

1 THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
2 HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN

3
4 ON APPEAL FROM THE GRAND COURT
5
6

7 Cause No. FSD 33 of 2011
8 C.I.C.A. No. 24 of 2014
9

10 IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES LAW (2010 REVISION)

11 BETWEEN: DD GROWTH PREMIUM 2X FUND (In Official Liquidation)

12 (Defendant) Appellant

13 AND: RMF MARKET NEUTRAL STRATEGIES (MASTER) LIMITED

14 (Plaintiff) Respondent
15


16 IN CHAMBERS
17

18 Appearances: Mr. Nigel Meeson QC, Mr. Ben Hobden and Mr. Ryan Charles of Conyers
19 Dill and Pearman for the Applicant/Respondent to the Appeal.
20

21 Mr. Peter McMaster QC and Mr. Jeremy Snead of Appleby for the
22 Appellant/Respondent to the application.
23

24
25 Before: THE HON. JUSTICE MANGATAL
26 (Sitting as a single Judge of the Court of Appeal)
27

28
29 Heard: 22nd April & 29th May 2015
30



REASONS FOR JUDGMENT



*Civil Practice and Procedure- application for security for costs of an appeal-Sub-section 19(2)
of the Court of Appeal Law (2011 Revision) - Section 74 of the Companies Law (2013
Revision)*

1. This is an application by RMF Market Neutral Strategies (Master) Limited, the Respondent ("RMF") seeking against DD Growth Premium 2X Fund (In Official Liquidation) ("the Appellant"), security for costs of the appeal in respect of which Notice of Appeal was filed December 23, 2014.

2. The application was made pursuant to Rule 19(2) of the *Court of Appeal Law (2011 Revision)* ("the *Law*") which provides as follows:

" Appeals in civil proceedings.

19....


(2) The appellant shall, at the time of lodging the notice of appeal required by subsection (1), deposit in the Grand Court the sum of fifty dollars as security for the due prosecution of the appeal together with such further sum as security for costs of the appeal as a Judge of the Grand Court may


1 direct, and such security for costs may be given by the appellant entering
2 into a bond by himself and such sureties and in such sum as the Judge of the
3 Grand Court may direct, conditioned for the payment of any costs which
4 may be awarded against the appellant and for the due performance of the
5 judgment of the Court.”

6
7 3. By virtue of section 33 of the *Law* all powers conferred on a single Judge of the Court of Appeal
8 may be exercised by a Judge of the Grand Court.

9
10 4. This application was sought by way of summons filed January 21, 2015. Originally, RMF had
11 also sought security for costs incurred at first instance. However, on the eve of the hearing before
12 me, learned Queen’s Counsel Mr. Meeson indicated a withdrawal of that aspect of the
13 application. Having had an opportunity to consider the authority of *Cay Realty v Hadsphatic*
14 *International Limited* [1952-79 CILR 185], which was an authority referred to in the Appellant’s
15 skeleton argument, RMF decided that it would not pursue that part of its application regarding the
16 costs at first instance, and would instead limit its application to costs of the appeal alone. This, as
17 well as revised costs estimates for the appeal provided by RMF, resulted in a substantial reduction
18 in the security for costs initially sought, from a total of US \$1,020,728 to US\$249,500.

19
20 5. Before turning to the evidence and arguments, I will set out the background to this application
21 very briefly.





1 **Background**

2 6. The Appellant was a feeder fund, incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 2 February 2007 as an
3 exempted company with limited liability to operate as a private investment fund. The Appellant
4 was placed in official liquidation on 29 May 2009.

5
6 7. RMF is a fund of hedge funds incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 12 March 2001. RMF held,
7 and now to a lesser extent, continues to hold redeemable shares in the Appellant.

8
9 8. In response to the Appellant writing to RMF to suggest that certain redemption proceeds should
10 be repaid, RMF commenced proceedings by way of originating summons dated February 21 2011
11 seeking a declaration that it was not required to repay monies to the Appellant.

