Attorney General of Grenada v The Grenadian Bar Association

*5(1$'$

,17+(&28572)$33($/

&,9,/$33($/122)

%(7:((1

$77251(<*(1(5$/2)*5(1$'$ $SSHOODQW DQG

7+(*5(1$'$%$5$662&,$7,21 5HVSRQGHQW

%HIRUH

7KH+RQ0U-XVWLFH&0'HQQLV%\URQ

&KLHI-XVWLFH

7KH+RQ0U-XVWLFH6DWURKDQ6LQJK

-XVWLFHRI$SSHDO

7KH+RQ0U-XVWLFH$OEHUW5HGKHDG

-XVWLFHRI$SSHDO

$SSHDUDQFHV

0U$OODQ$OH[DQGHU6& 0U.HLWK)ULGD\DQG0U5RKDQ3KLOOLSIRUWKH$SSHOODQW

0U-DPHV%ULVWRO 0U5H\QROG%HQMDPLQDQG0U$OEDQ-RKQIRUWKH5HVSRQGHQW

0UV&HOLD(GZDUGVIRU0U0DOFROP+ROGLS RXWRIFRXUWHV\WRWKH&RXUW

1RYHPEHU )HEUXDU\

-8'*0(17

>@ %<521&- 7KLVLVDQDSSHDODJDLQVWDMXGJPHQWRI$OOH\QH-GDWHG WK)HEUXDU\ LQZKLFKKHGHFODUHGWKDW >D@ WKH2IILFHRI'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVLVQRWVXEMHFWWRWHUPLQDWLRQE\HIIOX[LRQ RIWLPH >E@ WKH FRQWUDFWXDO FODXVH DSSRLQWLQJ 0U 0DOFROP +ROGLS WR WKH RIILFH RI 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVIRUWZR\HDUVLVQXOOYRLGDQGRIQRHIIHFWDQG >F@ 0U+ROGLSKROGVRIILFHVXEMHFWWRWHUPLQDWLRQLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHSURYLVLRQVRI WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGQRWRWKHUZLVH

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³ 7KH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVVKDOOEHDSSRLQWHGE\WKH*RYHUQRU *HQHUDODFWLQJLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHDGYLFHRIWKH-XGLFLDODQG/HJDO6HUYLFHV &RPPLVVLRQ 6XEMHFWWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRIVXEVHFWLRQ RIWKLVVHFWLRQWKH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQVVKDOOYDFDWHKLVRIILFHZKHQKHDWWDLQVWKHSUHVFULEHGDJH

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´ >@ 7KHTXHVWLRQUDLVHGE\WKLVVHFWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLVLQUHDOLW\RQHRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQ 'RHVWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHSRZHURIDSSRLQWPHQWXQGHUVHFWLRQ RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ FUHDWHDQDSSRLQWPHQWXQWLOWKHSUHVFULEHGDJHRUGRHVLWDOORZWKH*RYHUQRU*HQHUDOWR DSSRLQW IRU D VKRUWHU WHUP E\ DJUHHPHQW RU RWKHUZLVH" 7KH DSSHOODQW FRQWHQGV WKDW ³DSSRLQWPHQW´GRHVQRWVWLSXODWHDSHULRGRIWLPHDQG³YDFDWHRIILFH´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

WKHVHDQWHFHGHQWVLQFOXGHWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV DQG )XQGDPHQWDO )UHHGRPV DQG WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 8QLYHUVDO 'HFODUDWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV ZKLFKHQFRXUDJHDJHQHURXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDYRLGLQJµWKHDXVWHULW\RIWDEXODWHG OHJDOLVP¶WRHQVXUHWKDWWKHIXOOEHQHILWRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVDUHHQMR\HG,Q'RZ Y$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO> @/5& &RQVW $JXGD-$SDLQWHGKLVVXPPDWLRQDW ³,QP\YLHZWKHRYHUULGLQJSULQFLSOHPXVWEHDQDGKHUHQFHWRWKHJHQHUDOSLFWXUH SUHVHQWHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLQWRZKLFKHDFKLQGLYLGXDOSURYLVLRQPXVWILWLQRUGHU WRPDLQWDLQLQHVVHQWLDOGHWDLOVWKHSLFWXUHRIZKLFKWKHIUDPHUVFRXOGKDYHSDLQWHG KDGWKH\EHHQIDFHGZLWKWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWRGD\´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³VKDOOEH DIIRUGHGDIDLUKHDULQJZLWKLQDUHDVRQDEOHWLPHE\DQLQGHSHQGHQWDQGLPSDUWLDOFRXUW HVWDEOLVKHGE\ODZ´7KLVSURYLVLRQLQWULQVLFDOO\OLQNVFULPLQDOMXVWLFHZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIDQ

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³7KH6HSDUDWLRQRI3RZHUV±LWVUHOHYDQFH IRU3DUOLDPHQWDU\*RYHUQPHQWLQWKH&DULEEHDQ´DQHVVD\SXEOLVKHGLQWKH:HVW,QGLDQ /DZ-RXUQDO2FWREHU SDJHVDLG ³)XUWKHU SURYLVLRQ LV PDGH IRU UHVWULFWLQJ WKH H[HUFLVH RI DUELWUDU\ SRZHU E\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]LQJWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHRIILFHRIWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOZLWK UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI OHJDO DIIDLUV RI WKH 6WDWH LQFOXGLQJ WKH SUHSDUDWLRQ RIOHJLVODWLRQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKOHJDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ DQGWKDWWKH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVDOHJDORIILFHUZLWKWKHVHFXUHGWHQXUH DQGLQGHSHQGHQWVWDWXVRIDMXGJHZLWKUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHFRQGXFWRIFULPLQDO SURFHHGLQJV´ >@ &RXQVHOIRUWKHUHVSRQGHQWSUHSDUHGDWDEOHWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKHWKHRU\UHIHUUHGWRE\ 6LU$OOHQIRXQGH[SUHVVLRQLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRI*UHQDGD6HFWLRQ SUHVFULEHVWKDWLQ WKH H[HUFLVH RI WKH IXQFWLRQV YHVWHG LQ KLP E\ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ WKH 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQV ³VKDOO QRW EH VXEMHFW WR WKH GLUHFWLRQ RU FRQWURO RI DQ\ RWKHU SHUVRQ RU DXWKRULW\´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

LGHQWLFDOJURXQGVRILQDELOLW\DQGPLVEHKDYLRXU:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHSURYLVLRQVSURWHFWLQJ SHQVLRQVHFWLRQ RIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQPDNHVHTXDOSURYLVLRQIRUWKH-XGJHDQGWKH 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQV DQG ZLWK UHJDUG WR VDODU\ WKH -XGJH¶V SURWHFWLRQ SUHVFULEHGE\WKH&RXUW¶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

FODXVH³VKDOOKROGRIILFH´DQGWKDWWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKDFODXVHLQVHFWLRQLPSRUWVWKH YLHZWKDWQRULJKWRUPDQGDWHWRKROGWKHRIILFHZDVFUHDWHGIRUDQ\SDUWLFXODUSHULRG >@ +HVXEPLWWHGWKDWLQWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKPDQGDWHLWZDVIRUWKHH[HFXWLYHWRGRIL[WKH GXUDWLRQE\ZD\RIFRQWUDFW+HUHOLHGRQ7KRPDVY$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO :,5 DWZKHUH/RUG'LSORFNVDLG ³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³FRQILUPDWLRQRIDSSRLQWPHQWV´LQVHFWLRQ E UHPXQHUDWLRQDQGSHQVLRQV DQG F ZKDWWKHLU/RUGVKLSVKDYHFDOOHGWKH³FRGHRI FRQGXFW´WKDWWKHSROLFHRIILFHULVXQGHUDGXW\WRREVHUYH´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³6WDWXVVLJQLILHVDPDQ¶VSHUVRQDO FRQGLWLRQVRIDUDVLWLVLPSRVHGXSRQKLPE\WKHODZZLWKRXWKLVRZQFRQVHQWDVRSSRVHG WRWKHFRQGLWLRQZKLFKKHKDVDFTXLUHGIRUKLPVHOIE\DJUHHPHQW´7KLVUDWLRQDOHVXSSRUWV WKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVLV OHVV OLNHO\ WR EH GHWHUPLQHG E\ DQ\ FRQWUDFWXDO DUUDQJHPHQW WKDQ E\ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO VWDWXVRIWKH2IILFHDVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHUXOHVSUHVFULEHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLWVHOI

>@ ,WLVILUVWQHFHVVDU\WKHUHIRUHWRH[DPLQHWKHOHJLVODWLYHLQVWUXPHQWWKDWLVWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ WRVHHZKHWKHUVHFWLRQSURYLGHVWKHDQVZHUWRWKHLVVXHRIWKHGXUDWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQW 7KH0HDQLQJRI$SSRLQW >@ 7KHODQJXDJHRI6HFWLRQ LVFOHDUFRQFLVHDQGLPSHUDWLYH,WVLPSO\VWDWHVWKDWWKH 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQV ³VKDOO EH DSSRLQWHG E\ WKH *RYHUQRU*HQHUDO´ 7KH VXEVHFWLRQ GRHV QRW VSHFLI\ D SHULRG RI WLPH GXULQJ ZKLFK WKH DSSRLQWPHQW LV WR KDYH HIIHFW,WGRHVQRWVWLSXODWHWKDWDQ\WHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVRIVHUYLFHEHVSHFLILHGDVSDUWRI WKHDSSRLQWLQJSURFHVV,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHVHFWLRQWKHWHUPDSSRLQWFRXOGPHDQQRPRUH WKDQQRPLQDWHRUGHFODUHWKHRFFXSDQWRIWKHRIILFHRI'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQV7KDW LVWKHRQO\IXQFWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQRU*HQHUDOLQUHODWLRQWRWKLVPDWWHU:KHQWKH*RYHUQRU *HQHUDOKDVGRQHWKDWWKHRIILFHLVILOOHGE\WKHSHUVRQVRDSSRLQWHG >@ 6HFWLRQ XVHVWKHSKUDVHRORJ\³WKH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVVKDOOYDFDWHKLV RIILFHZKHQKHDWWDLQVWKHSUHVFULEHGDJH´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³6HFWLRQ RIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQLVDSUHVFULSWLRQDVWRWKHPD[LPXPDJHIRU UHPDLQLQJLQRIILFHQRWKLQJPRUH´

1RQHWKHOHVVKHZHQWRQWRILQGWKDWWKH*RYHUQRU*HQHUDOGLGQRWDSSRLQWWKHSODLQWLIIIRU DQ\VSHFLILFSHULRGDQGWKDWLWZDVWKH3XEOLF6HUYLFH&RPPLVVLRQZKRZLWKRXWWKHSRZHU WRDSSRLQWIL[HGWKHGXUDWLRQRIKHUHPSOR\PHQW+HFRQFOXGHGWKDWZDVDXVXUSDWLRQRI WKH *RYHUQRU*HQHUDO¶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·)HGHUDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDY -0$OH[DQGHU/WG &/5UHOHYDQW,QWKDWFDVHWKHDSSHOODQWVEURXJKW SURFHHGLQJV DOOHJLQJ WKDW WKH UHVSRQGHQWV KDG EHHQ LQ GHIDXOW RI DQ DZDUG RI WKH &RPPRQZHDOWK &RXUW RI &RQFLOLDWLRQ DQG $UELWUDWLRQ 7KH UHVSRQGHQWV FKDOOHQJHG WKH OHJDOLW\ RI WKH FRXUW LQ DV PXFK DV XQGHU WKH UHOHYDQW OHJLVODWLRQ WKH 3UHVLGHQW ZDV DSSRLQWHG IRU VHYHQ \HDUV RQO\ 7KH FRXUW KDG WR FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU VHFWLRQ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDZKLFKSUHVFULEHVWKDW ³-XVWLFHVRIWKH+LJK&RXUWDQGRIWKHRWKHU&RXUWVFUHDWHGE\WKH3DUOLDPHQWVKDOO EH DSSRLQWHG E\ WKH *RYHUQRU*HQHUDO LQ &RXQFLO DQG VKDOO QRW EH UHPRYHG H[FHSWE\WKHVDPHDXWKRULW\RQDGGUHVVIURPERWK+RXVHVRI3DUOLDPHQWSUD\LQJ IRUVXFKUHPRYDORQVSHFLILHGJURXQGV´ SUHYHQWHGWKHFRQIHUPHQWRIDWHUPRI\HDUVRQWKH3UHVLGHQWRIWKH&RXUW >@ 7KDW6HFWLRQ VXSUD FRPELQHVWKHSURYLVLRQVRIVHFWLRQ DQG RIWKH*UHQDGD &RQVWLWXWLRQ7KHSRZHURIDSSRLQWPHQWLVVLPSO\³VKDOOEHDSSRLQWHG´ZLWKQRVWLSXODWLRQ DVWRWLPHDVLQ 7KHSRZHURIUHPRYDOLVVLPLODUWRWKDWLQVHFWLRQ DQG ,W VKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHVHFWLRQGLGQRWHQDFWWKDWWKHMXGJHV³VKDOOKROGRIILFH´\HWWKH

WHQXUHRIWKHMXGJHZDVKHOGWREHSUHVFULEHG7KHFRXUWFRQVLVWHGRIVHYHQPHPEHUVDQG WKH\ HDFK JDYH UHDVRQHG GHFLVLRQV $ PDMRULW\ RI ILYH KHOG WKDW VHFWLRQ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQUHTXLUHVWKDWHYHU\MXGJHEHDSSRLQWHGIRUOLIH,IWKH$XVWUDOLDQFRQVWLWXWLRQ KDGSURYLGHGWKDWWKHRIILFHEHYDFDWHGDWDSUHVFULEHGDJHWKHQWKHRIILFHZRXOGKDYH EHHQKHOGWRWKDWDJHLQVWHDGRIIRUOLIH*ULIILWKV&-VDLG ³ 7KHVH ZRUGV ZKLFK DSSO\ WR DOO )HGHUDO -XGJHV DOLNH KDYH DOZD\V EHHQ DVVXPHGDQG,WKLQNULJKWO\WRPHDQWKDWWKHWHQXUHRIDOO)HGHUDO-XGJHVVKDOOEH IRUOLIHVXEMHFWWRWKHSRZHURIUHPRYDO´ %DUWRQ-VDLG ³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´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³7KH JUDQW RI DQ RIILFH GXULQJ JRRG EHKDYLRXU FUHDWHV DQRIILFHIRUOLIHRUXQWLO UHWLUHPHQWDJHGHWHUPLQDEOHXSRQEUHDFKRIWKHFRQGLWLRQ´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³WKHKLJKSXUSRVHZKLFKWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQVHHNVWRDFKLHYHE\WKHFRQIHUPHQWRI IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV LV QRW RQO\ WR EHQHILW LQGLYLGXDOV EXW WR VHFXUH WKH ODUJHU LQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\1RLQGLYLGXDOFDQEDUWHUDZD\WKHIUHHGRPVFRQIHUUHG XSRQKLPE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ´7KLVZRXOGUHIHUWRDQ\ULJKWDVWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ PDNHV QR GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV HQDFWHG IRU WKH EHQHILW RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO DQG WKRVH HQDFWHG LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW RU RQ WKH JURXQGV RI SXEOLF SROLF\7KHDUJXPHQWRQHVWRSSHODQGZDLYHUPXVWEHUHMHFWHG´ 6HYHUDQFH >@ ,Q GLVSRVLQJ RI WKH ILQDO LVVXH DV WR ZKHWKHU WKH DSSRLQWPHQW RI WKH 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQVZDVYDOLGQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIWKHWHUPRI\HDUVEHLQJ DJUHHGWR,FDQGRQREHWWHUWKDQWRFLWHZLWKDSSURYDOWKHZRUGVRIWKHOHDUQHGWULDOMXGJH ³,DPRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKDWSDUWRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWRIDSSRLQWPHQWZKLFKUHIOHFWVD ODZIXOH[HUFLVHRIDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSRZHUWKDWLVWKHDSSRLQWPHQWE\WKH*RYHUQRU *HQHUDORQWKHDGYLFHRIWKH-XGLFLDODQG/HJDO6HUYLFHV&RPPLVVLRQFDQDQG

