Al Beausoliel v The Attorney General

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE SAINT LUCIA CLAIM NO. SLUHCV2021/0347 BETWEEN: AL BEAUSOLIEL Claimant And THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Defendant Appearances: Mr. Leslie Prospere of Counsel for the Claimant Ms. Kozel Creese Crown Counsel with Mr. George K. Charlemagne, Crown Counsel, Attorney General's Chambers for the Defendant --------------·--· 2023: October 16; 2024: April 04 JUDGMENT

[1]INNOCENT, J.: The following facts are not in dispute. On 31st January 2020, the claimant attended at the Gros Islet Police Station. He was subsequently detained by WPC Fevrier. The claimant's rights as a prisoner in custody were explained to him and he was subsequently interviewed by WPC Fevrier. The claimant was kept in police custody at the Gros Islet Police Station.

[2]On 2nd February 2020, the claimant was charged with the offences of threatening words and assault with a dangerous weapo'f1, and kept in police custody until Jd February 2020.

[3]On 3rd February 2020, the claimant was taken before the magistrates' court. It appeared that due to the unavailability of a magistrate the claimant was detained in police custody until 4th February 2020.

[4]On 4th February 2020, the claimant was again taken before the magistrates' court where he was granted bail. The claimant was not immediately released from police custody. Instead, he was taken to the Police Custody Suites and subsequently conveyed to the Micoud Police Station where he remained until his release without charge on 7th February 2020.

[5]The claimant subsequently brought this claim for false imprisonment. The claimant's complaint is that he was wrongfully and unlawfully deprived of his liberty from approximately 1 :30 pm on 2nd February 2020 and 3:50 pm on 7th February 2020.

[6]The claimant's pleaded case was that following the bail hearing on 4th February 2020, he did not enter into the recognizances relative to the charges preferred against him by WPC Fevrier because he was prevented due to the conduct of the police from attending at the District Court Office for the purpose of entering into and signing the recognizances on the grant of bail to him.

[7]This assertion made by the claimant gave rise to serious dispute between the parties. There appeared to be a serious dispute regarding the date on which the claimant entered into the recognizance on the charges. Although a resolution of this issue is not exactly relevant to the decisive issues in the case, the court will deal with it in passing for the sake of completeness.

[8]The confusion regarding the above was in large measure clarified by the testimony of Ms. Agdoma who testified at the trial. Therefore, there is no need to deal with this issue at length. The court has concluded from the evidence that the claimant has failed to establish the allegation that the police had prevented him from signing his recognizance on bail. The recognizances entered into had in fact been signed on 4111 February 2020.

[9]In support of his case that the police had acted in bad faith, the claimant gave evidence that he was not taken to sign the recognizance on the grant of bail but was instead informed by the police that he would not be taken to sign the recognizance (9) the Micoud Police failed to prosecute him for any criminal charges whatsoever arising from an alleged related incident for which they wished to interview him. 111] The Attorney General's case was simply that in all the circumstances of the case, the police authorities had acted properly and in good faith, and in accordance with their duty as police officers and in keeping with what they described as "responsible and practical policing".

[12]The Attorney General took the position that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the claimant had committed the offence of arson and therefore, the police authorities had acted reasonably and lawfully in arresting the claimant a second time, notwithstanding that he had been granted bail in relation to the first two charges.

[13]Therefore, according to the Attorney General, the claimant's re-arrest by the police authorities was lawful and justifiable in circumstances where an investigation was being conducted in respect of a report of arson made by the same complainant in the other matters giving rise to the previous charges; and there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant had committed this offence.