12
13 9. It was agreed that the parties would put forward their respective cases in Statements of Grounds.
14 It was further agreed between the parties and Consent Orders were entered before Smellie CJ,
15 with directions being given, on the 18 December 2013 and 15 August 2014, by which certain
16 issues would be tried first, namely a claim referred to as the Section 37 Claim (in relation to
17 certain provisions of section 37 of the *Companies Law (2007 Revision)*, and Claims referred to as
18 Mistake and Preference Claims. By consent certain other claims and/or issues were ordered
19 stayed until further order of the Court.

20
21 10. The trial in relation to the agreed issues took place before the Honourable Chief Justice between
22 the 24-26 September, 2014, and a written judgment was handed down on the 17 November 2014.
23 The Order dated 17 November 2014 reflects the judgment of Smellie CJ and by Notice of Appeal
24 dated 23 December 2014, the Appellant has appealed against this Order. Grounds of Appeal have

1 not yet been filed as the time provided for in the Rules for the drawing up of the Grounds had not
2 up to the time of this application commenced running.



3
4 **RMF's Evidence**

5 11. The affidavit of Mr. Michael Beurer, was filed on March 10 2015 in support of the application.
6 Mr. Beurer is the Head of Secondaries, Workout and Transitions at FRM, a division of Man
7 Group plc, which manages RMF. Part of his duties, he indicated, include overseeing this litigation
8 on behalf of RMF. At paragraphs 15 of his Affidavit, Mr. Beurer states as follows:


9 **"DD Growth is Insolvent and has Insufficient Assets to Pay Costs**

10

11 **15. RMF was concerned that DD Growth has what was in essence a 'free**
12 **shot' against it in FSD 33 of 2011. DD Growth has nothing to lose**
13 **given that it would be unable to meet any costs award made against**
14 **it (as was proved to be the case) and was not responsible for its**
15 **lawyers who were funding the litigation and sharing in the proceeds**
16 **of the litigation on a contingency fee arrangement. RMF continues to**
17 **be concerned that this remains the position, and in essence means**
18 **that DD Growth has nothing to lose by pursuing its appeal. The**
19 **parties to this litigation are therefore not on an even playing field.**
20 **Put simply, RMF considers this situation to be unfair and unjust."**

21
22 12. Mr. Beurer at paragraphs 16 and 17 indicates that there have been limited attempts to agree
23 security as the Appellant had made its position clear from the outset, including in its letter to the

1 Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Mrs. Audrey Bodden, dated 23 December 2014. In that letter it
2 was opined by the Appellant's Attorneys Appleby that it would not be appropriate to provide
3 security at all.



4
5 **The Appellant's Evidence**

6 13. The application for security for costs has been opposed. The second Affidavit of Tammy Karina
7 Fu, dated 26 March 2015 was filed on behalf of the Appellant. Ms. Fu is a partner of Zolfo
8 Copper, who together with her fellow partner Gordon Ian Mac Rae, are the Joint Official
9 Liquidators, the "JOLs", of the Appellant. In paragraph 21 of this Affidavit Ms. Fu refers to the
10 fact that the parties have agreed to provisionally list the appeal for the November session of the
11 Court of Appeal. Whereas the Appellant's Attorneys have estimated that the appeal will take a
12 day, RMF's Attorneys estimate a day and a half. Miss Fu refers to and exhibits the letter to the
13 Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Mrs. Audrey Bodden, as well as an email from the Registrar,
14 listing the appeal for the 10-11 November 2015.

15 In the letter to the Registrar, the Appellant's Attorneys stated, amongst other matters, that security
16 in excess of CI \$50 would not be appropriate because the Appellant quite simply does not have
17 any assets available from which substantial security could be paid and that therefore such an
18 order would stifle a meritorious appeal.

19
20 14. In a number of paragraphs of her Affidavit, Miss Fu makes the point that the it has never been
21 denied that the Appellant is wholly insolvent and devoid of cash. She refers to the initial funding
22 arrangements and subsequent conditional fee arrangement with Appleby and other evidence to
23 show the Appellant's financial status. See in particular paragraphs 25-28.