VKRXOGEHVHYHUHGIURPWKDWSDUWRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWZKLFKUHIOHFWVWKHXOWUDYLUHV H[HUFLVHRIDSUHVXPHGSRZHUWKDWLVWKHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHWHUPRIDSSRLQWPHQWIRU DGXUDWLRQZKLFKIDOOVVKRUWRIWKHSUHVFULEHGUHWLUHPHQWDJH,ILQGVXSSRUWIRUWKLV SURSRVLWLRQ LQ WKH MXGJPHQW RI /RUG *RII RI &KLHYHOH\ LQ WKH FDVH RI &RPPLVVLRQHU RI 3ROLFH Y 'DYLV 3ULY\ &RXQFLO $SSHDO 1R RI %DKDPDV ZKHUH ZKLOH DGPLWWHGO\ DGGUHVVLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI VHYHUDELOLW\ RI OHJLVODWLYH SURYLVLRQV +LV /RUGVKLS PDGH WKH IROORZLQJ VWDWHPHQW ZKLFK ,WKLQN HTXDOO\DSSOLFDEOHWRWKHTXHVWLRQEHIRUHPH7KH/HDUQHG/DZ/RUGLQDSSO\LQJ WKHWHVWRIVXEVWDQWLDOVHYHUDELOLW\VDLG³WKLVWHVWUHTXLUHVWKDWZKHQWKH&RXUWPXVW PRGLI\WKHWH[WLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHVHYHUDQFHWKLVFDQRQO\EHGRQHCZKHQWKH &RXUWLVVDWLVILHGWKDWLWLVHIIHFWLQJQRFKDQJHLQWKHVXEVWDQWLDOSXUSRVHDQGHIIHFW RIWKHLPSXJQHGSURYLVLRQ¶´7KHVXEVWDQWLDOSXUSRVHRIWKH*RYHUQRU*HQHUDORQ WKHDGYLFHRIWKH-XGLFLDODQG/HJDO6HUYLFHV&RPPLVVLRQZDVLQP\YLHZFOHDUO\ WRDSSRLQWD'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQVIRU*UHQDGDLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH SURYLVLRQVRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ7KHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHWHUPZDVPHUHO\LQFLGHQWDO´ 2UGHU >@ ,ZRXOGWKHUHIRUHGLVPLVVWKHDSSHDODQGFRQILUPWKHGHFODUDWLRQVRIWKHOHDUQHGWULDO-XGJH H[FHSWIRUWKHRUGHUWKDW0U+ROGLSKROGVRIILFHZKLFKE\WKHFRQVHQWRIWKHSDUWLHVZH DFFHSW LV QR ORQJHU DFFXUDWH DV KH KDV VLQFH WKH KHDULQJ DW ILUVW LQVWDQFH YROXQWDULO\ UHOLQTXLVKHG RIILFH DQG PRYHG RQ WR RWKHU SRVVLEO\ JUHHQHU SDVWXUHV &RVWV WR WKH UHVSRQGHQWILWIRUWZRFRXQVHO

'(11,6%<521 &KLHI-XVWLFH

,FRQFXU

6$752+$16,1*+

-XVWLFHRI$SSHDO

,FRQFXU

$/%(575('+($'

