Clevette Sharplis v Simon Sharplis

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVil) COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA DOMHMT2008/0012 BElWEEN: Petitioner ClEVETTE SHARPLIS and Respondent SIMON SHARPLIS Before: The Hon. Justice Brian Cottle Appearances: Mrs. Singoalla Blomqvist Williams for the Petitioner Mr. Julian Prevost for Respondent JUDGMENT [2010: February 12] [27th April 2010]

[1]COTrlE J: On 12111 March 2008 the petitioner filed a petition for divorce. On 4th June 2008 the parties entered aconsent order for maintenance pending suit. The order required the respondent to pay the petitioner $1 ,200.00 per month as "maintenance pending suit" as from 31st May 2008 and on the 30th of each succeeding month "until further order."

[2]Adecree nisi was granted on 18th July 2008 and on the application of the petitioner, the decree was made absolute on 15th September 2008. On 11 th September 2009 the respondent filed the present application seeking to have the consent order for maintenance pending suit varied. The petitioner also wants the order for maintenance varied but unlike the respondent she wants to have the sum for maintenance increased.

[3]At the hearing of the application the court considered the evidence of both parties on affidavit and both were cross examined on the affidavits. Both counsel then sought leave to file written closing submissions. Leave was granted. It was only in her written submissions that counsel for the respondent alerted the court to the fact that the decree absolute had already been granted.

[4]Obvious difficulties arise. Section 22 of the Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 permits the court to order maintenance pending suit. Such payments must end with determination of the suit. This petition has come to an end with the grant of the decree absolute. The order for payment pending suit cannot survive the date of determination of the suit.

[5]Obviously, again, the petitioner ought to have had the matters of ancillary relief settled and afinal order made before proceeding to obtain the decree absolute. This she failed to do.

[6]The application to vary the consent order cannot be considered for the reasons I have explained. I make no order as to cost.

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVil) COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA DOMHMT2008/0012 BElWEEN: ClEVETTE SHARPLIS and SIMON SHARPLIS Before: The Hon. Justice Brian Cottle Appearances: Mrs. Singoalla Blomqvist Williams for the Petitioner Mr. Julian Prevost for Respondent JUDGMENT [2010: February 12] [27th April 2010] Petitioner Respondent

[1]COTrlE J: On 12111 March 2008 the petitioner filed a petition for divorce. On 4th June 2008 the parties entered aconsent order for maintenance pending suit. The order required the respondent to pay the petitioner $1 ,200.00 per month as "maintenance pending suit" as from 31st May 2008 and on the 30th of each succeeding month "until further order."

[2]Adecree nisi was granted on 18th July 2008 and on the application of the petitioner, the decree was made absolute on 15th September 2008. On 11 th September 2009 the respondent filed the present application seeking to have the consent order for maintenance pending suit varied. The petitioner also wants the order for maintenance varied but unlike the respondent she wants to have the sum for maintenance increased.

[3]At the hearing of the application the court considered the evidence of both parties on affidavit and both were cross examined on the affidavits. Both counsel then sought leave to file written closing submissions. Leave was granted. It was only in her written submissions that counsel for the respondent alerted the court to the fact that the decree absolute had already been granted.

[4]Obvious difficulties arise. Section 22 of the Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 permits the court to order maintenance pending suit. Such payments must end with determination of the suit. This petition has come to an end with the grant of the decree absolute. The order for payment pending suit cannot survive the date of determination of the suit.

[5]Obviously, again, the petitioner ought to have had the matters of ancillary relief settled and afinal order made before proceeding to obtain the decree absolute. This she failed to do.

[6]The application to vary the consent order cannot be considered for the reasons I have explained. I make no order as to cost.