1 15. At paragraphs 29 and 30 Miss Fu claims that it is the Appellant's very lack of cash that caused it
2 to claim that the payments should be recovered and that RMF is liable to repay them to the
3 Appellant.


4
5 16. At paragraphs 30 and 31 Miss Fu speaks to the nature of the appeal and the advice that has been
6 received from Appleby. The advice is, and it has been so argued before me, that the appeal turns
7 in part on a disputed issue of construction of a Statute and the question whether, if the Appellant's
8 construction is correct, there is a remedy in restitution to recover money paid in contravention of
9 the Statute. Further, that the appeal is an appeal with genuine merit and that it would therefore be
10 wrong to make an order that would stifle the appeal by imposing a condition of payment that
11 could not be met.

12
13 17. At paragraphs 33-38 Miss Fu then discusses the topic "The ability of the 2X Fund to obtain
14 further funding". Mr. Meeson QC has described this as "the crux of the matter."

15 Miss Fu states as follows:

16 "33. As indicated above, the 2X Fund has \$15,027.60 funding remaining,
which is insignificant in proportion to the award sought. This was
advanced for the specific purpose of funding claims against early
redeemers and accordingly has not been used for the Non RMF
Debts.

21 34. The funding arrangement, as approved by the CFA Judgment, has a
22 strict repayment waterfall indicating how any recoveries must be
23 paid (the Waterfall):




1 35. The above waterfall was sanctioned by the Court, And has the
2 effect of subordinating all of (a) the Provisional Liquidators' fees
3 and expenses; (b) the Liquidators' fees and expenses; and (c) any
4 adverse costs award, to the above.

5 36. The Liquidators cannot unilaterally amend the Waterfall. For the
6 2X Fund to obtain further funding to pay RMF's requested costs
7 would require the stakeholders in the above waterfall to agree to
8 subordinate their interests to any new funder.

9 37. As the Court will be aware, the 2 X Fund recently settled an
10 unrelated claim against another redeeming investor for \$350,000.
11 This sum fell to be paid in accordance with the Waterfall. This
12 money cannot be used to provide security for costs of the appeal
13 without the consent of the Lender and Petitioner A. Although the
14 Liquidators have raised this issue with them, their consent to use this
15 money for security has not been forthcoming. Had consent been
16 given, then the other stakeholders would have had to have been
17 consulted.

18 38. The Liquidators have unsuccessfully investigated further sources of
19 funding. No funder is prepared to provide funding for the Costs
20 below and the Appeal Costs."



1 **RMF's Arguments**

2 18. Mr. Meeson QC provided written and oral submissions. Reference was made to section 19(2) of
3 the *Law*. Reference was also made to section 74 of the *Companies Law (2010 Revision)* (which
4 is in the same terms as the current 2013 Revision) which states as follows:

5
6
7
8
9 “Where a company is plaintiff in any action, suit or other legal proceeding,
10 any Judge having jurisdiction in the matter, if he is satisfied that there is
11 reason to believe that if the defendant is successful in his defence the assets
12 of the company will be insufficient to pay his costs, may require sufficient
13 security to be given for such costs, and may stay all proceedings until such
14 security is given.”
15

16
17
18
19 19. It was submitted that whilst in the context of an appeal RMF is a ‘respondent’ as opposed to a
20 ‘defendant’ the provisions of section 74 continue to apply. Mr. Meeson relied on paragraph 24 of
21 the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in *Re Bancredit Cayman Limited*
22 [2009] CILR 578, where it was stated, though not in the context of an appeal, that:

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

1 20. The submission continues that it therefore follows that the circumstances within which the Court
2 can grant security pursuant to section 74 are exceptionally wide and applies to appeals, the
3 important consideration being one of substance, and not of form.

4
5 21. It was argued that where a claim is brought by an insolvent company in liquidation it follows that
6 section 74 is engaged and *prima facie* security should be provided by the liquidator because the
7 company has insufficient assets to pay the respondent's costs.