-XVWLFHRI$SSHDO

GRENADA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8 OF 1999 BET W EEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GRENADA and THE GRENADA BAR ASSOCIATION Appe l l ant Respondent Before: The Hon. Mr . Just i ce C. M . Denn i s By r on Ch i ef Just i ce T he Hon. Mr . Just i ce Sat r ohan S i ngh Just i ce of Appeal T he Hon. Mr . Just i ce A l be r t Redhead Just i ce of Appeal Appearances : Mr. Allan Alexander S.C.; Mr. Keith Friday and Mr. Rohan Phillip for the Appellant Mr . Ja m es B r is to l ; Mr . Reyno l d Ben j a m i n and Mr . A l ban John for the Respondent M rs. Celia Edwards for Mr. Malcolm Holdip (out of courtesy to the Court) : N ove m be r 23; 2000: F eb r ua r y 21 JUDGMENT [1 ] BYRON, C .J.: T h i s i s a n appea l aga i ns t a j udg m en t o f A ll eyn e J . date d 9 th F eb r ua r y , i n wh i ch he dec l a r ed that: [a] the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions is not subject to termination by effluxion of time; [b ] th e cont r actua l cl aus e appo i nt i n g Mr . M a lc o l m Ho l d i p to th e off i c e o f D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons for two yea r s i s nu l l , vo i d and of no effect, and; [c] Mr . Ho l d i p ho l ds o ff i ce s ub j ect to te r mi nat i on i n a cco r dance w i th the p r ov i si ons o f the Const i tut i on and not othe r w i se. The Fac t ual Background [2 ] B y a n i nst r u m en t date d th N ove m be r , , Hi s Exce l l enc y th e Gove r no r G ene r al appo i nted Mr . M a l co l m Ho l d i p to the off i ce o f D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons for a pe r i od of two years with e ffect from nd J anua r y , g ivi n g effec t to a cont r ac t i nt o wh i c h Mr . Ho l d i p ha d ente r ed . At th e en d o f t h e tw o yea r s th e Gove r n m en t r efuse d t o r ene w h i s cont r act . T hes e p r oceed i ng s w e r e i n st i t ute d b y t h e G r enad a Ba r Assoc i at i on . Mr . H o l d i p r e m a i ne d i n t h e pos t pend i n g th e outco m e o f th e case , w i t h t h e consen t o f a l l pa r t i es . At th e co m m ence m en t o f th e appea l , Mr s . E dwa r d s i nfo r m e d th e cou r t tha t Mr . H o l d i p had voluntarily demitted office a fter judgment had been given in the court below and had left G r enad a p r esu m ab l y fo r g r eene r pastu r es. The Appeal [3 ] Th e l ea r ne d t ri a l Judg e ha d m ad e a co m p r ehens i v e r e v i e w o f th e const i tut i ona l an d l egal p r i n c i p l e s app l ic ab l e . C ounse l f o r t h e appe l l an t gene r a liz e d th e g r ound s o n wh i c h he dete r mi ne d t o cha l l eng e th e dec i si o n unde r th e b r oa d quest i ons: [a ] W hethe r t h e off i c e o f th e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s w a s endowe d w i t h t enu r e by the Const i tut i on. [b ] D i d th e ag r ee m en t o f th e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s to a te r m ope r at e a s a wa i v e r o r estoppe l ? [c ] D i d th e appo i nt m en t to a n unconst i tut i ona l t e r m m ak e t h e ent i r e appo i nt m en t i nva l i d , o r cou l d i t b e seve r ed? The Constitutional Provisions [4 ] Th e r e l evan t p r o v i s i on s o f th e Const i tut i o n o f G r enad a a r e t o b e foun d i n s ect i o n . T hey a r e sub sect i ons ( ) , ( ) , ( 6) and ( ) . “ ( ) T h e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s s ha l l b e appo i nte d b y t h e Gove r no r Gene r a l a ct i n g i n acco r danc e w i t h t h e adv i c e o f t h e Jud i c i a l an d Lega l S e r v i ces Commission. (5) Sub j ect to the p r ov i si ons o f subsect i on ( ) of th i s sect i on, the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r osecut i ons sha l l vacate h i s off i ce when he atta i n s the p r esc r i bed age. (6) A pe r so n ho l d i n g th e off i c e o f D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s m a y b e r e m oved from o ffice on l y for in ab ility to e xercise the fu n c tio n s o f h i s o ffice ( wh e t he r a rising f r o m i nf i rmi ty o f bod y o r mi n d o r an y othe r c ause ) o r fo r mi sbehav i ou r an d sha l l not be so r e m oved except i n acco r dance w i th the p r ov i si ons of th i s sect i on. (7) The D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons m ay be r e m o ved f r om o ff i ce b y the Gove r no r G ene r a l i f th e quest i o n o f h i s r e m ova l f r o m off i c e ha s bee n r efe r r e d t o a t ri buna l appo i nte d unde r s ubsect i o n ( ) o f t h i s sect i o n an d th e t ri buna l has recommended to the Governor General that he ought to be removed for inability as afo r e sa i d or for mi sbehav i ou r “ . [5 ] Th e quest i o n r a is e d b y t h i s sect i o n o f t h e Const i tut i o n i s i n r ea l i ty on e o f i nte r p r etat i on: Doe s t h e exe r c i s e o f th e powe r o f appo i nt m en t unde r s ect i o n ( ) o f th e Const i tut i on c r eat e a n appo i nt m en t unt i l th e p r esc r i be d ag e o r doe s i t a ll o w th e Gove r no r G ene r a l to appo i n t f o r a s ho r te r te r m b y ag r ee m en t o r othe r w i se ? Th e appe l l an t c ontend s t hat “ appo i nt m ent ” doe s no t s t i pu l at e a pe r i o d o f t im e , an d “ v acat e off i ce ” r efe r s sim p l y t o t he t im e beyon d wh i c h th e off i c e c ou l d no t b e he l d . T h e r esponden t c ontend s t ha t t he co m b i ne d im po r t o f t h e sect i o n i s t ha t t h e appo i nte e ho l d s off i c e unt i l h e r eache s t he prescribed age of 55 years subject only to removal for inability and misbehaviour. The Principles of Interpretation [6 ] Th e p r i n c i p l e s t ha t gove r n th e i nte r p r etat i o n o f C onst i tut i on s hav e bee n cons i de r e d f r om t im e to t im e . A s a s u i tab l e sta r t i n g po i n t I w ou l d lik e t o adap t t h e e l egan t desc r i p t i o n o f t he bas i c p ri n c i p l e of s tatuto r y i nte r p r etat i on set out b y S i r V i ncent Fl o i ssac C.J. i n Savarin v Williams D o m i n ic a C i v i l Appea l N o. o f a t p.3 . T h e bas i c p ri n c i p l e i s t ha t t he i nte r p r etat i o n o f eve r y w o r d o r ph r as e o f a c onst i tut i ona l p r o v i s i o n i s de r iv e d f r o m t he i ntent i o n o f t h e f r a m e r s o f t h e Const i tut i o n i n r ega r d t o t h e m ean i n g tha t w o r d o r ph r ase shou l d bea r . Tha t i ntent i o n i s a n i nfe r enc e d r aw n f r o m t h e p r im a r y m ean i n g o f t h e wo r d and ph r ase w i th s uch m od i f i cat i ons a s m a y be necessa r y to m a ke i t conco r dant wi th the context of the Const i tut i on. In th i s r ega r d the context of the Const i tut i on co m p ris es e ve r y othe r w o r d an d ph r as e use d i n t h e Const i tut i o n a s a w ho l e , a l l th e im p lic at i on s t he r e f r om an d a l l r e l evan t s u r r ound i n g c irc u m stance s w h i c h m a y p r ope r l y b e use d a s i nd i cat i on s o f th e i ntent i o n o f t h e f r a m e r s o f t h e Const i tut i on . T h e r e l evan t s u r r ound i n g c irc u m stances i n c l ud e th e antecedent s f r o m w h i c h unde r lyi n g p r i n c i p l e s a r e d r awn . I n t h e we l l known case o f Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher ( ) AE R Lo r d Wil be r fo r c e r e mi nd s t hat thes e antecedent s i n c l ud e th e Eu r opea n Convent i o n fo r th e p r otect i o n o f H u m a n R i ghts an d Funda m enta l Fr eedo m s an d th e Un i t e d Nat i on s U n i ve r s a l D ec l a r a t i o n o f H u m an R i ght s wh i c h encou r ag e a gene r ou s i nte r p r etat i o n avo i d i n g ‘ t h e auste r i ty o f t abu l ated l ega l ism ‘ to ensu r e tha t t h e fu l l benef i t o f th e const i tut i ona l p r o v i s i on s a r e en j oyed . In Dow v A t to rney General [1992] LRC (C onst) 623 Aguda J.A. pa i nted h i s su m m a t i on at 668: “ In my v iew the overriding principle must be an adherence to the general p icture p r esente d b y t h e Const i tut i o n i nt o w h i c h eac h i nd i v i dua l p r o v i s i o n m us t f i t i n o r der t o m a i nta i n i n essent i a l deta i l s t h e p i ctu r e o f w h i c h t h e f r a m e r s cou l d hav e pa i nted had they been faced w i th the c irc u m stances of today.” [7 ] Th e natu r e o f a C onst i tut i o n r equ i r e s tha t a b r oad , gene r ou s an d pu r pos i v e app r oac h be adopte d t o ensu r e tha t i t s i nte r p r etat i o n r e f l ect s t h e deepe r i nsp i r a t i o n an d asp i r a t i o n o f t he bas i c c oncept s o n wh i c h th e Const i tut i o n i s f ounded . R espec t m us t b e pa i d t o t he l anguag e tha t i s use d an d i ts context , b y c ons i de r i n g a l l r e l evan t p r o v i s i on s bea r i n g o n the sub j ec t fo r i nte r p r etat i o n a s a w ho l e , an d t o t h e t r ad i t i on s an d usage s w h i c h hav e g i ven m ean i n g t o t ha t l anguage , i n o r de r to effec t t h e ob j ect i v e o f th e Const i tut i on . In o r de r to do th i s t h e cou r t m us t hav e a sobe r an d ob j ect i v e app r a i sal o f th e gene r a l canva s upo n wh i c h th e deta i l s o f th e const i tut i ona l p ic tu r e a r e pa i nted. The Nature of the Constitution [8 ] I n ou r j u r is d i ct i o n the r e hav e bee n seve r a l case s wh i c h hav e bee n dec i de d o n th e p r e m is e tha t t h e Const i tut i on s o f th e Co m m onwea l t h C a r i bbea n hav e adopte d th e st r uctu r e of d i v i d i n g th e agenc i e s o f gove r n m en t i nt o th e th r e e b r anche s o r a r m s o f Execut i v e, Leg i s l atu r e an d Jud i c i a r y . T h i s i s base d o n th e doct r i n e o f t h e sepa r at i o n o f powe r s i n wh i c h th e funct i on s o f thes e b r anche s a r e ent r uste d so l e l y to th e app r op r i at e b r anc h of gove r n m ent . T hu s t h e Const i tut i on s hav e bee n he l d t o hav e i n st i t ut i ona l iz e d a po l i t ic al theo r y i n tended to e stab l is h a system that p r o v i des m utual c hecks and ba l ances, the r eby limi t i n g a r b i t r a r i nes s an d abus e o f powe r i n Gove r n m en t an d p r o m ot i n g th e li be r t y o f the i nd i v i dua l . Chapte r 1 o f th e G r enad a Const i tut i o n conta i n s p r o v i s i on s f o r t h e p r otect i o n of funda m enta l ri ght s an d f r eedo m s i n c l ud i n g th e ri gh t to th e p r otect i o n o f t h e l aw . S ect i o n 8 o f t h e Const i tut i o n m andate s t ha t eve r y pe r so n cha r ge d w i t h a crimi na l offenc e “ s ha l l be affo r de d a fa i r hea r i n g w i th i n a r easonab l e t im e b y a n i ndependen t an d im pa r t i a l c ou r t estab l is hed by l aw “ . T h i s p r ov i si on i n t ri n s i ca l l y li n ks c rimi nal j ust i ce wi th the concept o f an i ndependen t an d im pa r t i a l j ud i c i a r y . T h i s p r ov i si o n m ake s i t cl ea r t ha t t h e i ndependence an d im pa r t i a li ty o f t h e j ud i c i a r y i s a ri gh t g r ante d t o an d fo r th e benef i t o f th e c i t i ze n a s an i n c i dent of the const i tut i onal gua r antee of h i s ri ght to have a fa i r t ri a l . [9 ] Secu r i ty o f t enu r e i s a c o r ne r ston e o f t h e const i tut i ona l p r o v i s i on s f o r j ud i c i al i ndependence . T hes e p r ov i si on s p r e sc r i b e tha t t h e appo i nt m en t o f th e j ud i c i a l off i ce r i s an appo i nt m en t unt i l h e r eache s r et i r e m en t ag e sub j ec t t o a c ond i t i o n pe r mi tt i n g h i s r e m o val for inability or for m isbehaviour. This i s intended to i nsulate him from the temptation to cate r t o t h e w i she s o f th e po l i t ic a l d ir ecto r at e t o p r ese r v e o r p r o l on g h i s cont i nuat i o n i n office. The Context of the Constitution as a Whole [10 ] T h e l at e d is t i ngu i she d S i r A ll e n Lew i s C .J. , i n “ Th e Sepa r at i o n o f P owe r s – i ts r e l evance for Parliamentary Government i n the Caribbean” an essay published in the West Indian La w Jou r na l Octobe r pag e , sa i d: “ F u r ther p r o v i s i on i s m ade for r e st r ic t i ng the exe r c i se o f a r b i t r a r y power b y i n st i t ut i ona l izi n g th e d i st i n ct i o n betwee n th e off i c e o f th e Atto r ne y G ene r a l , w i th responsibility for administration of l egal a ffairs o f the State, i ncluding the p r epa r at i o n o f l eg i s l at i o n cons i s ten t wi th l ega l i nte r p r etat i o n o f t h e Const i tut i on, and that the D i r e ctor of Pub l i c P r o secut i ons, a l egal off i cer w i th the secu r ed tenu r e and independent s tatus of a j udge, w ith responsibility for the conduct of c riminal p r oceed i ngs.” [11 ] C ounse l f o r t h e r esponden t p r epa r e d a tab l e , to de m onst r at e tha t t h e theo r y r efe r r e d t o b y S i r A ll en , f oun d exp r ess i o n i n t h e Const i tut i o n o f G r enada . S ect i o n ( ) p r e sc r i be s t ha t i n the exe r c i se o f the funct i ons v ested i n h i m b y the Const i tut i on, the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s “ sha l l no t b e sub j ec t t o t h e d ir e ct i o n o r c ont r o l o f an y othe r pe r so n or autho r i ty “ . Sect i on 84 ( 3) s pec i f ic a ll y e xe m p ts the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons f r o m the application of s ection 84, w hich c onfers responsibility on the Public Service C ommission fo r th e appo i nt m ent , an d d i sc i p li na r y cont r o l o f pub l i c off i ce r s . Instea d p r ov i si o n i s m ad e for the removal of the Director o f Public Prosecutions from office only on the ground of i nability and misbehaviour and only by the special procedure set out i n section 86(6) (9). It is s i gn i f i can t t ha t t h e p r ov i si on s f o r t h e r e m o val o f a J udg e se t ou t i n th e Cou r t s O r der section 8(4) (9) prescribe an identical formula, and limit the power o f removal to the identical g rounds o f inability and misbehaviour. With r egard to the provisions p rotecting pens i on , s ect i o n ( ) o f th e Const i tut i o n m ake s equa l p r o v i s i o n fo r th e Judg e an d the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons, and w i th r ega r d to s a l a r y, the Judge ‘ s p r otect i on p r esc r i be d b y t h e Cou r t ‘ s O r de r s ect i o n ( ) ( b ) an d ( ) i s s imil a r t o t ha t o f th e D i r ector o f P ub l i c P r osecut i on s p r e sc r i be d b y s ect i o n ( ) an d ( ) o f th e Const i tut i on respectively.

