

1 **IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS**
2 **HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN**

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6 **Cause No. 62 of 2013**
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10 **BETWEEN:** (1) ALICE MAE COE
11 (2) ANNIE MULTON
12 (3) EZMIE SMITH
13 (4) BETTY EBANKS



14 **Plaintiffs**
15
16

17 **AND:**

18
19 (1) THE GOVERNOR OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
20
21 (2) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE CAYMAN
22 ISLANDS
23
24 (3) MINISTER FOR FINANCE, DISTRICT
25 ADMINISTRATION, WORKS, LANDS &
26 AGRICULTURE
27
28 (4) NATIONAL ROADS AUTHORITY (NRA)
29
30 (5) DART REALTY (CAYMAN) LTD.
31

32 **Defendants**
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
Appearances: **Mr. Anthony Akiwumi of Stuarts Walker Hersant
 instructed by Mr. Irvin Banks, Attorney-at-Law
 for the Plaintiffs**

**Mr. Richard Keen Q.C. instructed by Ms. Reshma Sharma
& Ms. Jenny Catran of the Attorney General’s Chambers
for the 1st to 4th Defendants**

**Lord Goldsmith Q.C. instructed by Mr. Mac Imrie
& Mr. Adam Huckle of Maples and Calder
for the 5th Defendant**

Before: **Hon. Justice Henderson**


Heard: **December 9, 10 & 11, 2013**



JUDGMENT

The claims advanced in this writ action are aimed at overturning a decision
by government to close a portion of the West Bay road. In response, the

1 defendants say the action is brought too late and amounts to an abuse of
2 process.



3
4 **Facts**

5 1. The material facts have been agreed. No witnesses were called. The four
6 plaintiffs are Caymanians who reside here. They are members of a civic
7 action group known as the Concerned Citizens Group; the first Plaintiff is
8 the Group's chairwoman. The First to Fourth Defendants are government
9 officials and entities involved in one capacity or another with the impugned
10 decision. The Fifth Defendant, Dart Realty (Cayman) Ltd. ("DRCL"), is a
11 private sector developer which has developed a number of substantial
12 projects on Grand Cayman.

13
14 2. The Cayman Islands Government ("the CIG") and DRCL have entered into
15 a broad agreement known as the "FCIA" which is intended to stimulate the
16 economy and create employment and development opportunities in the
17 Cayman Islands. The heads of terms forming the basis of the FCIA were
18 signed by the CIG and DRCL on April 12, 2011. A press conference on

1 June 15, 2011 and subsequent media reporting brought the existence of the
2 agreement to the public's attention.



3
4 3. One of the goals of the FCIA is embodied in an agreement known as the
5 "NRA Agreement" which is intended to facilitate the development of a new
6 hotel on Seven Mile Beach, an extension of the Esterley Tibbetts Highway
7 to West Bay, and other related projects. One aspect of the NRA Agreement
8 requires the closure of a section of the West Bay Road which runs along a
9 portion of Seven Mile Beach ("the Affected Road"). Most of the parcels of
10 land adjacent to the Affected Road are owned by subsidiaries of DRCL
11 although a few are owned by independent parties. The NRA Agreement
12 provides for the land underneath the Affected Road to be added to the
13 adjacent parcels.

14
15 4. The plaintiffs and the general public have been using the Affected Road for
16 over 50 years. The West Bay road (of which the Affected Road is a part)
17 was designated a public road in the Official Gazette on January 31, 1977 in
18 accordance with the *Roads Law (1974 Revision)*. For generations, the public
19 in the Cayman Islands has had access to Seven Mile Beach from various

1 places on the Affected Road. The beach has been used for fishing, bathing
2 and recreation. While driving along the Affected Road (which is
3 approximately 3,900 feet long) one can enjoy a view of the sea.
4