8
9 22. It was also submitted that, unlike a Court at first instance, in deciding whether to award security
10 for the costs of an appeal, the Court of Appeal has to take into account the fact that the Appellant
11 has already had the issue concerned determined against it, and it is *prima facie* an injustice to a
12 respondent to allow an appeal to the Court of Appeal to proceed without security for costs being
furnished in circumstances where the respondent will be unable to enforce a costs order against
the appellant. There is accordingly, it was argued, a heavy burden on an insolvent appellant to
discharge in order to resist an order for security for costs on an appeal.

16
17 23. Importantly, RMF submitted that where an appellant suggests that an order for security would
18 prevent it pursuing an appeal, it is necessary for the appellant to establish not only that it is unable
19 to furnish security for costs from its own resources, but also that it is unable to raise the money
20 elsewhere.

21
22 24. Reference was made to the oft-cited decision of Peter Gibson LJ, sitting in the English Court of
23 Appeal, in *Keary Developments Ltd. v Tarmac Construction Ltd* [1995] 3 All E.R. 534 at page
24 540, g-j.

1
2 25. Learned Queen's Counsel also referred to the decision of Barma J, as he then was, in the Hong
3 Kong decision in *Easy Watch Products Manufacturing Co. Ltd.* [2003] HKCFI 325, where at
4 paragraphs 15 and 16 Barma J stated:

5 “15. In this case, the Plaintiff has seen fit only to make the bare assertion
6 that its shareholders and directors are unable or unwilling to fund
7 the litigation. No attempt has been made to indicate what assets the
8 shareholders have available to them, or as to the sources of finance
9 that might be available to them.....”


10 16. Moreover, it seems to me that Mr. Chan is right in saying that in
11 general, unwillingness of the backers of a company to put up funds
12 to enable it to proceed with a claim which it is making should be
13 afforded little, if any, weight when considering whether or not a
14 claim will probably be stifled if security for costs is ordered. This is
15 particularly so where, as here, it would seem that the Plaintiff is no
16 longer operating and that the only person likely to benefit from a
17 successful claim are its shareholders. In such a case, their professed
18 unwillingness to fund the claim should not, in my view, be regarded
19 as an impediment to the making of an order for security,
20 particularly where the court, as here, cannot be satisfied on the
21 evidence presented that they are actually unable to do so”

22 (Emphasis provided by Counsel)
23



1 26. Indeed, in *Global Fixed Income Limited and Euro Fixed Income Limited v HSBC Bank*
2 *Cayman Limited* (unreported), delivered 24 March 2009, Smellie CJ, in his ruling refusing leave
3 to appeal an earlier ruling he had made granting security for costs, cited the *Easy Watch* case
4 with approval. –see paragraph 7. The [2008 CILR Note 7] regarding the security for costs
5 decision states as follows:

6 “In an application for security for costs by a defendant, the court has to
7 balance the risk of stifling a valid claim by an impecunious plaintiff against
8 the risk of that impecuniosity being used as a weapon against the defendant
9 if the plaintiff is allowed to pursue a cause of little merit, at no financial risk
10 to himself. While the plaintiff only has to demonstrate some prospect of
11 success in order to satisfy the court that an order for security will be
12 oppressive to it, proprietary connections to richer parties, (eg., investors,
13 where the plaintiff is a company), who are clearly unprepared to fund the
14 claims of the plaintiff, will give rise to concerns about the genuineness of the
15 action, and security may be granted, pursuant to section 74 of the
16 Companies Law (2007 Revision), which is designed specifically to prevent
17 the risk of such abuse. (Pearson v Naydler [1977] 1W.L.R. 899 applied;
18 Keary Devs Ltd.....applied.”




19
20 27. It was submitted that in the present case, the Court is not dealing with investors who are without
21 means. Mr. Meeson submits that it is beyond question that they would be able to put up the funds,
22 they are just simply unwilling to do so. Mr. Meeson made the point that after being paid out the
23 subject sums, his client RMF still remains the largest investor in the Appellant. Learned Queen's
24 Counsel says that the other investors are Banks and other institutions like his client, or there are

1 also some very wealthy individuals. In other words, Counsel indicated, we are not dealing here
2 with, to use his descriptive language, "orphans and widows". In any event, it was posited that
3 Ms. Fu's Second Affidavit fails to disclose which investors the JOLS consider will potentially
4 benefit from the appeal (RMF itself being the largest unpaid investor), and the ability of said
5 investors to provide security.