[12]I a m sat i sf i ed that the context of the Const i tut i on does de m onst r ate that the off i ce o f D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons i s r equ i r ed to be endowed w i th the sa m e qua l i t i e s of i ndependence as the j ud i c i a r y to ensu r e that the c rimi nal j ust i ce system i s i ndependent o f po l i t ic a l an d othe r im p r ope r i nf l uence s an d ope r ate s o n th e l oft y p ri n c i p l e s o f equa l i ty befo r e th e l aw . T hus , th e gene r a l p ic tu r e o f th e Const i tut i o n o f G r enad a dep i cts the j ud i c i a r y a s be i n g i ndependen t an d im pa r t i a l , i n a stat e base d o n th e sepa r at i o n o f powe r s. Under the u m b r e ll a of the j ud i c i a r y stands the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons a s one of the gua r d i ans , be i n g i ndependent l y r espons i b l e f o r t h e i n st i t ut i o n an d conduc t o f crimi nal p r oceed i ngs , acco r d i n g t o th e sa m e h i g h standa r d s o f equa l i ty befo r e th e l aw , f a ir nes s and f r eedo m f r o m po l i t ic a l o r othe r im p r ope r i nf l uences . A ga i ns t th i s backg r oun d sect i o n m u st be i n te r p r e ted to m a i nta i n the essent i a l cha r acte r is t i cs of that p ic tu r e . It wou l d seem t o m y eye , t ha t an y d imi nut i o n i n t h e secu r i ty o f t h e tenu r e o f t h e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c Prosecutions w ill result i n a diminution of the independence of the office o f Director o f Pub l i c P r osecut i ons , an d wou l d b e ou t o f ha r m on y wi th th e gene r a l p ic tu r e . Th e deta i l s o f eac h sect i o n o f t h e Const i tut i o n m us t f i t i nt o th e ove r a l l sche m e i n t h e sa m e m anne r t hat the f r a m e r s of the Const i tut i on wou l d have conce i ved. In m y vi e w i t s ee m s c l ear that they wou l d hav e unhes i t at i ng l y ensu r e d tha t t h e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s w a s i nsu l ated f r om po l i t ic al and other im p r oper i nf l uences to the sa m e extent as the j ud i c i a r y. The Language [13 ] C ounse l f o r t h e appe l l an t gav e a n en l i ghten i n g an d l ea r ne d d i scou r s e o n th e te r m t enu r e wh i c h ha s i t s o ri g i n s i n l andho l d i n g i n f euda l t im e s an d s i gn i f i e s a ri gh t b y wh i c h l an d o r an off i c e i s he l d an d th e m od e o f t h e r e l evan t ho l d i n g o r occupat i on . H e a r gue d tha t t he Co m m onwea l t h C onst i tut i on s c onfe r r e d th e ri gh t to ho l d off i c e b y us i n g th e enact i ng c l aus e “ s ha l l ho l d off i ce “ , an d tha t t h e absenc e o f s uc h a c l aus e i n s ect i o n im po r t s t he v i ew that no ri ght or m andate to ho l d the off i ce was c r eated for any pa r t i cu l a r pe r i od. [14 ] H e sub m i tte d tha t i n th e absenc e o f s uc h m andat e i t w a s f o r t h e execut i v e t o d o f i x the du r at i o n b y w a y o f cont r act . H e r e li e d o n Thomas v Attorney General ( ) W .I.R. 375 at 386 whe r e Lo r d D i p l ock sa i d : “ The funct i ons o f the Po l ic e Se r vic e Co m mi ss i on fa l l i n to two cl a sses: ( 1) to appo i n t off i ce r s to th e Po l ic e Se r vic e , i nc l ud i n g the i r t r ansfe r an d p r o m ot i o n and conf i rm at i o n i n appo i nt m ents ; an d ( ) t o r e m ov e an d exe r c i s e d i sc i p li na r y cont r o l over the m . It has no power to l a y down te r m s of s e r v i ce for po l ic e off i ce r s ; th i s i s for the l eg i s l atu r e and, i n r e spect of any m atte r s not dea l t w i th b y l eg i s l at i on (w hether p r im a r y or subo r d i nate) i t i s for the execut i v e to deal wi th i n i ts c ont r a ct o f e m p l oy m en t wi th th e i nd i v i dua l po l ic e off i ce r . Te r m s o f s e r v i c e i nc l ud e such matters a s (a) the duration of the contract o f employment, eg for a fixed period, for a period ending on attaining retiring age, o r for a probationary period as i s env i s age d b y t h e r efe r enc e t o “ conf i rm at i o n o f appo i nt m ents ” i n sect i o n ( ) ; ( b ) r e m une r at i o n an d pens i ons ; an d (c ) wha t t he i r Lo r dsh i p s hav e ca l l e d th e “ c od e of conduct” that the po l ic e off i cer i s under a duty to obse r ve.”

