OLIVIER GARON V JEAN EBRARD et al

#048 SAINT LUCIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVIL) A.D. 1996 Suit No. 62 of 1990 BETWEEN: OLIVIER GARON .... ... J c Pla iff ~ and

1.JEAN EBRARD

2.RADIO CARIBBEAN (1982) LTD. De s Mrs. C. Malaykhan for Pla iff . K. Monplaisir Q.C. and Mrs. C. Hinkson - Ouhla for Defendants c r +- <: [1 " 1996: October 22 and 24; November 6. J U D G MEN T .::::. MATTHEW J. c. The Plaintiff was the General Manaaer of the seccnd Def company in Saint Lucia from 1980 until 1988. first De r -- <: s at the time and still is the Chairman of the Board of Directors the second Defendant company. r G :;: March 1, 1989 the first De wrote in French to the -,: P a iff the following which s been tted both to be a correct translation in ish 7- t "Mr. 01 er Garon ~ La Ferme/Redoute ~ 97200 Fort de France Martinique. Dear Sir, For several years you occupied the post of Director of Radio Caribbean (1982) Limited. Various invest audits which I recently in that company revealed a s di in the strat account f s. You were che one in and for several years you were the one to have committed the company by your s Yet I was ed t make external enquiries to a true picture f the situation. It is in t s confusing situac on that I have noted for seve years now, many s were your siGnature from the company's account in the Credit Martiniquais in Fort de France, and i ted in another account, ly to the domiciliation ment your name, or somet f your predecessor. Ac to the ion we you were t only s to that account at t Francaise Commerciale in Dominica, an account which was used to settle the company's expenses in Dominica. Now it appears that s 1982 more EC $5 ,G 0 five hundred and EC dollars) was d=posited into thlS account but t for many of the s from that account were not annexed; othe words, withdrawals were not ed the re evant This vexing state of affairs cannot s you, particularly s we have no documents soever ln our possession since 1 10/86, no bank statements, vouchers, receipts etc. This is we are requesting that you send us most urgently all documents relevant to that account which may still be your possess We send you a detailed ist of expenses for which we have no vouchers, ills or invoices, so that you can furnish the necess explanat I am persuaded that you fully appreciate the need to et us have that information, and that you will it your most urgent attention. Jean Ebrard Chairman of the Board. As Cl. rp t of that letter the PIa iff on 28, nstituted a I I act t t Def s. In paragraph 5 of his statement 0: claim t PIa iff all that their ordinary and natural meaning the he second of the letter, that is - "Yet I was forc to make ext ries to a true picture of the situat aken in the context of the letter as a e in i art in the context of the irst and second f tne sa iff as the Ie ter! meant and were Y'~ -'"" to mean that the PIa person In of (1982 ted di st a false picture f the account and f ial departments of t company! and the said are defamatory. In paragraph 6 of his statement of claim the PIa iff al t their ordinary and natural meaning! the words the thi fourth and fifth of the said letter t context the letter as a e! meant and were understood to mean that Plaintiff had dealt tly th funds of t and accordingly, the said words are defamatory. In their defence filed on April 24, 1990 the Defendants ed that words complained of bore or were understood to bear or are e of be any meaning defamatory Plaintiff and tion they relied on qualified lege. Plaintiff's fil on 23, 1990 a ication was malic t Part are on issues se s case. are as llows: 1. her was a 2 . If was .::t icat of are e f PI iff.