5 5. The NRA Agreement has been publicized in the media in over 200 pages of
6 press articles. CIG representatives and employees of DRCL have made
7 themselves available to the media for interviews on the subject. A variety of
8 documents relating to the FCIA initiative, including documents about the
9 closure of the Affected Road, have been available on the FCIA website since
10 January 10, 2012. The first and second plaintiffs appeared as guests on a
11 television show on June 27, 2011 and expressed their opposition to the
12 closure of the Affected Road. It is clear from what was said during the
13 interview that they were well informed on the proposal. Public meetings for
14 the discussion of the NRA Agreement were held on August 4 and 30, 2011.
15 The plaintiffs, CIG officials, and DRCL representatives attended.
16

17 6. The plaintiffs and the Concerned Citizens Group communicated their
18 opposition to the closure of the Affected Road to the Governor, to the
19 Premier, and to others during 2011 and 2012. On August 30, 2011 the First



1 Plaintiff advised the Governor that a petition was being prepared, to be
2 signed by persons objecting to the road closure. It was provided to the
3 Governor on December 12, 2011. There were over 4,000 signatures on the
4 petition. The First Plaintiff engaged in correspondence on the subject with
5 the Premier and with the United Kingdom Minister for the Overseas
6 Territories. Members of the Concerned Citizens Group also met with DRCL
7 representatives in 2011 to express their opposition to the development.
8

9 7. The NRA Agreement was executed by DRCL, by CIG officials and by the
10 Fourth Defendant (the National Roads Authority) on December 15, 2011.
11 The Agreement has been amended on two subsequent occasions but no party
12 has suggested that these amendments are material to the decision I have to
13 make.
14

15 8. Since the execution of the NRA Agreement, construction work has been
16 continuing. The planned extension to the Esterley Tibbetts Highway has
17 been completed; it facilitates travel between West Bay and George Town, a
18 route which used to require travel on the Affected Road. Some of the rush




1 hour traffic congestion previously experienced in West Bay has been
2 alleviated by the new highway.

3
4 9. The NRA Agreement requires that the Affected Road be closed in
5 accordance with the procedure set out in section 14 of the *Roads Law*. By
6 agreement of the parties to the NRA Agreement this is now to be done in
7 two phases, the second of which has not yet been implemented. The phase I
8 road closure occurred on March 13, 2013 by virtue of a notice in
9 Extraordinary Gazette no. 22/2013 in accordance with section 14 of the
10 *Roads Law*. The phase I closure affects approximately 1,600 feet of the
11 roadway.


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13 10. An independent review of the business case by PwC Corporate Finance &
14 Recovery (Cayman) Limited has recommended that the CIG proceed to
15 implement the NRA Agreement. The National Roads Authority itself
16 reviewed and commented on the NRA Agreement before it was signed.

17
18 11. In 2003 the Chief Surveyor prepared a report to government entitled "Beach
19 Access: 'A way forward'" which identified six beach access points running



1 across property adjacent to the Affected Road which is owned by DRCL
2 subsidiaries. Although the Chief Surveyor recommended “legal
3 recognition” under the *Roads Law* of some of these beach access points,
4 such recognition has never been extended. The current design includes a
5 network of bicycles paths and pedestrian walkways following the
6 approximate route of the Affected Road and crossing two of the beach
7 access points.
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
9 12. Included within these six beach access points are two registered twelve-foot
10 public pedestrian rights of way from the Affected Road to Seven Mile
11 Beach: one within each of the phase I and phase II areas. Under the NRA
12 Agreement, CIG has agreed to implement a statutory mechanism to allow
13 for public rights of way, including these two rights of way, to be
14 extinguished in consideration for a transfer by DRCL to CIG of land in the
15 same area of equivalent value. However, the Agreed Statement of Facts says
16 also (at para. 8.14) that these two rights of way “will be connected from the
17 beach to the public promenade” to be constructed in the approximate
18 location of the Affected Road. Overall, the plaintiffs believe that the
19 network of bicycle paths and pedestrian walkways will not compensate for



1 what they expect will be a loss of the sort of access to the Seven Mile Beach
2 area which they enjoyed previously.

3
4 13. The Cayman Islands Development Plan (1997) provides for the protection of
5 certain areas by classifying them as public open space, mangrove buffer,
6 scenic coastline or historic overlay zones. The public beach is designated as
7 public open space. Parcels adjacent to the Affected Road are classified
8 variously as tourism development, neighbourhood commercial and low
9 density residential zones. The Statement of Agreed Facts explains that
10 DRCL “consulted” with the Department of the Environment on various
11 aspects of the construction to be carried out under the NRA Agreement.
12 There is no reference in the agreed facts to any formal environmental impact
13 study.