[15]I do no th i n k that the quotat i on suppo r ts h i s content i on because Lo r d D i p l ock c l ea r l y s tates tha t t h e powe r o f appo i nt m en t doe s no t c a r r y wi th i t t h e powe r to l a y dow n te r m s of se r vic e , i nc l ud i n g th e du r at i o n o f t h e appo i nt m ent . Th e po i n t i s e m phas i z e d i n Abeywickrema v Pa t hirana & Ors. ( ) LR C (C onst ) 9 a cas e e m anat i n g f r o m S r i Lanka . At pag e Sha r vanand a C.J . e xp l a i ne d tha t t h e r e l a t i onsh i p tha t r esu l t s f r o m e m p l oy m en t b y th e State , o r Gove r n m ent , i s usua l l y gove r ne d b y s tatus . T h e attach m ent of ri ghts and dut i e s i s gove r ned by pub l i c l aw and not b y cont r a ct a s these ri ghts and dut i e s a r e sub j ect to v a r i a t i on by l eg i s l at i v e p r esc r i p t i on w i thout the consent o f the e m p l oyee . In Sa l m on d Ju r is p r udenc e ( th ed) p .240 “ Status s i gn i f i es a m an ‘ s pe r sonal cond i t i on, s o far as i t i s im posed upon h i m by the l a w w i thout h i s own consent, as opposed t o t h e cond i t i o n wh i c h h e ha s acqu i r e d fo r h ims e l f b y ag r ee m ent “ . T h i s r a t i ona l e suppo r ts th e conc l u s i o n tha t t h e du r at i o n o f t h e appo i nt m en t o f th e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s i s l e ss lik e l y t o b e dete r mi ne d b y an y c ont r actua l a rr ange m en t t ha n b y t h e const i tut i onal status of the Off i ce, as ev i denced by the r u l e s p r esc r i bed by the Const i tut i on i tse l f.

