s fendant did not apply within 14 days to set as writ. May 17, 1996 Defendant took out a summons e 19 and under the inherent j sdiction of the Court to st out the writ on the ground that it is an abuse process of t Court or in the alternativ~ tc stay the action under Order e 5 until after Pl iff caused to be paid to the Defendant the costs directed to pa llip Bernadine to the Defendant in Suit 287 of 1992 Court and in suit 9 of 1995 the Court Appeal. Frederick swore to an affidavit in support of summons I to draw attention to two paragraphs of aff t. In paragraph 5 the deponent stated that in High Court Suit No. 287 1992 Phillip Bernadine v. Stanislaus te, iff c aimed title to the same piece of land be cl s as an heir of Felicien Alexander; and aga stated: "The Plaintiff herein, suing his as an r of Felicien Alexander on his behalf and on behalf of the other heirs, is again putting in issue ts which were dis put in issue in the aforemen oned Suit No. 287 of 1992 and which have been solemnly found against one of rs s capacity as such." for j 1996 the Plaintiff filed a summons May 29, Rules the defence under Order 19 Rule 5 of fault of Supreme Court. above represent the material pleadings for the purposes of this case. Learned Counsel for the Defendant in support of his submission tendered a type written document with his skeleton s. Counsel asked that the matter be thrown out as res j cata. iance was placed on Article 1171 of the 1 Code whi is as lows: "The authori ty of a final judgment (res judicata) ies a presumption incapable contradic on t of t which has been the object of the judgment, when is founded on the same cause, is between the same par es in the same qualities, and is for same as action adjl:dged upon." Counsel elaborated on the article by reference to a Treatise on 1 Law, Volume 2, Part 1 by Marcel Planiol and Faculty of Law of the University of Paris, pages 34 - At page 34 the two essors state: "In order to determine in wha t cases of res judicata is opposable to a new demand, three tions long been established; it is necessary: ) that the second t be between the same persons, that it concerns the same object, and) t it same cause as the rst (Article 1351 " the heading, Identity of Persons, they state "Every action is li gated between defini persons, who are parties to it. The judgment ob by one of them against the other should not benefit or iniure third persons, unless case of an amicable arrangement concluded by suc~ persons between themselves in lieu of pleading r respective rights. It follows, therefore that the exception of res judicata, means of which individuals respect the authority or presumption of the truth which the law attaches to judgments, cannot be used except for the benefit of a person who was a party to the process, or who is a successor to ts of one of the parties, and against a person who was a partv or who is the successor to such party." Under the haading, Identity of object, they state - "It is necessary, between the parties, to res the t of the judgment to that which was the object of litigation, and to leave them to debate tween themselves, their other rights; in a word, to ve judgment an effect limi as to its ect.fI authors explain the Identity of Cause by stating - "It is quite clear t if I claim of as acquired by purchase, my failure will not prevent me renewing the revindication as a legatee or r of the owner. My second action not :he same cause as my t. If Learned Counsel for the Defendant went on to make a submission ed on what called the public interest princ Ie. that head he submitted that Court has the power r 18, Ku~e and under its inherent j sdiction, to dismiss an act as vexatious and an abuse the process of the Court ses matters which could and should have been litigated ier proceedings. He cited as authority the case YAT TUNG INVESTMENT CO. LTD. v. DAO HENG BANK LTD. and ANOTHER 1975 A.C. 581 P.C. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff in reply submitted that Parties in the present case are not the same as the Parties the ier suit, No. 287 of 1992. She submitted that in the ier case, Phillip Bernadine, the natural son of Muriel Joseph, acted for himself and his claim was based on adverse possession. Counsel submitted the novel proposition that Phillip was claiming adverse possession for himself and during s minor years, mot 's possession was to be regarded as his possession. said that llip's claim was against the heirs of Felicien includes his mother. Counsel stated that the present case is a representat act brought by one of the heir~ o~ Felicien exander and so it cannot held that the interest of llip is ical to o Rodney Jacob although admitted that ece f and was same in both actions. Counsel submitted t ses of actions are different. CONCLUSIONS From the pleadings s case it appears Felicien Al r was married to Arcenne Fel ien and they s namely: (1) Netta Petit Frere; (2) Hortense Detervil (3 ) St. Mart Felicien; (4) Joseph Felicien; (5) Nemorin Felicien; and 6) Felicien Felicien It must always be noted that this is only a There not been yet any proof of the family tree. the earlier suit Phillip Bernadine, though not an ir, t s roots from St. Martin Felicien who would have s grand father via Amazilta Joseph and her daughter Muriel The pleadings state that Elizabeth Macauldy from whom the Defendant claims was the grand daughter of Joseph Felicien. It is not quite clear from the pleadings how the aintiff this action becomes the lawful great grandson of Felicien Alexander and Arcenne Felicien as stated in paragraph 1 of the amended statement o claim, or as an heir of the said Felicien Alexander as stated s affidavit dated July 8, 1996 in opposition to De's summons to strike out the writ. will be incumbent on to prove those things if s act second suit is to succeed. But let me de with the summons under Order 18 Rule 19. In t course of ~aking s submissions, very e in the day, 1 Counsel for the Defendant asked to delete from s leton arguments the following words: "He sought to t Defendant 