3.If ar a mean whe occasion was

4.If occasion was whe it was ss mal ceo shall to deal wi these issues in the order ication is t VI t ley on states can be ma 1 or sl unless ained of have been i Lord Esher .R. sa "The mat of cause of act s ting, t 1. II 222 states icat is meant the the def matter, after t tten, to some person of it is tten. In this case iff cannot est ish that there was ication to a support of that there was a icat In 3 of the statement of cl t PI all that first Defendant wrote and publi of t a iff t stated in the letter of March 1, 1989. In ence the Defendant admitted paragraphs 1, 3 of atement of cl only evidence of ication comes from the Jean ,one t two tnesses for de said In cross- ion that as far as could it was stian Bonnel, t ot tness and present r t second fendant company, who t letter f Ma'::'ch I, 198 . When Bonnel gave ev , again r cross- ion, he stated that is pess e he the etter but could not real recall the matter. the aintiff can only rely ication f t endant to an employee f t se Defendant I PULLMAN and ANOTHER v. WALTER HILL & CO. LTD. 1891 1 QB 524 the Court of held an action fer 1 that here was ication from t ter t letter to s clerks c sien was not privil later case of BRYANS TON FINANCE LTD and OTHERS v. DE VRIES and ANOTHER 1975 2 AER 609 seems to have fied t ew lman's case. was a maj ty decis of t Court f 1. In case Lord Denning M. R. the e held that t dictat a inessman to s st, re the dictation was the accepted mode 0 C the ett rs, gave se to an lege, was te the intended recipient might or whe letter was actual. sent. Based on the ision of it would seem t ication to Bonnel would not give se to an actionable ication for this would be barred by ori Lord Justice Lawton, who agreed with Lord that the al would be lowed, did not go along with his notion original lege between the writer of the letter and s st. Lawton L J. was of the view that at least some of the intended re ients the letters in the case a common erest th the ter rece the complaints and icat to t would ected by qualified privilege; and so he ld t ication to the ist ier would also nave pc~ed if the ication to them had in usual course business which every empl had an erest In ensurlng was successful. Lawton L.J. was ~hus advocat anci ary lege ch is more clearly defined in the j f Lord I I were to adopt the view for the time that the etter March 1, 1989 to the Plaintiff was clothed wi fied privilege would come to the conclusion on the of Lawton L.J. t the Dublication to Bonnel wotild be privil and so here would be actionable ication. co~plete the pict~re ~ should state t ew of Lord ock who hls ssenting judgment took the view that was unable to the broad and novel proposit of Lord t i an original privi ege s out of contractual ationship of employer and employee ch automatical att s every occasion on which a businessman dictates a ss etter t a typist in s office; can be splaced proof of ice. Lord Dip ock t that it was not an orig lege but one ancillary to, and. dependent on, stence of a lege for the publication of the def contents of tter to its addressee. Lord k came to the conclus that the main publication to he Plaintiff was e of attracting any ancillary privileqe for it:s prior ication to clerical oyees of the defendants in the course of ng it for despatch to him. Worthy of note is the view of Lord Diplock at page 623 of the judgment that the members of the Court of Appeal in Pullman's case not appear to have regarded it as being in the course o business practice at that date to dictate letters to ists. the authori of Bryanston's case, treasons Lord Denning M.R. and Lawton L.J. I would d t there was no ication of the letter of March I, 1989 that would rise to a cause of action to a iff, t is, w~ether ication to Bonnel be regarded as an lege or as an ancillary privilege. of But I would not wi to rest my decision on this the ication and so I pass on to cons r ained of are capable a defamatory 119 of Gatley states as follows: "It is well settled t the question ther are complained of are e of famatorv is a question of law 1'1d is therefore one I decision of Court. If words are so e it is a question for the jury ther the words do in fact convey a famatory me If a publication, either stanOlnq a or taken in connection with ot circumstances, is capable of a libellous construction, it s for ury, not for t Court, to say whether a 1 llcus construction should be upon it." s wi t and It st es "Where the Plaintiff relies on the natural and meaning of the words complained of, no evidence is admissible of their meaning or the sense in which they were understood or of any facts giving se to any erences to be drawn the words used, for it is for the jury to determine t sense in which the words would reasonably have been understood by an ordinary man the 1 ight of general known facts and For instance, evidence of the mean of meanings of words. ch has passed into common use would not a slang expression admiss e." In this jurisdiction of course, and in this case, performs the functions of the Court and th~ ~llrf. I read the letter of March 1, 1989 in its totali see a concern by the Chairman of the Board of Directors f the se fendant company in respect of the administrat , account f ial departments of the company in that it was not clear whose name was the Dominica account; and there t thdrawals from that account thout ing The Chairman therefore requested