14
15 14. DRCL has now done an extensive amount of construction work in pursuit of
16 its entitlements and in fulfilment of its obligations under the NRA
17 Agreement. A very significant amount of money has been expended by
18 DRCL on the assumption that the CIG was permitted by law to enter into the
19 NRA Agreement.





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3 **The Issues**

4 15. For the plaintiffs, Mr. Akiwumi began by saying that the claim amounts to a
5 “focused attack” on the decision made under the *Roads Law* by the CIG
6 defendants to close the Affected Road. He says that the decision taken
7 under section 14 of the *Roads Law* was unconstitutional and, in any event,
8 that all of section 14 is incompatible with the *Bill of Rights*. The
9 incompatibility becomes manifest by a consideration of sections 15, 18 and
10 19 of the Constitution.


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12 16. Mr. Akiwumi placed heavy reliance upon the case of *Shonleigh Nominees*
13 *Ltd v AG (1974) 27 P & CR 407 (HL)*. He said the *Highways Act* of 1835
14 provided for notice to the public of impending road closures in a reasonable
15 (i.e., constitutional) way. He argued that the absence of some similar
16 provision in our *Roads Law* is now, in light of the new *Bill of Rights*, a fatal
17 defect which renders the legislation incompatible with the Constitution. He
18 identified the following deficiencies in the *Roads Law*:

- 19 1) it does not provide for prior notification of a road closure to the
20 public;

- 1
2 2) it does not set out any specific process by which aggrieved members
3 of the public can challenge a road closure;
4
5 3) the only “affected persons” are the owners of adjacent land, not
6 members of the general public;
7
8 4) there is no obligation to give reasons for a decision under section 14;
9 and
10 5) there is no possibility of an appeal to the Grand Court (or elsewhere)
11 from such a decision.
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
13 17. Mr. Akiwumi made reference to the *Governor (Vesting of Lands) Law* as an
14 example of Cayman legislation which provides a framework for the
15 alienation of Crown land which is consistent with the Constitution.
16

17 18. The First to Fourth Defendants have argued that the action as presently
18 constituted amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. They say that
19 the entire claim is essentially a challenge to the CIG’s decision to agree to a
20 closure of the Affected Road. The decision was taken by the state and the
21 challenge to it is grounded upon an assertion of rights which are essentially
22 public in nature.
23



1 19. The defendants also say that the action has not been commenced within the
2 permitted time period for challenges to governmental decisions. I note that
3 Quin, J. in *Ackermon v. Government of the Cayman Islands and the National*
4 *Roads Authority (unreported) April 24, 2013* determined from the evidence
5 before him that an application for leave to apply for judicial review of this
6 same road closure decision initiated on March 11, 2013 was in violation of
7 the 90-day time limitation for judicial review found in the Grand Court
8 Rules.

9
10 20. This action was commenced on February 25, 2013. The closure of the
11 Affected Road was announced in the Official Gazette on March 13, 2013.
12 The plaintiffs say that is the date upon which the decision to close the road
13 took effect. The time within which that decision may be challenged started
14 to run on March 13, 2013. Section 26(4) of the Constitution provides that
15 constitutional claims under section 26(1) must be commenced within one
16 year of “the decision or act that is claimed to breach the *Bill of Rights*.” The
17 plaintiffs say that while the decision to close the road may have been the
18 subject of governmental deliberation more than one year prior to the date
19 upon which this action was commenced, the actual decision to close the road




1 was taken less than one year before the writ was filed. Indeed, if Mr.
2 Akiwumi is correct, the action was commenced before the impugned
3 decision became final. The Amended Statement of Claim refers to the road
4 “to be closed”.