's stered tle, alleging that title should be awarded to tead, as of the said Felicien Alexander, who alleged was the true owner thereof". se words were spoken of Phillip Bernadine because Counsel just realised that Bernadine was never an ir. He is t son of an heir at most. The deletion was sought to recti basis of his argument that Phillip Bernadine was an heir. But the de etion of the words did not cure the position. words deleted were contained in the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th lines of a began wi the words: "No 287/92 was an action brought by Phillip Bernadine, an heir of Felicien Alexander, against Stanislaus Modeste." If I may be permitted to use the analogy of this dreadful disease, ~ ~ SIG e", I understand that the surgeon may remove fective s of the body affected which are clearly visible, yet t st 11 remains infected parts of the body which are not so clearly sible. statement of claim in the earlier suit is an exhibit in this case. Paragraph 2 states that natural son of Muriel Bernadine Joseph, who is paragraph as the lawful great grand daughter of Felic Alexander. ~~ge 2 of the skeleton arguments continues error it st - "It was further held that the Plaintiff, d~d not by himself nor through s ancestors," etc. And yet at page 3, learned Counsel cites PIal at says - "The obverse of this statement would be that if ano were to recommence the suit in the capaci as tutor of same minor, he would be subj ect to the of res judicata, notwithstanding the lack iden of ma person. " These last words are sed on the contention Bernadine was an heir just as Rodney Jacob. This leads Counsel to come to a wrong conclusion when states at page 3 of his skeleton arguments - "Thus, there is an identity of persons between No. 287/92 and No. 788/95. While the material person bringing No. 788/95 is Rodney Jacob he brings it as a representative heirs Felicien Alexander. Thus the person whose ghts were adjudicated upon in No. 287/92 and that which is now demanded the heirs to be adjudicated upon in No. 788/95 is the same: of Felicien Alexander. II In my judgment therefore the Plaintiffs in both actions are materially different and are not acting in the same capacity. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff cited the case of MARGINSON v. BLACKBURN BOROUGH COUNCIL 1939 as an authority on Parties ing different. In that case the Parties were mat al same but Marginson was not estopped where he brought a second act as Personal Representative of his deceased wife when first act was brought by him his personal capacity. decis can seen as an authority for a statement at the footnote of 36 of aniol's treatise. There it is stated - "The identi ty of the :;:'J.rties in the second case, whi is necessary in order that the exception of res judicata used, does not mean the material identity of persons, but identity of capacity or quality. Thus a tutOL t having lost a case brought in the name of his ward, may recommence it in his own name, without being subject to the of res judicata because he is not acting in the same capaci it is not the same person who is pleading. II It is admitted that there is a common identi of ect both actions and I have found that there is no common identi of persons. It may be unnecessary to consider i f cause. Learned Counsel for the Defendant submitted i of cause and learned Counsel for the plaintiff submitt to the contrary. I would be more inclined to agree that common ity of cause was lacking. Phillip Bernadine's case was on adverse possession and this is made clear at pages 1, 2, 7 and 8 of t judgment in the earlier suit. This suit seems to be a claim on behalf of the heirs of Felicien Alexander, not based on long possession, but derived from a deed of sale and possess by the owner and his heirs. I do not think it necessary to consider the public interest principle and the authority of YAT TUNG INVESTI1eNT CO. LTD. It is not here relevant where there is an absence of identity of Parties. decision of the Privy Council in that case was that the trine of res judicata in its wider sense applied and it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings." If it were found that there was identity of persons cases then in my view the principle could apply the cons ion of new claims brought in the second action, that is, t constructive trust and overriding interests, or cOillmuni ch were absent in the earlier case. In his summons, the Defendant asked to stay t proceedings Defendant was not paid costs due to him in two ts himself and Phillip Bernadine. Order 21 Rule 5(1) of the es of the Court is as follows:- "Where a party has discontinued an ac on or coun a~m or withdrawn any particular claim made him he s liable to pay any other party's costs acr:~on or counterclaim or the costs occasioned to any other claim withdrawn, then if, before payment of those costs, he subsequently brings an action for the same, or tan al the same, cause of action, the Court may order the in that action to be stayed until those costs are paid. " s rule is clearly inapplicable where two dif rent ies are bringing the actions. And even if it was Phillip who was bringing the second action the rule would not apply in re of the High Court action for he did not discontinue action or withdrew any particular claim in the action. F ~y learned for the Defendant at the conclusion of submissions stated - "In the event the Court should find that the action d continue we are applying for an extension of time within which to file a defence." s was clearly related to the Plaintiff's summons for j referred to above and learned Counsel for the Plaintiff must been aware of it. In her reply learned Counsel for Plainti not oppose the application. I therefore grant leave to the Defendant to file and serve s fe.ncp within twenty one days failing which judgment entered for the Plaintiff. costs on this summons s~~all be costs in cause to Plaintiff to be agreed or otherwise taxed. A.N.J. MATTHEW sne Judge

Suit No. 762 of 1995 MATTHEW J. Delivered: 09/10/96