the Pl iff to send all s in s possession which could he to cl t posit and when he send these the company would send a detai ed st of expenses for which there were still no support s s he could furnish any r explanation. I am at a loss to see any ation of di s the a iff ether in a false picture the strat f account and financial departments of the company or in deal with t funds of the company. I agree with learned Counsel for the De s that the nature of the letter was one of enquiry. In my judgment the words complained of in the letter of March 1, 1 89 written by the first Defendant did not bear and are e of bearing a defamatory imputation of the Plaintiff. But I shall assume for the time being that the words did bear a famatory meaning and I therefore go on to consider the de ence ified privilege. As indicated earlier I assume there was an acti e ication from the Chairman of the Board Directors to the General Manager of the second Defendant company. s no e of any publ.ication to any other person. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff in her ext ens ross ion of the first Defendant suggested that t letter may h~ve 0cen published to a Miss Gibson. When the tness said did know a Miss the suggestion was aroppea 1- Ke a ato. And her closing address Counsel for iff admitt that the y e of lication was t Bonnel. subject qualified pr lege is alt th t fourth t tion of Halsbury's Laws of 1 Volume 28 1 s relat cation from the writer to the ssee. Volume 28 deals the fence of ifi lege. It states: "On grounds of public the law af ectlon f h and wi certain occasions to a person acting in any improper motive who makes a statement about another person which is in fact untrue and def Such occasions are called occasions of qualified privilege. It is not possible to set out all the occasions at common law 11 be held to be pr leged but I as a general rule, there must a common and corresponding duty or interest between the person who makes communication and the person who rece sit." Learned Counsel for the Defendants has quite ly stated t it was a duty of the irman of the Board f Directors to write the alleged defamatory letter to the General Manager of t radio station who had a corresponding duty to receive it. 111 of the said Volume 28 of Halsbury1s Laws of and states that an occasion is privileged where the person who makes a cation has an interest or a duty, 1 ,soci or to it to the person to whom it is made, and to t ~s so made a corresponding interest or to rece it. am of the view that if the letter of March 1, 1989 could ever as defamatory defence of qualif ed lege could to avoid action. t is trite law that malice can defeat the de ence of fied ilege. 28 of Hals 's Laws of land deals with effect of malice states "It is the Def to prove the occasion ication is one ified lege. feat t defence t Plaintiff must t prove that the Defendant, ishing the words complained of, was actuated express malice." the burden is on the PI iff to eXDress malice on the of the De s. 762 of Gatley states that t i f 11 sue t existence of ss malice if he can show that the Defendant was not us the occas stly for purpose for the law s ect but was actuated some indirect mot not connected with lege, i.e. actual malice. 765 states ac mal ce does not necessari mean personal sp te or ill 1 . any indirect motive other than a sense f is the law Is malice. Both Counsel ref to the case of HORROCKS v. LOWE 1974 1 AER 662, H. L. on the question of malice. In t case the Plaintiff brought an action claiming damages for slander which accepted the Defendant I s plea that:. '[he words were on a privileged occasion but alleged that the Def was actuated by express malice. Judge found that t Defendant not been actuated by personal spite and that he had honest ieved that what he was say.ing was true and justifiable. He held however that, owing to the Defendant's anxiety to have the iff removed from the tee, s state was one s unreasoning prej ce express iff he De's iff House of House of De s or to t ifC to succeea s of "" had sa was entit sa that althouoh oross ce se an f ice it t t De h or of what ne naa sala, lt couJ.a not case it him to belleve ln the trutn or hlS were no circumstances from House smis he who gave s express 670. clos address learned Counsel for the i f ted De s not iff t of the es t not trut of ions conta in the letter. my s s De e. It s not the Plaintiff of he results of their t not lieve t of wrote. iff rel on the fact t letter was ten to him t mont after he insti a i c t Def s for fees owed to as of ice on of the Def s. It is true t cross first Def stat was not Garon had filed a case the company but thlS more is not sufficient to satis the burden on the Pla iff t was express malice on the of the Def s. An issue was of the fact that the first De s t ted accounts of t 1985, 986 and t erence being t if s t accounts he d not l ter quest any matter related to accounts. t rd answered the rence correct when he sa !II approved f ial state:nents for 1 8 , 1986 and -L 8 approved documents thac were tt to the Board. does not mean that I apprc or frauds scovered subs that did not come to my at is must have satisfied learned Counsel for the Pla ff never mentioned the accounts in her clos address. my judgment no express malice has been on the the a~ntiff in t s case. For the reasons stat above the act s ssed th costs to Defendants to be taxed, if not A. N. . MATTHE'i'l sne

