JULIAN R. HUNTE v SHARON WILLIAMS et al

SAINT LUCIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE ''-"' (CIVIL) A.D. 1997 r Suit No.139 of 1991 J.- Between: JULIAN R. HUNTE Plaintiff vs 1) SHARON WILLIAMS 2) THE VANGUARD PUBLISHING LIMITED 3) ADVANCE PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS L1~ITED Defendants Mr. Peter Foster for aintiff Defendants absent and Unrepresented 1997: April 24 July \. J}JDGMENT By a writ of summons indorsed with a Statement of aim filed on the lOth of April, 1991 the Plaintiff sought damages and costs against the Defendants for libel, claiming that the Defendants falsely and maliciously published an article which +- r in its natural and ordinary meaning was defamatory of him in 1- the Vanguard newspaper which has a large circulation i throughout the State of Saint Lucia. v He pleaded that he was a prominent businessman who is commonly known as Ju-Ju and that at that time, 1991, h~ was t Leader of the Opposition, Leader of the St Lucia Labour Party, Parliamentary Representative for the Gros-Islet constituency in the House of Assembly in the State of Saint Lucia. Paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim is reproduced: "On the 9th day of March, 1991 the Defendants falsely and maliciously wrote, and printed and published, or caused to be written, printed and published on page 11 issue of the said newspaper dated that day under headline "PEOPLE ARE SAYING" of and concerning Plaintiff, the words following, that is to say: PEOPLE ARE SAYING: Ju-Ju does not only have Party problems, he so have an alcohol problem. In Monchy and La Borne is ten carried to his car like :"1'1 invalid, drunk after two drinks and always picking a fight." On the 7.2nd dcly of April, 1991 an appearance was entered on behalf of the Defendants. A judgment dated 21st June, 1991 and filed on the 27th day of June 1991 was obtained by the aintiff against the Defendants and reads as follows: "No Defence having been filed and/or herein by the Defendants, it is this day adjudged that Interlocutory Judgment be entered against the Defendants for damages to be assessed and costs." On the 26th of February an order was granted these terms: "That the judgment dated 21st June, 1991 be and is hereby set aside. That the Defendants do file their Defence on or before 11th March, 1992. That the matter do hereafter take its usual course. That there will be no order as to costs." On the 28th day of February, 1992 a Defence "wi th leave granted on 26th February, 1992" was filed by the Defendants. The Defence is reproduced: DEFENCE (With leave granted on 26th February, 1992) The defendants state:

1.Save as to the allegation that the Plaintiff II is commonly and/or also knows as Ju-Ju", of which the plaintiff has no knowledge, paragraph 1 of the Statement of Claim is admitted.

2.Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim is admitted.

3.The defendants admit publishing the words set out paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim but deny that the words were published falsely or maliciously.

4.The defendants deny paragraph 4 of the Statement Claim and state as follows: (a) the said words in their natural and ordinary meaning did not bear and were not understood to bear and are incapable of bearing any of the meanings alleged in the said paragraph 4 or any meaning defamatory of the plaintiff; (b) in their natural and ordinary meaning f the said words are true in substance and fact.

5.The defendants deny paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim and state that the said ~'ords did not bear and were not understood to bear and ~re incapable of bearing any the extended meanings alleged in the said paragraph 5 or any extended meaning defamatory of the plaintiff.