6
7 28. Further, that the fact that the Appellant cannot get third party Funders to invest and to indicate
8 willingness to provide security speaks volumes about the merits of the appeal.

9
10 29. It was submitted that the Appellant cannot come close to suggesting that its appeal is so likely to
11 be successful that it would justify the risk of exposing RMF to the injustice of having to bear its
12 own costs of an appeal, even if successful. In all of these circumstances, RMF asks that the Court
13 exercise its discretion to order security for costs.



14
15 **The Appellant's Arguments**

16 30. Learned Queen's Counsel Mr. McMaster also provided both written and oral submissions. He
17 argued against the order for security for costs upon multiple bases. Queen's Counsel submitted
18 that impecuniosity alone is not sufficient reason for the Court to exercise its discretion to award
19 security. In considering whether to exercise its discretion, it was urged that the Court should
20 consider:

- 21 (1) The stage in proceedings at which security is sought. Although it was
22 admitted that the security for costs application in respect of the appeal was


1 being made at the very earliest stage, it was pointed out that no attempt had
2 been made to obtain security in respect of the costs below.

3 (2) Whether the security will stifle a meritorious claim.

4 (3) Whether the plaintiff's want of means has been brought about by any
5 conduct of the defendant.
6

7 31. Learned Queen's Counsel stated that the Appellant seeks recovery of sums paid to RMF at a point
8 in time when the Appellant was insolvent (as found, it was submitted, by the Court below). The
9 argument continued, that if those monies had not been paid to RMF, the Appellant would not now
10 be impecunious. It was submitted that the Appellant's impecuniosity is therefore caused, in part,
11 by the actions of the Respondent.
12

13 32. Counsel highlighted the fact that the Liquidators have explored sources of funding but that none
14 are currently available. Any order for security would, Mr. McMaster posited, therefore stifle the
15 appeal.
16



17 33. It was submitted that the appeal is meritorious for the following reasons:

18 (1) The Grand Court was wrong to reject the Appellant's construction of the relevant
19 provisions of the *Companies Law*, and hence the payment was in fact unlawful.

20 (2) In reaching its own construction, the Grand Court had regard to material on
21 which it did not give the Appellant an opportunity to be heard, in breach of
22 natural justice and the *audi alteram partem* rule.



1. (3) The Grand Court did not go on to find whether (had it found a breach of the
2. statutory prohibition) there was a good claim in restitution or by way of
3. constructive trust, but that that should be determined by the Court of Appeal and
4. determined in favour of the Appellant.
5.

6 34. Mr. McMaster also traced the history of the application, and the various transformations it has
7 gone through. This included what he submitted was an unprecedented attempt to obtain as a
8 condition of being allowed to take the matter to the Court of Appeal, an order securing the costs
9 in the Court below. Learned Queen's Counsel classified the application as a crude attempt to
10 stifle a genuine appeal.
11

12 35. In all of the circumstances, it was argued that the Court should exercise its discretion by refusing
13 the application for security for costs. In the alternative, if the Court were minded to grant the
14 application, Mr. McMaster argued that the amount sought for costs is excessive. He reminded the
15 Court of the old case of *Aberdare and Plymouth Co. v Hankey (No. 2)* (1887-1888) 32 Sol J. at
16 644, which is often cited for the proposition that the court never orders an amount as security that
17 would cover the entire costs of the appeal, but only orders security of a reasonable amount.
18

19 **Resolution of The Issues**

20 36. I start my consideration of the issues by noting that section 19(2) of the **Law** does not provide any
21 guidance or set out any specific basis upon which security for the costs of an appeal may be
22 directed. This may be contrasted, for example, with section 74 of the **Companies Law (2013**
23 **Revision)** which deals with companies and speaks to a basis of reason to believe that the company
24 will have insufficient assets to pay the successful defendant's costs. However, I agree with Mr.