[14]In a nutshell, the underlying basis of the case for the Attorney General is that the facts relied on by the claimant in support of his case cannot raise the spectre of bad faith in these proceedings and that the actions of the police authorities did not amount to bad faith. Therefore, on that premise, the claimant cannot succeed on the present claim, having failed to establish liability on the part of the Crown as a matter of law, since the claim was brought outside of the period prescribed by Article 2124 of the Civil Code. In the circumstances, it appears that the Attorney General has relied almost substantially on the principle of prescription to defeat the present claim. (15] The preceding issues raised by the Attorney General go entirely to the question of liability of the Crown and not necessarily whether the claimant has a viable cause manner that is in keeping with the cornstitutional rights of detained persons and not otheiwise. It is important for police offtcers exercising their powers of arrest to have a deep appreciation for the presumption of innocence which requires them lo take the rights of persons seriously, particularly where their liberty is at stake. [57] Section 3 of the Bail Rules sets out certain overarching principles which must be followed in relation to the grant of bail. Although the Bail Rules refer specifically to the powers exercised by the court, the same principles ought to apply in relation to the police. The section provides that in considering bail, the court shall have regard to following overarching principles; (a) that a person accused of committing an offence Is presumed innocent until proven guilty; (b) the right lo liberty enjoyed by every person under the Constitution in each Member State and Territory; (c) that bail must not be unreasonably withheld and cogent reasons must be shown for keeping a person accused of committing an offence in custody among other things. [58] It must be understood that an accused person's right to bail is enshrined in the Constitution itself and does no! derive purely from statute. The right to bail must be seen as a concomitant to the presumption of innocence. Therefore, in exercising their powers of arrest and detention it cannot be overemphasised that the police authorities mus! adhere to these principles in the discharge of their duties. Subsequent arrest and detention [59] Before embarking on an excursion irelatlve to the lawfulness of the claimant's subsequent detention, it is necessary to place the entire matter within its relevant context by first considering the nature of the allegations against the claimant. This contextual analysis is a necessary imperative to determining the offence in relation to which the police authorities had reasonable suspicion that the claimant had committed. (60] The first observation !hat !he court ma.kes is that !he offences of threatening words, assault with a dangerous weapon a.nd arson all concerned the same complainant, the claimant's girlfriend. In the court's view. notwithstanding that the several arrested committed an offence of the particular kind which the officer had in mind. In the instant case, it was necessary to focus on such matters in the mind of PC Biscette as might support his suspicion that the claimant had committed the offence of arson. [75] It was necessary to consider those matters both individually and cumulatively. Considered cumulatively, those matters might provide reasonable grounds for suspicion that the claimant had been involved in some unlawful activity; for example, it might well have given rise to reasonable grounds for suspicion of involvement in threatening words. But the question here is whether it was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the claimant had committed an offence of a kind which PC Biscette had in mind which, in this case, was arson. [76] PC Biscette testified that sometime in the month of August 2019, the claimant's former girlfriend made a report to him concerning the claimant's threats to burn down the house which she occupied as a tenant located in Micoud. He said that he interviewed the claimant's former girlfriend on 15th August 2019 and took possession of her mobile device with the intention of submitting it for forensic analysis. [77] This witness also testified that on the afternoon of 4th February 2020, he along with other police officers attached to the Micoud Police Station conveyed the claimant from Custody Suites to the Micoud Police Station where he was arrested and detained. [78] According to PC Biscette, on 7th February 2020, after conducting an interview under caution with the claimant, the claimant was returned to his cell and later that same day he was released without charge. He suggested that the claimant was not kept in custody beyond the 72 hour period. [79] In his written evidence, PC Biscette said that during the period of the claimant's detention, he was awaiting a "report" on the text messages extracted from the mobile device belonging to the claimant's former girlfriend. He said that the claimant unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute. [111] Indeed discretion necessarily implies good faith in discharging a public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. The ordinary language of the legislature cannot be so distorted. [112] The responsibility of the police as an organ of the State includes the obligation to act objectively, independently and fairly toward an offender. An offender has the constitutional right, as a principle of fundamental justice enshrined under the Constitution not to be deprived of his liberty otherwise than in keeping with the due process of law. [113] Admittedly, this is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. The underlying basis of the statutory provisions contained in the Criminal Code as they relate to the exercise of the power of arrest and detention exercisable by the police are the progeny of the Constitution and are intended to protect offenders from the arbitrary exercise of the power of arrest and detention for improper or oblique purposes. [114] However, the claimant has failed to show demonstrably that the police officers deliberately intended to subvert or abuse their office or the process of criminal justice or that they had blatantly ignored overarching principle of fairness to the person detained in police custody. The claimant has clearly failed to satisfy this criteria. The claimant has not shown that he has suffered harm as a result of the deliberate and unlawful conduct of the police officers in connection with his arrest and detention in the exercise of their functions as public officers. [115) The court accepts that the acts of the police officers without any doubt may have brought about a breach of an expressed public statutory duty toward the claimant; however, it was not a gross abuse of legal power expressly intended to punish him for an act wholly irrelevant to the statute. The claimant has failed to prove that there was any intention on the part of the police officers to deprive him of his freedom Procedure and article 2124 of the Civil Code. However, valiant, the claimant's attempt at circumventing these provisions, his attempt was thwarted by the unsupported allegations of bad faith, [123] The court having considered the substance of the allegations of bad faith made by the claimant in the context of the foregoing observation, feels inclined to adopt the Attorney General's argument that the present claim amounts to an abuse of process. Res judicata [124] The Attorney General also pleaded that the present claim was res judicata; the claimant having brought a previous claim on substantially the same facts which was not decided in his favour and therefore is a further abuse of process. [125] The court declines to find that the issue of res judicata arises here. The issues arising on the private claim are clearly distinct from the administrative claim. In any event, the constitutional motion was not decided on its merits and none of the issues were specifically, discretely and distinctly determined. Needless to say that this point, given the findings already arrived at by the court, is not by itself dispositive of the present case. Conclusion [126] For the reasons that the court has given in this judgment, the claimant's claim fails. Accordingly, the claimant's claim is dismissed. The court makes no order as to costs. Shawn Innocent High Court Judge By the Court ,----_-'--- :_) ______ Registrar