SAINT LUCIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVIL) A.D. 1996 Suit No. 62 of 1990 BETWEEN: OLIVIER GARON and

1.JEAN EBRARD

2.RADIO CARIBBEAN (1982) LTD. Mrs. C. Malaykhan for Pla iff #048 Pla iff De s . K. Monplaisir Q.C. and Mrs. C. Hinkson – Ouhla for Defendants MATTHEW J. 1996: October 22 and 24; November 6. J U D G MEN T The Plaintiff was the General Manaaer of the seccnd Def company in Saint Lucia from 1980 until 1988. first De s at the time and still is the Chairman of the Board of Directors the second Defendant company. March 1, 1989 the first De wrote in French to the P a iff the following which s been tted both to be a correct translation in ish “Mr. 01 er Garon La Ferme/Redoute 97200 Fort de France Martinique. Dear Sir, For several years you occupied the post of Director of Radio Caribbean (1982) Limited. ……. J c ~ c r +- <: [1 ” .::::. c. –r <: r G :;: -,: 7- t ~ ~ Various invest audits which I recently in that company revealed a s di in the strat account f s. You were che one in and for several years you were the one to have committed the company by your s Yet I was ed t make external enquiries to a true picture f the situation. It is in t s confusing situac on that I have noted for seve years now, many siGnature from the company’s s were account in the your Credit Martiniquais in Fort de France, and i ted in another account, ly 1 to the domiciliation ment your name, or somet f your predecessor. Ac to the ion we you were t only s to that account at t Francaise Commerciale in Dominica, an account which was used to settle the company’s expenses in Dominica. Now it appears that s 1982 more EC $5 ,G 0 five hundred and EC dollars) was d=posited into thlS account but t for many of the s from that account were not annexed; othe words, withdrawals were not ed the re evant This vexing state of affairs cannot s you, particularly s we have no documents soever ln our possession since 1 10/86, no bank statements, vouchers, receipts etc. This is we are requesting that you send us most urgently all documents relevant to that account which may still be your possess We 11 send you a detailed ist of expenses for which we have no vouchers, ills or invoices, so that you can furnish the necess explanat I am persuaded that you fully appreciate the need to et us have that information, and that you will it your most urgent attention. Jean Ebrard Chairman of the Board. As Cl. rp t of that letter the PIa iff on 28, 199 nstituted a I I act t t Def s. In paragraph 5 of his statement 0: claim t PIa iff all that their ordinary and natural meaning the he second of the letter, that is – “Yet I was forc to make ext ries to a true picture of the situat 11 aken in the context of the letter as a e in i art in the context of the irst and second f tne sa Ie ter! meant and were Y’~ -‘”” to mean that the PIa person In of (1982 ted iff as the di st a false picture f the account and f ial departments of t company! and the said are defamatory. In paragraph 6 of his statement of claim the PIa iff al t their ordinary and natural meaning! the words the thi fourth and fifth of the said letter t context the letter as a e! meant and were understood to mean that Plaintiff had dealt tly th funds of t and accordingly, the said words are defamatory. In their defence filed on April 24, 1990 the Defendants ed that t words complained of bore or were understood to bear or are e of be any meaning defamatory t Plaintiff and tion they relied on qualified lege. Plaintiff’s fil on 23, 1990 a ication was malic t Part are on issues se s case. are as llows:

3.If ar a mean whe occasion was 1

4.If occasion was 1 whe it was ss mal ceo shall to deal wi these issues in the order ication is t VI t ley on 1 81 22 states 1 can be ma 1 or sl unless ained of have been i Lord Esher .R. sa “The mat of cause of act 1 s ting, t 1 1. II 222 states icat is meant the the def matter, after t tten, to some person of it is tten. In this case iff cannot est ish that there was ication to a support of that there was a icat In 3 of the statement of cl t PI all that first Defendant wrote and publi of t a iff t stated in the letter of March 1, 1989. In 1 f t ence the Defendant admitted paragraphs 1, 2 3 of atement of cl only evidence of ication comes from the Jean ,one t two tnesses for de said In crossion that as far as could it was Bonnel, t ot tness and present r t fendant company, who t letter f Ma’::’ch I, 198 . stian second When Bonnel gave ev , again r cross- ion, he stated that is pess e he the etter but could not real recall the matter. the aintiff can only rely ication f t endant to an employee f t se Defendant I PULLMAN and ANOTHER v. WALTER HILL & CO. LTD. 1891 1 QB 524 the Court of held an action fer 1 that here was ication from t ter t letter to s clerks c sien was not privil later case of BRYANS TON FINANCE LTD and OTHERS v. DE VRIES and ANOTHER 1975 2 AER 609 seems to have fied t ew lman’s case. was a maj ty decis of t Court f

1.her was a 2 . If was .::t icat of are e f PI iff.