6 **The Principle of Exclusivity**

7 21. The action has been commenced by writ of summons. The Prayer for
8 Relief (“the Prayer”) asks for:

- 9 (a) *A declaration that the Plaintiffs together with the people*
10 *of the Cayman Islands enjoy a common law prescriptive*
11 *right of way and right of passage over the Road and its*
12 *beach access points by way of dedication by grant to the*
13 *people of the Cayman Islands, and/or by the doctrine of*
14 *Lost Modern Grant.*
- 15
- 16 (b) *A declaration that the Plaintiffs and the people of the*
Cayman Islands enjoy a prescriptive easement i.e. a right
of way and/or right of passage over the Road to be closed
either by (i) virtue of the Prescription Law (1997
Revision), (ii) unregistered equitable easement under
Section 70 (a) and (f) of the Registered Land Law (2004
Revision).
- 22
- 23
- 24 (c) *A declaration that the Agreement between Cabinet*
25 *(represented by the Third Defendant), DRCL and the*
26 *Fourth Defendant as described above in the body of the*
27 *claim which calls for the closure and Disposition of the*
28 *Road to DRCL is ultra vires and void under sections 19*
29 *and 24 of the Constitution for the statutory and*
30 *constitutional reasons given above in the body of the*



1 claim, namely *inter alia* the illegal fettering of the
2 Agreement by the Fourth Defendant and the non-
3 adherence to the Crown Lands Law and PMF Law by the
4 Governor in Cabinet and Third Defendant;
5

6 (d) A declaration that the First Defendant and/or Governor
7 in Cabinet has acted in breach of sections 18, 19 and 31
8 of the Constitution, and the Third and Fourth Defendant
9 [sic] has acted in breach of Section 19 of the
10 Constitution as defined above in the body of the claim;
11

12 (e) A declaration under Section 23 and 25 Cayman Islands
13 Constitution Order 2009 that Section 10(3)(a)(b) of the
14 Governor (Vesting of Lands) Law (2005 Revision) is
15 incompatible with Sections 18, 19 and 24 as it ignores
16 the importance of transparency and fiscal responsibility
17 in the disposing of Crown Land and the interests of good
18 governance. Likewise a declaration that the requirements
19 of Section 14 Roads Law as currently drafted is also
20 incompatible with the Constitution as defined in sections
21 23 and 25 of the Constitution.
22

23 (f) A declaration that any disposition of Crown Land to
24 DRCL under the Agreement by way of the Governor in
25 Cabinet approving the transfer under Section 9 of the
Governor (Vesting of Lands) Law (2005 Revision) is void
if in fact the requirements of Sections 10 (1) and (2) and
(3) of that law are not followed, and that any disposition
sought under the Roads Law Section 14 is likewise void
unless the requirements of Section 10(1) and (2) are
followed;
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33 (g) A declaration that the Second Defendant reaffirm
34 publicly his support for the legality of the Independent
35 Report and by extension, the Agreement, as soon as
36 possible;
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
38 [and certain other relief not material here].



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
22. The claims advanced in this action are public law claims seeking the enforcement of public rights. The allegation that the plaintiffs “together with the people of the Cayman Islands” enjoy a common law prescriptive right of way and right of passage over the Affected Road, the argument that the road closure is *ultra vires*, the argument that it is in breach of various sections of the Constitution, and the argument that any disposition of the Affected Road is void all give rise to considerations which are essentially public not private.

23. There is a possible exception in paragraph (b) of the Prayer which seeks a declaration that the plaintiffs enjoy a prescriptive easement or an unregistered equitable easement over the affected road. An easement is a private law interest in property and thus would be the appropriate subject of a writ action but there is no evidence before me directed at proving the essential elements of an easement. None of the plaintiffs is alleged to be the owner of an interest in land adjacent to the Affected Road or even near to it. They cannot, therefore, claim to be the owners of an easement. To establish such a claim they would need to plead and prove ownership of a dominant




1 tenement and demonstrate that the easement “accommodates and serves” it
2 and is “reasonably necessary for the better enjoyment” of it: *In Re*
3 *Ellenborough Park* [1956] 1 Ch131, 170 (CA). Megarry and Wade, in *The*
4 *Law of Real Property*, 8th Edition, at para. 27-009 say that “The servient
5 tenement must be close enough to the dominant tenement to confer a
6 practical benefit on it”. The evidence does not begin to address these
7 requirements. In any event, paragraph (b) of the Prayer is really aimed at
8 establishing a public law right because it seeks a declaration that “the
9 Plaintiffs and the people of the Cayman Islands” enjoy the alleged easement.