1 Meeson QC that where, as here, it is plain that the party pursuing the appeal is an insolvent
2 company, and one in liquidation, section 74, or indeed, the rationale behind it, should enter into
3 the Court's consideration when an application is made under section 19(2) of the *Law*. I find that
4 the decision in *Re Bancredit Cayman* is supportive of such reasoning. Section 19(2) of the *Law*
5 is also to be contrasted with Order 23 of the *Grand Court Rules* which provides more detailed
6 guidance as to when the Grand Court may order security for costs in respect of an action or other
7 proceedings at first instance in the Grand Court. It would in my judgment seem clear that Mr.
8 Meeson is right that RMF's application gains considerable strength and traction from the fact that
9 it has already secured a win in the Court below, and that in the circumstances that prevail there is
10 reason to believe that the appellant will not be able to, and its assets will be insufficient to pay
11 RMF's costs were RMF to succeed on appeal. However, it is also plain that when an appeal is
12 filed there are no *a priori* assumptions, and the question of whether to order security for costs
13 remains a matter involving the exercise of the Court's discretion.

14
15 37. In the circumstances it does seem to me that the principles governing the exercise of the
16 jurisdiction to order security for costs against a plaintiff company under the *English Company*
17 *Law* provision discussed in *Keary* provide useful guidance. Though the English section under
18 consideration is differently worded from section 74 of the *Cayman Companies Law*, it is
19 sufficiently similar for present purposes to inform the Court as to some of the considerations that
20 should enter the analysis under section 19(2) of the *Law* in the present circumstances. These
principles may be summarized as follows (see pages 539-542 of *Keary*):

1. The Court has a complete discretion whether to order security, and accordingly it will act
in light of all the relevant circumstances.



- 1 2. In considering all of the circumstances, the Court will have regard to the appellant's
2 chances of success, though it should not go into the merits in detail unless it can be
3 clearly demonstrated that there is a high degree of probability of success or failure.
4
- 5 3. The possibility or probability that the appellant will be deterred from pursuing its claim
6 by an order for security is not without more a sufficient reason for not ordering security.
7 Indeed, in relation to companies governed by the *Companies Law*, Parliament having
8 worded section 74 the way it did, it must have been envisaged that the order might be
9 made in respect of a company that would find difficulty in providing security.
10
- 11 4. In considering the application for security for costs, the Court must carry out a balancing
12 exercise. On the one hand, it must weigh the possibility of injustice to the appellant if
13 prevented from pursuing a proper appeal by an order for security. This must be placed
14 against the possibility of injustice to the respondent if no security is ordered and the
15 appeal fails and the respondent finds itself unable to recover from the appellant the costs
16 incurred in resisting the appeal. The Court will properly be concerned not to allow the
17 power to order security to be used as an instrument of oppression, such as by stifling a
18 genuine claim by an indigent company against a more prosperous company. This is
19 particularly the case when the failure to meet the claim might in itself have been a
20 material cause of the plaintiff's impecuniosity. But it will also be concerned not to be so
21 reluctant to order security that it becomes a weapon whereby the impecunious company
22 uses its inability to pay costs as a means of putting unfair pressure on the more
23 prosperous company.
24




1 5. Before the Court refuses to order security on the grounds that it would unfairly stifle a
2 valid claim, the court must be satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is probable that
3 the claim would be stifled. There may be cases where this can properly be inferred
4 without direct evidence. However, such a case is likely to be far rarer than those cases in
5 which the Court will require evidence from the appellant to make good the assertion that
6 the claim would probably be stifled by an order for security for costs. Further, the Court
7 should consider in the case of an appellant company, not only whether the company can
8 provide security out of its own resources to continue the appeal, but also whether it can
 raise the amount needed from its directors, shareholders or other backers or interested
 persons. As this is likely to be peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant
 company, it is for the appellant to satisfy the court that it would be prevented by an order
 for security from pursuing the appeal.