1.In case Lord Denning M. R. the e held that t dictat a inessman to s st, re the dictation was the accepted mode 0 C the ett rs, gave se to an 1 lege, was te the intended recipient might or whe letter was actual. sent. Based on the ision of it would seem t ication to Bonnel would not give se to an actionable ication for this would be barred by ori 1 Lord Justice Lawton, who agreed with Lord that the al would be lowed, did not go along with his notion original lege between the writer of the letter and s st. Lawton L J. was of the view that at least some of the intended re ients the letters in the case a common erest th the ter rece the complaints and icat to t would ected by qualified privilege; and so he ld t ication to the ist ier would also nave pc~ed if the ication to them had in usual course business which every empl had an erest In ensurlng was successful. Lawton L.J. was ~hus advocat anci ary lege ch is more clearly defined in the j f Lord I I were to adopt the view for the time that the etter March 1, 1989 to the Plaintiff was clothed wi fied privilege would come to the conclusion on the of Lawton L.J. t the Dublication to Bonnel wotild be privil and so here would be actionable ication. co~plete the pict~re ~ should state t ew of Lord ock who hls ssenting judgment took the view that was unable to the broad and novel proposit of Lord i an original privi ege s out of ationship of employer and employee ch automatical every occasion on which a businessman dictates a t a typist in s office; can be splaced ice. Lord Dip ock t that it was not an orig t contractual att s ss etter proof of lege but one ancillary to, and. dependent on, stence of a lege for the publication of the def contents of tter to its addressee. Lord k came to the conclus that the main publication to he Plaintiff was e of attracting any ancillary privileqe for it:s prior ication to clerical oyees of the defendants in the course of ng it for despatch to him. Worthy of note is the view of Lord Diplock at page 623 of the judgment that the members of the Court of Appeal in Pullman’s case not appear to have regarded it as being in the course o business practice at that date to dictate letters to ists. the authori of Bryanston’s case, treasons Lord Denning M.R. and Lawton L.J. I would d t there was no ication of the letter of March I, 1989 that would rise to a cause of action to a iff, t is, w~ether ication to Bonnel be regarded as an as an ancillary privilege. lege or But I would not wi to rest my decision on this ication and so I pass on to cons r of the ained of are capable a defamatory 119 of Gatley states as follows: “It is well settled t the question ther complained of are e of famatorv a question of law 1’1d is therefore one I decision of Court. If words are so e are is it is a question for the jury ther the words do in fact convey a famatory me If a publication, either stanOlnq a or taken in connection with ot circumstances, is capable of a libellous construction, it s for ury, not for t Court, to say whether a 1 llcus construction should be upon it.” 1311 s wi t and It st es “Where the Plaintiff relies on the natural and meaning of the words complained of, no evidence is admissible of their meaning or the sense in which they were understood or of any facts giving se to any erences to be drawn the words used, for it is for the jury to determine t sense in which the words would reasonably have been understood by an ordinary man the 1 ight of general known facts and meanings of words. a slang expression admiss e.” For instance, evidence of the mean of ch has passed into common use would not In this jurisdiction of course, and in this case, performs the functions of the Court and th~ ~llrf. I read the letter of March 1, 1989 in its totali see a concern by the Chairman of the Board of Directors f the se fendant company in respect of the administrat , account f ial departments of the company in that it was not clear whose name was the Dominica account; and there t thdrawals from that account thout ing The Chairman therefore requested the Pl iff to send all s in s possession which could he to cl t posit and when he send these the company would send a detai ed st of expenses for which there were still no support s s he could furnish any r explanation. I am at a loss to see any ation of di s the a iff ether in a false picture the strat f account and financial departments of the company or in deal with t funds of the company. I agree with learned Counsel for the De s that the nature of the letter was one of enquiry. In my judgment the words complained of in the letter of March 1, 1 89 written by the first Defendant did not bear and are of bearing a defamatory imputation of the Plaintiff. e But I shall assume for the time being that the words did bear a famatory meaning and I therefore go on to consider the de ence f ified privilege. As indicated earlier I 1 assume there was an acti e ication from the Chairman of the Board Directors to the General Manager of the second Defendant company. s no e of any publ.ication to any other person. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff in her ext ens ross ion of the first Defendant suggested that t letter may h~ve 0cen published to a Miss Gibson. When the tness said did know a Miss the suggestion was aroppea 1- Ke a ato. And her closing address Counsel for 1 iff admitt that the y e of lication was t Bonnel. subject qualified pr lege is alt th t fourth tion of Halsbury’s Laws of 1 Volume 28 1 s relat cation from the writer to the ssee. 108 Volume 28 deals the lege. It states: “On grounds of public the law af certain occasions to a person acting in fence of ifi ectlon f h and wi t any improper motive who makes a statement about another person which is in fact untrue and def Such occasions are called occasions of qualified privilege. It is not possible to set out all the occasions at common law 11 be held to be pr leged but I as a general rule, there must a common and corresponding duty or interest between the person who makes communication and the person who rece sit.” Learned Counsel for the Defendants has quite ly stated t it was a duty of the irman of the Board f Directors to write the alleged defamatory letter to the General Manager of t radio station who had a corresponding duty to receive it. 111 of the said Volume 28 of Halsbury1s Laws of and states that an occasion is privileged where the person who makes a cation has an interest or a duty, 1 ,soci or to it to the person to whom it is made, and to t ~s so made a corresponding interest or to rece it. am of the view that if the letter of March 1, 1989 could ever as defamatory defence of qualif ed lege could to avoid action. t is trite law that malice can defeat the de ence of fied ilege. 109 28 of Hals ‘s Laws of land deals with effect of malice states “It is the Def to prove the occasion ication is one ified lege. feat t defence t Plaintiff must t prove that the Defendant, ishing the words complained of, was actuated malice.” express the burden is on the PI iff to eXDress malice on the of the De s. 762 of Gatley states that t i f 11 sue t existence of if he can show that the Defendant was not us ss malice the occas stly for purpose for the law s ect but was actuated some indirect mot not connected with lege, i.e. actual malice. 765 states ac mal ce does not necessari mean personal sp te or ill 1 . any indirect motive other than a sense f is the law Is malice. Both Counsel ref to the case of HORROCKS v. LOWE 1974 1 AER 662, H. L. on the question of malice. In t case the Plaintiff brought an action claiming damages for slander which accepted the Defendant I s plea that:. ‘[he words were on a privileged occasion but alleged that the Def was actuated by express malice. Judge found that t Defendant not been actuated by personal spite and that he had honest ieved that what he was say.ing was true and justifiable. He held however that, owing to the Defendant’s anxiety to have the iff removed from the s unreasoning prej ce he De’s House of House of or to t tee, s of “” had sa was entit s state express iff De ifC to succeea sa that althouoh oross ce se an f t t De was one iff s ice it h or of what ne naa sala, lt couJ.a not case it him to belleve ln the trutn or hlS were no circumstances from House smis he who gave 1 669 670. clos address learned Counsel for the De s t of the es t not not ions conta in the letter. my e. It s not the Plaintiff of he results of their t not lieve t of s express De i f iff trut of s wrote. ted s iff rel on the fact t letter was ten to him t mont after he insti a i c t Def s for fees owed to as of ice on of the Def s. It is true t cross first Def stat was not Garon had filed a case the company but thlS more is not sufficient to satis the burden on the Pla iff t was express malice on the of the Def s. An issue was of the fact that the first De s t ted accounts of t 1985, 986 and 8 t erence being t if s t accounts he d not l ter quest any matter related to accounts. t rd answered the rence correct when he sa !II approved f ial state:nents for 1 8 , 1986 and -L 8 approved documents thac were tt to the Board. does not mean that I apprc or frauds scovered subs that did not come to my at is must have satisfied learned Counsel for the Pla ff never mentioned the accounts in her clos address. my judgment no express malice has been on the the a~ntiff in t s case. For the reasons stat above the act s ssed th costs to Defendants to be taxed, if not A. N. . MATTHE’i’l sne