10
11 24. The result is that this writ action seeking to overturn a government decision
12 and establish a public law right is, at least arguably, improperly founded.
13 Such claims are best brought under the provisions of Order 53 of the *Grand*
14 *Court Rules* as a judicial review of administrative action. The First to
15 Fourth Defendants have argued that the claim should be struck out for just
16 this reason. They point out that the Court has jurisdiction to strike a claim
17 even after a trial (see *Summers v Fairclough Homes Ltd.* [2012] 1 WLR
18 2004 (*Supreme Court*)), and that the so called “exclusivity principle” set out
19 in *O’Reilly v Mackman* [1983] 2 AC 237 and confirmed in subsequent



1 decisions supports their contention. In essence, the principle of exclusivity
2 requires that challenges to governmental acts and decisions be advanced by
3 way of judicial review; to pursue such a claim in a writ action is tantamount
4 to an abuse of process. For further elaboration of this principle, see *Trim v*
5 *North Dorset District Council* [2010] EWCA Civ 446; *Clark v University of*
6 *Lincolnshire* [2000] 1 WLR 1988; *Bahamas Telecommunications Company*
7 *Ltd. v Public Utilities Commission* [2008] UKPC 10; and *Stancliffe Stone*
8 *Co. Ltd. v Peak District National Park Authority* [2005] EWCA Civ 747
9 (CA).

10
11 25. I am satisfied that the principle of exclusivity is part of the legal system in
12 the Cayman Islands. It is open to this Court to view a writ action which
13 challenges the validity of a governmental act or decision and does not assert
14 any private law right, or in which the assertion of a private law right is a
15 transparent fiction adopted for the sole purpose of avoiding the judicial
16 review process, as an abuse of the process of the Court. However, the force
17 of the exclusivity principle has been somewhat eroded by the adoption of
18 our new Constitution and the catalogue of rights found within it. Section
19 26(1) of the Constitution enlarges the jurisdiction of this Court as it permits



1 applications to the Grand Court where it is claimed that a governmental act
2 or decision has breached a personal right or freedom.

3
4 26. Where the act or decision complained of is capable of grounding a claim
5 (including an application for judicial review) under the law of the Cayman
6 Islands as it was before the *Bill of Rights* took effect, the claim should
7 ordinarily be advanced in the traditional manner. Nevertheless, there has
8 now been some relaxation of the exclusivity principle (as is illustrated by the
9 authorities mentioned below) and the fact that a writ action invokes
10 constitutional protections and seeks to challenge a governmental act or
11 decision will not necessarily or automatically mean that the action must be
12 brought by way of judicial review. The law is in an undeveloped state at
13 present. It is clear that some constitutional claims can be brought by a writ
14 action in the ordinary way but this should not be permitted to become a
15 “general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial control of
16 administrative action”: *Harrikisson v Attorney General of Trinidad and*
17 *Tobago [1980] AC 265 (PC)*; also see *D et al. v Home Office [2005] EWCA*
18 *Civ 38 (CA)*. Just where the line should be drawn is unclear; some guidance




1 has been provided in *Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop*
2 [2005] UKPC 15 where the Privy Council said (at 25):

3 “... where there is a parallel remedy, constitutional relief
4 should not be sought unless the circumstances of which
5 complaint is made include some feature which makes it
6 appropriated to take that course. As a general rule there must
7 be some feature which, at least arguably, indicates that the
8 means of legal redress otherwise available would not be
9 adequate. To seek constitutional relief in the absence of such a
10 feature would be a misuse, or abuse, of the court’s process. A
11 typical, but by no means exclusive, example of a special feature
12 would be a case where there has been an arbitrary use of state
13 power.”
14


15 **The Limitation Period**

16 27. The debate before me really centers on the question of the limitation period
17 for challenging the decision to close the Affected Road. Our rules for
18 judicial review, like those in the United Kingdom, specify that any challenge
19 to a decision must be brought within three months: *Grand Court Rules O. 53*
20 *r. 4(1)*. Claims advanced under section 26(1) of the Constitution enjoy a
21 significantly more liberal time limitation as they must be commenced within
22 one year of the decision or act complained of: Constitution, section 26(4).
23 Under both the judicial review rules and the Constitution, the Court has
24 jurisdiction to extend time if that would be in the interests of justice.