13
14 6. The lateness of the application for security is a circumstance which can properly
15 be taken into account, however, what weight to give it must depend upon the
16 circumstances. It is proper to take into account the fact that costs have already
17 been incurred without there being an order for security. Nevertheless, it is
18 appropriate for the Court to have regard to what costs may yet be incurred.

19
20 7. The Court in considering the amount of the security that might be ordered will
21 bear in mind that, provided it is more than simply a nominal amount, the amount
22 ordered is not bound to be substantial.

23
24 38. Guided by those principles, I start with the prospects of success of the appeal. I am satisfied,
25 particularly given that the grounds involve matters of law, including the construction of a Statute,



1 that this is not an appeal of which it can be said that there is no real prospect of success. Further,
2 it cannot be demonstrated clearly that there is either a high degree of probability of success or
3 failure. It would therefore be wrong to delve any further into the merits in order to decide whether
4 it would be just or appropriate to make an order for security for costs. I therefore move on to
5 consider other aspects of the matter.

6
7 39. I remind myself that the possibility or probability that the Appellant might be deterred from
8 pursuing its appeal is not without more necessarily a sufficient reason for not ordering security.
Indeed, when orders are made under section 74 of the *Companies Law* in so far as they are made
in circumstances where the Court has reason to believe that the company's assets will be
insufficient to satisfy the defendant's costs, it must be the case that a company that is in severe
financial straits may be exposed to such an order being made against it.



13
14 40. In terms of the timing of the application, in my view, the appeal stage is quite different from the
15 first instance stage in the sense that new considerations and factors may apply. Thus, upon
16 reflection, I do not think that the fact that RMF did not apply for security for costs in respect of
17 the proceedings below sways the matter one way or the other. It does not, in any event, make this
18 an application at a late stage. It simply means that RMF had no security for costs in the Court
19 below. That in my view ought not to count against it with regard to the making of the application
20 at the appeal stage, Round 2, so to speak.

21
22 41. In carrying out the balancing exercise, I have examined the Appellant's claim that the actions of
23 RMF may in part have contributed to the Appellant's impecuniosity. I agree with Mr. Meeson
24 that this does appear to be a circular argument. The Appellant relies on its very state of

1 impecuniosity as the reason why it makes its claim against RMF, i.e. one of the main planks of its
2 claim is that the payments it made to RMF were made at a time when the Appellant was unable to
3 pay its debts as they fell due - see paragraphs 29-30 of Ms. Fu's affidavit. Further, RMF, like
4 others put in its redemption request. Even if the Court of Appeal were to find that the funds
5 should not have been paid out to RMF, it is not immediately apparent to me that this would mean
6 that RMF even caused the payment. Without more, it would seem that it would have been, as Mr.
7 Meeson submitted, the Directors of the Appellant who would have directed the payment out. I do
8 agree with Mr. McMaster that the wording in *Keary* does not suggest that the deed or misdeed
9 needs to be as direct or serious as to be of the nature of tortious or other wrongdoing on the part
10 of the applicant. However, on the basis of the instant case as pursued thus far, and in respect of
11 the matters the subject of the appeal, it appears to me that, without more, any actions or inactions
12 of RMF fall short of the mark as being a material cause of the Appellant's impecuniosity. In any
13 event, they are not such as to constitute a factor properly weighing against RMF and its
14 application for security.



15
16 42. However, perhaps the most decisive factor in this application is the question of whether an order
17 for security for costs would stifle the Appellant's case because it is financially unable to furnish
18 security. In my view, this is not a case where the Court could properly draw such an inference
19 without direct evidence. Thus, I must scrutinize the evidence with care. I appreciate that at the
20 time that Ms. Fu swore her Affidavit, RMF had not yet abandoned a substantial aspect and
21 amount of the sum claimed for security. However, there is no evidence about the investors'
22 inability to pay security for costs, in any sum whatsoever, whether the original sum or the reduced
23 sum. Further, in their written submissions at paragraph 41, the Appellant's Attorneys make the
24 bare statement, unsupported by sufficient evidence, that even the sum of U.S.\$147,907.25 would

1 stifle the Appeal. In relation to other sources of funding, Ms. Fu has said that no funder is
2 prepared to provide funding for the Appeal Costs. She has not said that they cannot afford to
3 provide the funding. Mr. McMaster candidly conceded that there is a certain lack of evidence
4 regarding the willingness of funders or investors to provide the reduced amount of security
5 sought. However, he asked the Court to protect the Appellant against this attempt to stifle the
6 Appeal.