[16]It is first necessary, therefore, to examine the legislative instrument, that is the constitution, to see whether sect i on 86 p r ov i des the answer to the i ssue of the du r at i on of e m p l o y m ent. The Meaning of Appoint [17 ] T h e l anguag e o f S ect i o n ( ) i s c l ea r , conc i s e an d im pe r at i v e . I t s im p l y s tate s tha t t he D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s “ sha l l b e appo i nte d b y t h e Gove r no r G ene r a l “ . T he subsect i o n doe s no t s pec i fy a pe r i o d o f t im e du r i n g wh i c h th e appo i nt m en t i s t o have effect . I t doe s no t s t i pu l at e tha t an y t e r m s an d cond i t i on s o f se r vic e b e spec i f i e d a s pa r t of th e appo i nt i n g p r ocess . In th e contex t o f t h e sect i o n th e te r m appo i n t c ou l d m ea n n o m o r e than no m i nate or dec l a r e the occupant o f the off i ce o f D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons. That i s t h e on l y funct i o n o f t h e Gove r no r G ene r a l i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s m atte r . W he n th e Gove r no r General has done that, the office is filled by the person so appointed. [18 ] S ect i o n ( ) use s th e ph r aseo l og y ” t h e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s s ha l l vacat e h i s off i ce w hen he atta i n s the p r esc r i bed age “ . It i s the i n te r p r e tat i on of th i s subsect i on that i s c r uc i a l . T h e appe l l an t c ontend s t ha t i t doe s n o m o r e t ha n spec i fy th e m a x im u m age beyon d wh i c h a pe r so n canno t ho l d th e off i ce . I w ou l d say , howeve r , tha t t h e ph r as e cou l d on l y hav e tha t m ean i n g i f t h e D i r ecto r c ou l d b e r e m ove d f r o m off i c e p r i o r t o h i s atta i n m ent o f t h e p r esc r i be d age . Q u i t e cl ea r ly , h e shou l d b e i n off i c e a t tha t dat e i f h e cou l d no t be removed earlier. T he appellant r elied on the first instance decision of M atthew J . (as he then was) i n Emma H ippolyte v Attorney General, S t . Luc i a N o.51 o f . So m ewhat ir on i ca l l y l ea r ne d Sen i o r C ounse l f o r t h e appe l l an t i n thes e p r oceed i ng s i s r e lyi n g o n th i s j udg m en t w h i c h r e j ecte d th e a r gu m ent s h e ha d m ad e a s c ounse l f o r t h e p l a i nt i f f i n t he H i ppo l yte case. In that case the D i r e ctor of Aud i t c l a im ed that s he was un l awfu l l y r e m oved f r o m he r post . In sh e ha d ente r e d i nt o a n ag r ee m en t to cont i nu e i n t h e pos t fo r a two yea r pe r i od , an d o n i ts exp i r a t i o n th e gove r n m en t r efuse d t o r enew . Th e wo r d i n g o f t he r e l e vant p r o v i s i on, s ect i on 90 ( ) , ( ) and ( ) of the St. Luc i a C onst i tut i on, i s i dent i c al wi th the wo r d i ng of sect i on ( ) ( ) and ( ) of the G r enada Const i tut i on. At p.27 M a tthew J. sa i d: ” Sect i o n ( ) o f th e const i tut i o n i s a p r e sc r i p t i o n a s to th e m a x im u m ag e for r e m a i n i ng i n off i ce, noth i ng m o r e “ Nonethe l ess , h e wen t o n t o f i n d tha t t h e Gove r no r G ene r a l d i d no t appo i n t t h e p l a i nt i f f for any s pec i f i c pe r i od, and that i t was the Pub l i c Se r v i ce C o m mi ss i on, w ho w i thout the power t o appo i nt , f i xe d th e du r at i o n o f he r e m p l o y m ent . H e c onc l ude d tha t w a s a usu r pat i o n of th e Gove r no r G ene r a l’ s f unct i o n an d wa s the r efo r e u l t r a v ir es . T h i s dec i si o n was p r e m is e d o n h i s conc l u s i o n tha t t h e powe r o f appo i nt m ent , wh i c h th e Const i tut i o n veste d i n the Gove r no r Gene r a l , i nc l uded the power to f i x the du r at i on of se r v i ce. [19 ] T h e l ea r ne d t ri a l Judg e i n t h i s cas e r efe r r e d t o t h i s op i n i o n a s ob i te r , an d i nd i cate d tha t he d i sag r ee d w i t h an d r efuse d t o f o ll o w i t . T h e r u l e s o f sta r e dec i si s d o no t r equ i r e t ha t any f irs t i nstanc e dec i si o n i s b i nd i ng , an d w e a r e a t li be r t y to cons i de r t h e quest i o n af r es h and rule o n its correctn e ss. [20 ] I c a n po i n t ou t imm ed i ate l y , t ha t i n co m i n g t o h i s c onc l u s i o n M atthe w J i n b r eac h o f t he p r i n c i p l e o f c onst r uct i o n r equ i ri n g h i m t o c ons i de r t h e contex t o f t h e wo r d s t o be i nte r p r eted , d i d no t c ons i de r t h e im po r t o f t h e p r ov i si on s o f sect i o n ( ) w h i c h i s the equ i va l ent of sect i on 89 ( 6) of the G r enada Const i tut i on. Pe r haps i t was for that r eason that h e d i d no t f i n d th e Aust r a li a n cas e The W a t erside W orkers’ F edera t ion of Aus t ralia v J. M . Alexander Ltd. ( ) C.L.R . r e l evant . I n t ha t c as e th e appe l l ant s b r ought p r oceed i ng s a ll eg i n g tha t t h e r espondent s ha d bee n i n defau l t o f a n awa r d o f t he Commonwealth C ourt of C onciliation and Arbitration. T he respondents challenged the l ega l i ty of the cou r t i n a s m u ch a s under the r e l e vant l eg i s l at i on the P r es i dent w as appo i nte d fo r seve n yea r s on l y . T h e cou r t ha d t o c ons i de r w hethe r s ect i o n o f t he Constitution of Australia which prescribes that: “ J ustices of the High Court and of the other C ourts c reated by the Parliament shall b e appo i nte d b y t h e Gove r no r G ene r a l i n Counc i l , an d sha l l no t b e r e m oved except b y the same authority on address from both Houses o f Parliament p raying fo r suc h r e m ova l o n spec i f i e d g r ounds” p r evented the confe r m ent of a te r m of yea r s on the P r es i dent of the Cou r t. [21 ] T ha t S ect i o n (s up r a ) c o m b i ne s t h e p r ov i si on s o f sect i o n ( 1an d ( ) o f th e G r enada Const i tut i on . T h e powe r o f appo i nt m en t i s s im p l y “ sha l l b e appo i nted “ , w i t h n o st i pu l at i on a s to t im e a s i n ( ) . T h e powe r o f r e m o val i s simil a r t o t ha t i n sect i o n ( ) an d ( ) . It shou l d b e note d tha t t h e sect i o n d i d no t enac t tha t t h e j udge s “ sha l l ho l d off i ce “ , y e t t he tenu r e o f t h e j udg e wa s he l d t o b e p r esc r i bed . T h e cou r t cons i s te d o f s eve n m e m be r s and the y eac h gav e r easone d dec i si ons . A m a j o r i ty o f f iv e he l d tha t s ect i o n o f t he Const i tut i o n r equ i r e s tha t eve r y j udg e b e appo i nte d fo r li f e . I f th e Aust r a li a n const i tut i on ha d p r ov i de d tha t t h e off i c e b e vacate d a t a p r e sc r i be d age , t he n th e off i c e w ou l d have been he l d to that age i n stead of for li fe. G r i ff i ths C.J. sa i d: “ Thes e wo r ds , w h i c h app l y t o a l l Fede r a l J udge s a lik e , hav e a l way s been assu m ed , an d I th i n k ri ght l y , t o m ea n tha t th e tenu r e o f a l l Fede r a l Judge s sha l l be for life, subject to the power of removal “ . Ba r ton J sa i d : “ W o r d s cou l d no t m o r e c l ea r l y i nd i cat e t ha t un l es s suc h a n add r es s b e adopted h e i s ent i t l e d t o ho l d off i c e a s l on g a s h e liv es . I t wa s i ndee d a r gue d tha t a t enu r e for any def i ned pe r i od, however b ri e f, was co m pat i b l e wi th the p r ov i si on. T hat vi e w is , I th i nk , c o m p l ete l y untenab l e . T he r e a r e n o wo r d s i nd i cat i n g powe r to limi t t he tenu r e i n t ha t m anne r , an d hav i n g r ega r d t o t h e who l e sche m e o f C hapte r III , and t o t h e fac t t ha t a n appo i nt m en t du r i n g goo d behav i ou r wi t hou t m o r e ha s a lw ays bee n const r ue d a s be i n g fo r li f e , s ub j ec t t o t ha t c ond i t i on , un l es s i t i s coup l e d w i th a n exp r es s limi t at i o n o f t enu r e i n po i n t o f t im e , I d o no t t h i n k t ha t t h e a r gu m ent necess i tates extended d i scuss i on.” It was po i nted out b y Isaacs and R i ch JJ i n a j o i nt op i n i on that the power to f i x a te r m gave the power to fix any term. [22 ] In m y vi e w the r e i s li tt l e d i ffe r enc e i n t h e concep t o f f i x i n g a te r m t ha t i s dete r mi nab l e on the occurrence of an event and one that i s determinable on the arrival o f a date, for exa m p l e , o n th e exp i r a t i o n o f t w o y ea r s . C a r ryi n g tha t p r opos i t i o n t o i t s ext r e m e , i f t he Gove r no r G ene r a l m a y f i x an y t e r m h e chooses , h e m a y choos e on e wh i c h i s determinable by the occurrence of an event s uch as, until a member o f Parliament s hall p r esent an add r ess i n the House, e xp r e ss i ng want o f conf i dence i n the Just i c e, irrespective o f misbehaviour. This, quite obviously, would nullify the provisions i n 86(6). If th e p r ov i si on s i n ( ) a r e to hav e effect , the y m us t ope r at e t o p r even t t h e exe r c i s e o f any power to have the D i r e ctor o f Pub l