6.Save as herein specifically admitted the defendants deny each and every material allegation in the Statement of Claim as if the same had been herein set out seriatim and specifically denied. The defendants claim that the action be dismissed wi costs. On the 13th of March, 1992 a request for hearing was filed by the Plaintiff. The matter was set down to be heard on the 7th day of 1994. During the period that the matter was ripe for hearing and set down for trial, Counsel, Mr Henry Giraudy for the Defendants died. Thereafter various correspondence, to the Defendants were filed. The firm of Floissac Flemming and Associates wrote many letters to the Defendants requesting them to instruct "new solicitors to take over the proceedings." Barrister-at-Law, Lennard Riviere appeared on three occasions when he was sent for. He told the Court that he did not have the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the Defendants. There were sixteen (16) adjournments. The matter was part heard on the 27th of February, 1996 and completed on thB 24th day of April, 1997. The first Defendant and Mr Hollis Bristol attended court on a few occasions when the matter had to be adjourned on their behalf. The matter was adjourned fifteen times on behalf of the Defendants. At the trial 011 the 27th day of February, 1996 only Plaintiff attended court anc gave evidence on his own behalf. He told the Court that he was a married man who lived with his wife and family at Sunny Acres, Choc, Castries, that he was Chief Executive of the Julian R. Hunte Group of Companies which employs about thirty (30) persons. He said that he was then Leader of the Opposition at least ten (10) years standing, Leader of the Labour Party for eight (8) years and was commonly called Ju-Ju and Toddy by hlS friends. He.narrated the various boards of which he had been chairman over the years. He told t~e Court how he had contested both the 6th April and 30th April elections in 1987 and had been successful at both elections, that he was the Parliamentary Representative for Gros-Islet and that the areas of Monchy and La Bourne are areas forming part of the said constituency of Gros-Islet. At the hearing he referred to another paragraph on the same page 11 of the issue of the said newspaper under headline "People are Saying" which reads as follows: "OECS Unity is struck in Ju-Ju throat like a bone. He has no scope in Ravine Mitant, Grande Riviere and La Bourne - the little he had in Monchy has gone the Calbasse way - what a Dope for Scope. It He explained to the Court what scope meant and who was Calbasse. I pause here to state that, the words mentioned above were not pleaded but printed in the same issue of the newspaper and is connected with the subject-matter of the libel. The Defendants were not legally represented or present at the trial nor was any excuse tendered on their behalf. CONCLUSION The gist o~ the Defendants' defence is that the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim quoted earl in their natural and ordinary meaning did not bear and were not understood to bear and are incapable of bearing any of the meanings or extended meanings alleged in the Statement of Claim or any meaning or extended meaning defamatory the Plaintiff. it is settled law that in order to understand the meaning and significance of words complained of one must look at the context in which they were used and that the test is objective. It is what meaning would the ordinary, man ascribe to or infer from these words. "According to that test, the question required to be answered is whether under the circumstances in which the words were published, the defamatory meaning pleaded is the meaning which ordinary, reasonable men to whom the publication was made would ascribe to or infer from these words." Sir Vincent F1oissac, C.J. in NABANO ET AL vs POWELL ET AL B.W.I. CIVIL APPEAL NO.8 OF 1994 PAGE 6. The Plaintiff relied on the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. In JONES vs. SKELTON [1963] 3 AER 952, Lord Morris explained the concept at page 958. "The ordinary and na tural meaning of words may be the li teral meaning or it may be an implied or an inferred or indirect meaning; any meaning t not require the support of extrinsic ts passing general knowledge but is a meaning which is being detected in the language used can ordinary meaning words (see Levis vs. Ltd) . The ordinary and natural meaning include any implication cr reference whi a e reader, guided not by any special but only knowledge and not fettered by any s ct es construction, would draw from the words. II As I see it the words complained of in the natural meaning are capable of conveying a famatory of the Plaintiff to the ordinary reasonable man. I as a fact that the do in fact convey such a mean~ng viz[ that the Plaintiff is an alcoholic is incapable of properly conducting himself alcoholic beverages in that he becomes violent fights with anyone. To pick a fight with anyone is a offence in Saint Lucia. The Defendants have pleaded that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are true in substance and in fact. As stated earlier neither the Defendants nor any witnesses gave evidence on their behalf at the trial which would allow me to deduce from their evidence, after forming an analysis, and having regard to the surrounding circumstances that the words were indeed true in substance and fact. I have only the Plaintiff's evidence to consider though I bore in mind the pleadings in the defence. I have considered and compared the quantum of damages awarded in our jurisdiction to people in or aspiring to high pol i office. As stated earlier I find the words complained to defamatory of the Plaintiff and that he has been his credit, character, and reputation and has been into public scandal, odium and contempt and loss and damage. I therefore give Judgement for the aintiff against Defendants for damages in the sum of fifteen thousand lars ($15,000.00), with costs to be taxed if not \'i~­ SUZIE d'AUVERGNE PUISNE JUDGE

Suit "No 139 of 1991 D’Auvergne, J Delivered: 24/07/97