7
8 43. In my judgment, the Appellant has not provided sufficient information as to the identity of its
9 investors or backers. Nor has it provided sufficient evidence as to the inability, as opposed to the
10 unwillingness, of its investors to put up funds in respect of security for costs. It is not enough to
11 show that the Appellant has no ability to furnish security from its own resources. Nor is it
12 sufficient to show that investors or funders are unwilling to fund. Indeed, if they are unwilling to
13 fund that may carry negative connotations for the genuineness or merits of the Appeal.

14
15 44. As to the suggestion that RMF is deliberately attempting to stifle the appeal, I do not think that is
16 a view I could properly or lightly take. It does seem to me that it would be quite a leap for me to
17 find that that is the situation. RMF is in fact a party in whose favour a judgment has been given
18 and an order for costs made. Further, although there was a change in the nature and quantum
19 involved in the application over time, including on the eve of the hearing, I do not consider that
20 there is a sufficient evidential basis upon which I could find that there has been a deliberate
21 attempt to stifle the appeal, whether by way of an express finding or by way of the drawing of a
22 reasonable inference. I do not therefore find that this application is being made in an oppressive
23 fashion.



1 45. However, in any event, the onus is on the Appellant to satisfy the Court that a genuine appeal
2 may probably be stifled. If that is not shown, then RMF's intentions are less significant. It is for
3 the Appellant to go further than it has done and to show that its investors are unable to put up the
4 funds. The Appellant would have these matters peculiarly within its knowledge and it has failed
5 to satisfy me that it would be prevented from pursuing the appeal if I were to make an order for
6 security for costs. In my view, the reasoning on this point in *Keary, Easy Watch and Global*
7 *Fixed Income* (discussed above) is applicable to the instant case.


8
9 46. In my judgment, it would be appropriate in all of the circumstances to order security for costs.
10 The question remaining is as to the amount. I agree with Mr. McMaster that the figures quoted do
11 appear excessive. For example, the estimated number of hours of correspondence, up to and
12 including the Court of Appeal hearing, 40 hours for Mr. Meeson QC, 60 for Mr. Hobden, and 20
for Mr. Bodden, seems far from reasonable. That amounts to nearly a third of the total
US\$249,500 sought. I bear in mind that all I need order is a reasonable amount for security. The
cases demonstrate that this aspect of the exercise of the Court's discretion is not a particularly
scientific exercise. Mr. McMaster had suggested what he considered a more realistic range of
\$75,000-\$100,000.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19 47. In all of the circumstances, it seems to me that an appropriate sum for security for costs would be
20 US \$80,000.00. As regards the costs of this application itself, I have taken into account the stage
21 at which the application for the first instance costs was withdrawn and the reason for so doing.
22 As a result, I will reduce the successful party RMF's costs to 75% – see paragraph 24 of the
23 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in *Seepersad v. Persad* [2004] UKPC 19.

1 48. After consultation with Counsel as to the terms of the Order, it is hereby ordered and directed
2 that –

- 3 1. The Appellant shall provide security for costs of the appeal in the sum of US \$80,000 by
4 depositing in the Grand Court that sum (the **Security**) within 28 days of the date of this
5 Order.
6 2. The Appellant shall be at liberty to apply for any extension of time before the expiry of the
7 said 28 days.
8 3. In the absence of any application for extension of time or the provision of the Security within
9 the said 28 days, this appeal shall stand dismissed.
10 4. The Appellant shall pay 75% of the Respondent's costs of this application, to be taxed if not
11 agreed.

12
13 Dated this 29th day of May, 2015

14
15 

16 Mangatal J.
17 Judge of the Grand Court