i c P r o secut i ons r e m oved f r om o ff i ce e xcept for the r eason s an d i n t h e m anne r i t exp r esse s an d pe r mi ts . I t wou l d see m t he r efo r e tha t t he powe r o f appo i nt m en t doe s no t i nc l ud e th e concep t t ha t i t i s a t o r du r i n g th e p l easu r e of th e Gove r no r G ene r a l , a s i t i s cl ea r t ha t s uc h p l easu r e m a y b e i n c onf l ic t w i t h s ect i on ( ) . I t wou l d see m t ha t t h e effec t o f th e subsect i o n i s to p r ov i d e tha t t h e appo i nt m ent will last until the prescribed age on the condition that the officer is able to perform and is of goo d behav i ou r . [23 ] T h e l a w i s w e l l sett l e d tha t a n appo i nt m en t du r i n g goo d behav i ou r i s a n appo i nt m en t f or li f e , o r unt i l r e t ir e m en t ag e an d ca n b e te r mi nate d on l y fo r mi sbehav i ou r . Th i s p ri n c i p l e has ancient o rigins and the current text books still refer to the 1 th c entury case Harcourt v Fox ( ) S ho w P a r l Ca s i n s uppo r t o f t h e p r opos i t i on . In m o r e m ode r n t im e s the p r i n c i p l e f i nds exp r e ss i on i n Halsburys Laws of England (4 th ed.) Vol. 8(2) para 903: “ T h e g r an t o f a n off i c e du r i n g goo d behav i ou r cr eate s a n off i c e f o r li fe o r unt i l r e t ir e m en t ag e dete r mi nab l e upo n b r eac h o f th e cond i t i on.” [24 ] I accept , an d app l y th e r a t i ona l e i n t h e m a j o ri ty o f t h e W ate r si d e case . Unfo r t unate l y , I do not ag r ee w i th the conc l u s i on of M atthew J . i n the H i ppo l yte case that the const i tut i onal p r ov i si on s o n wh i c h h e r u l e d enab l e d th e appo i nt m en t f o r a t e r m o f y ea r s , an d r u l e i t per i n c u ri a m . In m y v i ew, the l anguage of the sect i on taken as a w ho l e l eads to the conc l u s i on tha t th e Const i tut i o n p r esc r i be s tha t th e Gove r no r G ene r a l appo i nt s du r i n g goo d behav i our and ability to perform; he does not appoint during pleasure. C onsequently, the holder o f th e off i c e o f D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s c anno t b e r e m ove d o n an y g r oun d othe r t han inability or m isbehaviour before he attains the prescribed age. T his leads i nevitably to the r u li ng that he cannot be r e m o ved on the bas i s of the eff l ux i on of t im e . Waiver and Estoppel [25 ] I t wa s a r gue d tha t t h e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s ha d wa i v e d h i s ri gh t to r e m a i n i n off i c e unt i l r e t ir e m en t ag e o r w a s estoppe d f r o m i ns i s t i n g o n i t b y h i s ow n ag r ee m en t to a lesser term. As I s aid earlier, the provision providing a safeguard is for the benefit o f the c i t i zen , a s a n i n c i den t to h i s ri gh t to a fa i r t ri a l befo r e a n i ndependen t an d im pa r t i al j ud i c i a r y , an d i t i s no t t h e ri gh t o f th e appo i nte e t o g iv e away . Fu r t he r , a n ag r ee m en t wh i ch cou l d l awfu l l y a vo i d a n i n st i t ut i ona l s afegua r d fo r th e i ndependenc e o f t h e off i c e t he confe r s uc h a te r m w ou l d b e a dev i c e fo r secu r i n g a n a m end m en t to th e Const i tut i on . T h i s o f c ou r s e w ou l d offen d th e r u l e t ha t n o a m end m en t o f a n ent r enche d p r ov i si o n o f t he Const i tut i on , s uc h a s s ect i o n , c ou l d hav e an y effec t un l es s th e p r ocedu r e se t ou t i n sect i on 39 of the Const i tut i on i s fo l l o wed. [26 ] W ad e o n Ad m i n i st r a t i v e La w (6 th ed ) a t p.26 m ake s th e po i n t t ha t i n pub l i c l a w t h e m ost obv i ou s limi t at i o n o n th e doct r i n e o f estoppe l i s tha t i t canno t b e i nvoke d s o a s t o g iv e an autho r i ty powe r s wh i c h i t doe s no t i n l a w possess . In othe r w o r ds , n o estoppe l c an l eg i t im a te a ct i on, w h i ch i s u l t r a v ir e s, and at p .264 i t adds that the p r im a r y r u l e i s that no wa i v e r o f ri ght s an d n o consen t o r p r iv at e ba r ga i n ca n g i v e a pub l i c autho r i ty m o r e power than i t l eg i t im a te l y possesses. Once aga i n, the p r i n c i p l e of u l t r a vir e s m u st p r e va i l when i t co m e s i n to c onf l ic t w i th the o r d i na r y r u l e s of l aw. T he i n st i tut i onal s afegua r ds o f the i ndependenc e o f th e j ud i c i a r y d o no t be l on g t o t h e j ud i c i a l off i ce r fo r h i m t o s u r r ende r a s he p l eases, they a r e ri ghts wh i c h a r e e m bedded i n the c i t i zen to p r o tect h i s c onst i tut i ona l l y gua r anteed ri ghts to the r u l e of l aw, equa l i ty befo r e the l a w and fa i r t ri a l . I do not th i n k that th e cou r t s c ou l d a ll o w th e consen t o f a n off i c e ho l de r to an y e r o s i o n o f t h e const i tut i onal safegua r d s to h i s i ndependenc e shou l d b e a ll owe d t o hav e g r eate r effec t t ha n th e i nte r est of the pub l i c i n the p r ese r vat i on of the i r ri ghts to a f r ee and i ndependent j ud i c i al system. In the case o f Tellis & Ors v Bombay Municipal Corp & Ors [1987] L RC (C onst) 351 Chand r achu d C.J . goe s eve n fu r t he r becaus e h e conc l ude d tha t eve n whe r e th e ri ghts we r e for the benef i t of the i nd i v i dual he cou l d not wa i ve the m . He sa i d at 366: “ the h i gh pu r pose wh i c h the Const i tut i on seeks to a ch i e ve b y the confe r m ent o f funda m enta l ri ght s i s no t on l y t o benef i t i nd i v i dua l s bu t to secu r e t h e l a r ger i nte r e sts o f t h e co m m un i ty . N o i nd i v i dua l c a n ba r te r awa y t h e f r eedo m s confe r r ed upo n h i m b y t h e Const i tut i on. ” Th i s w ou l d r efe r t o an y ri gh t a s th e const i tut i on m ake s n o d i st i n ct i o n betwee n funda m enta l ri ght s enacte d fo r th e benef i t o f an i nd i v i dua l an d thos e enacte d i n t h e pub l i c i nte r es t o r o n th e g r ound s o f pub l i c po l i cy. The a r gu m ent on estoppel and wa i v er m ust be r e j e cted.” Severance [27 ] In d i spos i n g o f t h e f i na l i ssu e a s to whethe r t h e appo i nt m en t o f th e D i r ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i ons w as v a li d notw i thstand i ng the unconst i tut i ona l i ty of the te r m o f 2 yea r s be i ng ag r eed to I can do no better than to c i te w i th app r oval the wo r d s of the l ea r ned t ri a l j udge: “ I a m o f t h e op i n i o n tha t t ha t pa r t o f t h e i nst r u m en t o f appo i nt m en t wh i c h r ef l e cts a l awfu l exe r cis e o f a c onst i tut i ona l powe r , tha t i s th e appo i nt m en t b y th e Gove r no r Gene r a l o n th e adv i c e o f t h e Jud i c i a l an d Lega l S e r v i ce s Co m mi ss i on , c a n and Order shou l d b e seve r e d f r o m t ha t pa r t o f t h e i nst r u m en t w h i c h r ef l e cts th e u l t r a v ir e s exe r c i s e o f a p r esu m e d powe r , tha t i s , t h e limi t at i o n o f t h e te r m o f appo i nt m en t f or a du r at i o n wh i c h fa l l s s ho r t o f t h e p r esc r i be d r e t ir e m en t age . I f i n d suppo r t fo r th i s p r opos i t i o n i n t h e j udg m en t o f Lo r d Gof f o f C h i eve l e y i n th e cas e o f Commissioner of Police v Davi s , P r i vy Counc i l Appea l N o.5 o f (Bahamas) where, w hile admittedly addressing the question of s everability of l eg i s l at i v e p r ov i si ons, H i s Lo r dsh i p m ade the fo l l o w i ng state m ent, wh i c h I th i n k equa l l y app l ic ab l e t o t h e quest i o n befo r e m e . T h e Lea r ne d La w Lo r d , i n app l y i ng the test of substantial severability, said “ this test r equires that w hen the Court must m od i f y t h e tex t i n o r de r to ach i ev e seve r anc e th i s c a n on l y b e don e ‘w he n the Cou r t i s sat i sf i ed that i t i s effect i ng no change i n the substant i a l pu r pose and effect o f t h e im pugne d p r ov i si on ‘ . ” T h e substant i a l pu r pos e o f t h e Gove r no r G ene r a l , on the adv i c e of the Jud i c i al and Legal Se r v i ces Co m mi ss i on, w as, i n m y v i ew, c l ea r l y t o appo i n t a Dir ecto r o f Pub l i c P r osecut i on s f o r G r enad a i n acco r danc e w i t h t he p r ov i si ons of the Const i tut i on. The limi tat i on of the te r m was m e r e l y i n c i denta l .” [28 ] I wou l d the r efo r e d i s mi ss th e appea l an d conf i r m t h e dec l a r a t i on s o f th e l ea r ne d t ri a l Judge excep t f o r t h e o r de r t ha t Mr . H o l d i p ho l d s off i ce , wh i c h b y t h e consen t o f th e pa r t i e s w e accept i s no longer a ccurate a s he has s ince the hearing at first instance voluntarily r e li nqu i she d off i c e an d m ove d o n t o othe r poss i b l y g r eene r pastu r es . C ost s to the r e spondent f i t for two counse l . DENNIS BYRON Chief Justice I c on c u r SATROHAN SINGH J u s t ic e o f A ppeal I c on c u r ALBERT REDHEAD J u s t ic e o f A ppeal