1 28. I need not come to a settled conclusion as to whether the action as presently
2 constituted amounts to an abuse of process because it violates the exclusivity
3 principle. I am satisfied that whether it does or not this challenge to the
4 decision to close the Affected Road is brought too late to be considered on
5 its merits.

6
7 29. The action was commenced on February 25, 2013. Even assuming that it is
8 properly brought as a constitutional action under section 26(1) rather than in
9 the form of a judicial review, the Court is permitted to consider only
10 governmental decisions made on or after February 26, 2012. While the
11 publication of the notice in the Official Gazette on March 13, 2013 may
12 constitute in law and in fact the closure of the road, that is not the date on
13 which the decision to close it was taken. I agree with Mr. Akiwumi's
14 argument that the taking of this decision was to some extent a continuous
15 process which commenced around the time the heads of terms were executed
16 in April, 2011 and continued through various discussions, public
17 consultations, and studies throughout the latter part of 2011. I cannot accept
18 his contention that the decision was made only when the notice in the
19 Gazette was published. At the very latest, the impugned decision had been




1 taken by the time the NRA Agreement was executed on December 15, 2011.

2 It is clear from the agreed facts that the plaintiffs would have known that the
3 decision had been made within hours of the NRA Agreement being signed.

4 The NRA Agreement contains a commitment by government to close the
5 Affected Road. Publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is notice to
6 the world of the road closure. Had the intention to close the road been kept
7 secret until March 13, 2013 the publication in the Gazette would be of
8 considerable significance as it would provide the starting point for the
9 limitation period calculation. Given the widespread publicity about the
10 intended road closure throughout 2011, the Gazette notice in this case
11 amounts to nothing more than compliance with a necessary legal formality
12 (publication is required by section 14(1) of the *Roads Law(2005 Revision)*).

13 I am satisfied that the decision to close the road and thus the real gravamen
14 of this case occurred at the latest on December 15, 2011. The decision may
15 have been taken earlier.

16
17 30. The plaintiffs have not asked for any extension of time under section 26(4)
18 of the Constitution. I am satisfied that this is for good reason: any such
19 request would fail. The plaintiffs have always been well informed about the




1 proposed road closure and can be taken to have possessed all the information
2 necessary to advance the present claim a few days after December 15, 2011
3 at the latest. There is nothing before me which justifies or even explains the
4 14-month delay before this action was started.

5
6 31. For these reasons, I find that the claim, insofar as it is a challenge to the
7 decision to close the Affected Road, is barred by the limitation period in
8 section 26(4) of the Constitution and must be dismissed.

9
10 **Declaration of Incompatibility**

11 32. In addition to the attack on the decision to close the Affected Road, the
12 plaintiffs have sought to argue that the *Roads Law* is incompatible with their
13 constitutional rights. The argument (referred to in paragraph (e) of the
14 Prayer) that s. 10(3)(a)(b) of the *Governor (Vesting of Lands) Law (2005*
15 *Revision)* is incompatible with the Constitution was abandoned during the
16 hearing.

17
18 33. A declaration of incompatibility is made under section 23(1) of the
19 Constitution but that section does not confer a free-standing cause of action.



1 It is only within the confines of a claim under section 26(1) of the
2 Constitution – that is, an assertion by a claimant that “government has
3 breached or threatened his or her rights and freedoms” – that a question of
4 compatibility may be considered and a declaration made. As a consequence,
5 this challenge to the compatibility of the *Roads Law* falls away and must
6 also be dismissed in light of the conclusion I have reached above.

7
8 Dated this 17th day of February, 2014

9
10 *Henderson, J.*

11 Henderson, J.
12 Judge of the Grand Court
13

